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ERNEST JACKH

ERNEST JACKH, founder and president of both the famous Hochschule für Politik in Berlin and the German League of Nations Union, has been a British subject since 1933 and is now conducting at Columbia University a seminar on Near Eastern and Middle Eastern problems. In 1908, the year of the Young Turks' revolt, he made the first of many trips to Turkey and the Balkans, and for many years thereafter his association with such leaders of the new government as Mustafa Kemal (later Atatürk) and İsmet İnönü, was close and sympathetic. His various political and diplomatic missions gave him the inside story about many secret negotiations, here revealed for the first time. Their importance and authenticity have been acknowledged by American, British and German authorities, as well as by his Turkish friends themselves.

The Rising Crescent

TURKEY YESTERDAY, TODAY, AND
TOMORROW

BY ERNEST JACKH
Author of "The War for Man's Soul"

Illustrated with Photographs



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*In Gratitude
for a Lifelong Friendship
with the Turkish people
whose perseverance and creative quality
have realized the author's early vision of*

THE RISING CRESCENT

THE AUTHOR expresses his gratitude to President Nicholas Murray Butler and the Trustees of Columbia University for appointing him Professor of Public Law with a seat in the Faculty of Political Science, in 1940; to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, for arranging with Columbia University for a seminar on world politics, particularly in the Near and Middle East; and to Dr. Stephen Duggan, the Director of the Institute of International Education, for enabling him to co-operate with higher education in the United States.

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PART ONE

THREE TURKEYS—ONE PEOPLE

1

THE THREE CRESCENTS

TURKEY IS A NEW STATE AND AN OLD NATION. MODERN TURKEY came into existence in 1923 when Ataturk founded the republic that replaced the ancient Ottoman Empire. Before that date "Turkey" was a common misnomer. The change of name signifies as much as the change from Russian Empire of the Romanovs to Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. In fact, it represents as profound a change—though basically of a different character—as that from German Empire of the Hohenzollerns to Third Reich of Adolf Hitler. Significantly, however, the insignia of Ottoman Empire and Turkish Republic remained the same. For centuries, a crescent has flown above the imperial or the presidential palace.

Three times in history the crescent has risen over Constantinople, the metropolis whose historic role has been equaled only by that of the eternal city of Rome. Each time marked a vital development in the character of the city of the Golden Horn and the empire of which it was the center.

It was in 1453, at the very beginning of the modern European era, that Sultan Mehmet II, the powerful head of the Ottoman dynasty of the Turkish people, stormed the city named after Constantine the Great. This was the crowning act in two centuries of piecemeal conquest of the Byzantine Empire in western Asia Minor and southeastern Europe by the Ottoman Turks. The name of the city was changed to Istanbul—*the town to which one goes*. It became the center of Ottoman rule and its Byzantine emblem of the crescent was adopted as the insignia of the Turkish Ottoman's imperial house and empire. In the course of the ensuing two centuries the Ottoman crescent was carried forward by the Turkish soldier over three continents. It conquered many races and creeds. It advanced into Middle Europe as far as the walls of Vienna and the gates of Venice. It ad-

vanced into Middle Asia as far as the Garden of Eden and reached the Indian ocean, and it moved across North Africa so that the empire expanded to the Atlantic and its size equaled that of the U.S.A. of today.

In 1908, an imperial Ottoman army marched against Constantinople for a second time. Then the rising crescent of the Young Turks' revolution took over the Ottoman palace and the capital in order to save the Ottoman Empire from further disintegration which had gone on for two centuries, reducing it on the three continents to about a third of the size of the U.S. The Young Turkish reformers, however, did not intend to depose the emperor but intended rather to defend the empire by breaking the corrupt power of the palace. In fact, it was only after the sultan-caliph, Abdul Hamid, attempted to betray the democratic constitution imposed upon him by the Young Turkish Committee that they forced his abdication. Even then, they sustained the imperial Ottoman dynasty. At the end of the Young Turkish Ottoman decade and as a result of continuous defensive warfare in Europe, Africa and Asia, and finally as a result of the world war, the Ottoman Empire was confined by a dictated peace to a territory comparable to the state of Kansas and nearly as land-locked within the Turkish peninsula as Kansas is in the center of the U.S.A.

In the third march on Constantinople it was the crescent of Turkey herself that rose over Constantinople. This time, the Turkish nation was led by a Turkish genius of creative statesmanship and military strategy. Mustafa Kemal was an imperial Osmanli up to 1908, a Young Turkish Osmanli from then until 1918, and, finally, as Ataturk, he became first president of the Turkish Republic, holding the office until his death in 1938. It was he who by the Turkish war of independence and by a negotiated peace succeeded in recreating the Turkish nation within the historic and national boundaries of a Turkish state. The present Turkish Republic extends over the peninsula of Anatolia. It is four times as large as the Ottoman state which the defeated Ottoman imperial dynasty had accepted from the Allies—in fact, almost as large as Texas and Louisiana combined—and once more borders the Mediterranean and controls the Straits.

The standard-bearer of the three crescents has always been the Turkish peasant-soldier from his homeland of Anatolia, the land of the rising star. Atatürk once accurately described his Turks as "a nation long-suffering but full of vitality and capable of every kind of sacrifice . . . endowed with fortitude of mind and intrepidity of spirit." No people on earth are more valorous and loyal. No people have been more maligned by the nations of the Western world.

I was privileged to live in and to observe these three Turkeys. I witnessed the last weeks of the old decaying Ottoman Empire when I first arrived in Smyrna and Constantinople in 1908. I visited the Young Turks' Ottoman Empire annually on missions for the German government during the next decade, traveling from Salonika to Baghdad, and from Albania to Arabia. Finally, after my emigration from Berlin to London when the Hitlerites came into power, I went on several missions to Turkey for the British government in the years 1937 to 1940, visiting Ankara and Anatolia.

This brief background of personal experience may explain and partly excuse some of the autobiographical and documentary character of a record that is set down by a lifelong friend of the Turkish people. That does not mean that the author has accepted any Turkish opinion at face value, or sets forth any official Turkish point of view. His conviction, and the conclusions arrived at, are based on lifelong experiences and independent studies. He is quite aware that he is challenging some prevailing theses.

My interest in Turkey developed during that first visit to Smyrna and Constantinople. The Young Turks' revolution in that year threw a sudden light on the essentially human qualities of the people and their leaders—Kemal among them. Their determined stand against the despotism of the "bloody sultan" was so controlled and dominated by reason that it has come to be known as the "bloodless revolution," or the "revolution of the gentlemen." I had no particular predisposition in favor of the Turks. Neither did I have a violent Western prejudice. But my long experience with them, my close association with many Turkish families, some of high rank, and some belonging to the common people, has revealed to me that the true nature of the Turkish people is thoroughly different from that suggested by the popular slogans. It is out of a sense of duty, of chivalry towards

an oppressed nation, and as tribute to a very long friendship that I am presenting my discovery of and faith in the "Rising Crescent."¹

By understanding another people's soul one enriches one's own soul. But it is only by loving a people that one really comes to understand them. I was blessed with such a love when, as a young democratic German, I first went to Turkey in 1908. Then and there I was honored by the friendship of the German ambassador, my Swabian fellow citizen from Wuerttemberg, von Kiderlen-Waechter, who was to become foreign minister in Berlin, to make me what he called "free-lance ambassador"² and to bequeath his intimate papers to me.³

Twenty-five years later I returned to my first love as a free citizen of the British Commonwealth of Nations, on missions for the British Foreign Office, which finally appointed me head of the South East-ern Division of the Ministry of Information.

It all began with a casual Mediterranean cruise. On that cruise the vacationist acquired a vocation—the vocation of interpreting an ancient but still unknown people to the wider community of nations in which they are bound to play a more and more significant part. What began as an accidental interest has evolved into some kind of destiny.

¹ The title of the author's first book on Turkey, in 1909, *Der Aufsteigende Halbmond*, as opposed to another European book, *The Declining Crescent*, jointly published by an Italian and a French author, in 1908.

² See page 261.

³ E. Jackh, *Kiderlen-Waechter* (two vols.), 1924; *Kiderlen-Waechter intime d'après ses notes et correspondance*, 1924, Paris, Payot.

2

A TREATY THAT MADE HISTORY

THIS CHAPTER WILL TELL THE STORY OF THE TREATY WHICH DESTROYED four empires, liberated two nations, and created thirteen states. It is largely made up of a series of telegrams exchanged between Constantinople and Berlin in the weeks immediately preceding the outbreak of the war of 1914 to 1918. These telegrams have not been published before. Their content is so little known that Trotsky, as he states in his memoirs, could find no trace of them in 1917 when he searched thoroughly the archives of the Russian Foreign Office for this secret treaty. They show the importance of Turkey's position in World War I. They throw important light on Turkey's critical and strategic position today as World War II moves into the final phases of the European conflict. In a sense, they give relevance to much of the historical and geopolitical analysis of Turkey's significance which will be taken up in the later pages of this book.

What must be recognized, if it is not generally recognized now, is that Turkey's armed neutrality in this war has already served to maintain the stand of the British, American, and Russian armies in the Middle East and the Caucasus. If Adolf Hitler's armies, following the unbroken series of victories in western Europe and the Balkans, had been able to march on from subjugated Bulgaria and from occupied Greece into adjacent Turkey, they would then have been in a position to move eastward and open Russia's and Iran's backdoors to the Caucasus and to the Mosul oil wells. Or they would have been able to roll southeastward and pour down into Iraq and Syria, Palestine and Arabia, sweep on to Suez and Egypt and the gates of the Eastern Hemisphere and cut the American-British-Russian sea-and-land junction between the Persian Gulf and the

Red Sea, the strategic center of the struggle for the world. Then they would have been able to join the Japanese ally in the Indian Ocean, and by this junction put a chain around the world.

Today this sounds a fantastic "if." Not so very long ago, this disastrous series of events actually threatened. Had it taken place, it is most unlikely that any British-American offensive and victory in North Africa would have been possible and the invasion of south Europe would have had to be postponed indefinitely. For all the British and American forces now in Sicily and Italy would have been needed to defend and hold that indispensable lifeline, the vital jugular vein between the American-British ocean, the Middle East and Russia. It was not without significance that Winston Churchill's airplane carries on it the Turkish crescent as well as the Russian hammer and sickle.

Turkey's Maritza line has protected the British-American-Russian bridge between Suez and Baghdad from the east just as Montgomery's Eighth Army's stand at El Alamein protects it from the west.

Credit for Turkey's position in this war must go to Ataturk, who for four terms was president of the Turkish Republic. It is among the ironies of history that during the Great War Ataturk had been a prominent Turkish officer acting on the German side, whose army had defeated the British forces which on Winston Churchill's advice had tried to force the Dardanelles. And yet Ataturk, more than anyone else, prepared the way for the friendly conference between his successor, Inonu, and Prime Minister Churchill and President Roosevelt in Cairo in the early days of December, 1943. It was he who prepared Turkey for the significant role she was to play in this war against the Axis.

The position of Turkey today has been determined by the series of events which caused her to emerge as a prodemocratic and peace-loving power and caused Germany to succumb to the aggressive and antidemocratic totalitarianism of Hitler. It is again ironical that one of Ataturk's comrades-in-arms in the Palestine campaign in the Great War was Colonel Franz von Papen who much later was to become Hitler's ambassador to Turkey.

The action that was probably most responsible for the start of the great Middle Eastern upheaval of 1914 was the secret treaty

which formed the alliance between Germany, Austria, and the Ottoman Empire; it was signed August 2, 1914, the day before the formal outbreak of hostilities between the Allies and the Central Powers.

The prime aim of this alliance was to defeat the common enemy, Czarist Russia. This was achieved by Mustafa Kemal's outstanding success in defending the Dardanelles against the attack by Russia's western allies. This victory isolated and choked landlocked Russia and eventually caused the overthrow of Czarist absolutism by the Bolshevik Revolution which led in time to Joseph Stalin's Russian nation of today.

Another aim of the secret treaty was to defend the Ottoman Empire against the common enemies, the powers of the Triple Entente, who themselves had secret treaties partitioning Ottoman Turkey—assigning Constantinople and northwest Anatolia to Russia, southwest Anatolia to Italy, and restricting the Ottoman torso to a landlocked area in the interior of the Middle East.

It is, of course, impossible to speculate with any degree of accuracy on what would have happened if the Allied plans for Turkey had worked out as intended, if Czarist Russia had been sustained so that the revolution was nipped in the bud (as the wars of intervention aimed to do when it was too late). If Czarist Russia and Imperialist Italy had been in control of the Turkish peninsula when a Hitlerite Germany arose and Hitler had begun his *Drang nach Osten*—who would dare say that the Czarist, Italian and partitioned Turkish armies would have put up the resistance of the Red Army and the modern Turkish Republic?

The rebirth of both the Russian and the Turkish nations dates from the destruction of the two anachronistic empires which began with the signing of the secret treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Central Powers, dated August 2, 1914. This treaty was the death warrant for four imperial dynasties and the birth certificate for thirteen succession states which saw the light of day after the war—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria-Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, and the two Arabias. The climax of the military strategy prompted by that treaty was Atatürk's victory in the Dardanelles. Concerning that victory the Australian official war record states: "Seldom in history

can the exertions of a single divisional commander have exercised so profound an influence not only on the course of a battle, but perhaps on the fate of a campaign and even the destiny of a nation." Today we might add "the destiny, not of one nation but of two, and beyond that, the destiny of the world."

As was suggested at the beginning of this chapter, even after some thirty years the steps leading to the signing of this treaty are of great interest and illustrate the geopolitical importance of Turkey in the scheme of world power politics. The story is told in the series of telegrams herewith made public for the first time.¹ One surprising fact revealed by this exchange is that the treaty was negotiated not on German but on Ottoman instigation. (See the German ambassador's telegram to the German Foreign Office of July 22, 1914.)

THE GERMAN FOREIGN MINISTER TO THE GERMAN AMBASSADORS IN VIENNA AND CONSTANTINOPLE

Berlin, July 14, 1914

Count Szögény [Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Berlin] read me note from Count Berchtold in which the latter asked Margrave Pallavicini [Austrian ambassador to Constantinople] his opinion on whether Turkey could be won over to the Central Powers. The ambassador expressed himself approximately as follows: It cannot be denied Constantinople at present has certain inclination toward Russia, and that this tendency is strengthened by growing mistrust of Italy because of Turkish suspicions toward Italian aspirations in Asia Minor. Furthermore, Russia and France are hard at work in Constantinople. Turkey would prefer to seek closer ties with Austria and Triple Alliance [Germany, Austria, Italy] if the monarchy could again secure decisive position in Balkans through vigorous and successful action against Serbia. Consequently, Count Berchtold instructed Count Széchenyi to obtain my views on whether it does not seem indicated that Turkey could be moved to join Central Powers immediately.

I answered that in my opinion, likewise shared by ambassador in Constantinople, Turkey could be regarded only as passive factor for next few years because of her unfavorable army situation. She would not be

¹ This applies to all the telegrams, letters and reports, used in this book. The original German text of the documentary material, which is in the author's possession, has been translated by Mr. Lewis F. Gittler, co-editor of *German Psychological Warfare*.

capable of aggressive action against Russia. Moreover, she would undoubtedly place her own demands on us if we were to propose union to her. For instance, we could never guarantee Turkey absolute protection against Russian attacks on Armenia.

I was of opinion Turkey in her present situation could assume no other position than that of swinging like a pendulum between the powers, eventually joining the stronger and more successful group. If Rumania stands firmly beside Triple Alliance and if Bulgaria too were to seek alliance with our group, then undoubtedly this would influence Turkey's attitude. It seems useless, if not risky, to make a *démarche* now in Constantinople patterned after Count Berchtold's suggestions, because of inevitable demands, incapable of fulfillment, for counterperformance on our part.

JAGOW

GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Constantinople, July 18, 1914

Austria's *démarche* in Belgrade, announced but repeatedly postponed, is already being spoken of here as a matter not to be taken seriously. Triple Entente [France, Russia, Britain] circles particularly are firmly convinced Serbia will accept all of Austria's paper demands, and that then everything will remain as of before. Pallavicini is indeed conscious of importance of the moment for future of Triple Alliance, but seems to doubt himself Vienna will make any strong decisions. He expects Austria to be saved less from vigorous acts of his government than from negotiation of new alliances and wishes, therefore, to induce Turkey to join Austria through Bulgaria.

I vigorously oppose this kind of thinking. Without doubt, Turkey today is totally incapable of carrying out an alliance. She would only place burdens on her allies, without being able to offer them any advantages in return. By allying herself with Bulgaria, Turkey would directly provoke Russian counterstroke in Armenia. Triple Alliance policy must therefore consist of building up relations with Turkey in such a way that, if Turkey should really become a power factor after several years, then our bonds with her would not be cut. For the present, Turkey can only be advised to remain aloof from any political adventure and maintain good relations with all countries. Even a neutral Turkey will always keep several Russian army corps firmly rooted on Armenian frontiers.

WANGENHEIM

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Constantinople, July 21, 1914

Grand Vizier Talaat and Enver Pasha informed my Austrian colleague yesterday that now is the last opportunity for Austria to settle the political loss she suffered in the Balkan war and thus again restore her prestige as a great power in eyes of Turkey and Balkan peoples. Not only Bulgaria, but also Rumania and Turkey would place themselves without hesitation on side of Triple Alliance if Austria were to teach Serbia an unmistakable lesson. Turkey, against her better judgment, is about to sign pact with Greece at wish of Germany and Rumania. But this alliance will not materialize if Austria links Bulgaria to herself by vigorous action.

From talks with Turkish ministers, Margrave Pallavicini received impression that Triple Entente, namely, Russia, is working at present for a Greek-Turkish alliance.

WANGENHEIM

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Constantinople, July 22, 1914

Enver Pasha informed me I had explained to Grand Vizier that Turkey should not enter into any alliances until completion of her military and administrative reorganization. Theoretically, he says, my interpretation is completely correct. In practice, however, Turkey's difficulty is that she can only reorganize with internal calm and thoroughness if she is protected externally from attack. For this, she needs support of one of groups of great powers. A small minority in the committee is in favor of alliance with France and Russia because this would guarantee Turkey's security to extent states adhering to Triple Alliance in Mediterranean are the weaker group. Majority of the committee, headed by the Grand Vizier, Talaat, Halil, and Enver Pasha himself, did not wish, on contrary, to become vassals of Russia and are convinced Triple Alliance is militarily stronger than Entente and would win in event of world war.

Enver Pasha could therefore say that present Turkish government urgently desires to join Triple Alliance, and only if she were rejected by us would she decide, with a heavy heart, in favor of pact with Triple Entente.

The cabinet realizes very well, Enver continues, that Turkey at present is not capable of carrying out an alliance with the great powers. There-

fore, she demands merely the protection of group of powers concerned for any alliance she may herself conclude with a smaller state. At present, Turkey has two possibilities for secondary alliances—with Greece, which leads over to Triple Entente, and alliance with Bulgaria, which steers toward Triple Alliance. The cabinet is therefore inclined to ally herself with Bulgaria on condition Triple Alliance, or at least one of Triple Alliance powers, will sponsor such a pact. All details of an alliance with Bulgaria are already agreed upon, but have not yet been signed because Bulgaria is not able to decide in favor of such a pact without sponsorship of Triple Alliance.

By now, as result of Austrian-Serbian crisis, situation has become critical. The Grand Vizier, Enver says, will negotiate with Venizelos concerning an alliance. Refusal of Greek proposals will be easier for him if prospect exists for Turkey and Bulgaria to enter as a bloc into Triple Alliance in a similar relationship as Rumania did earlier with Austria. At outbreak of war in Balkans, the Sublime Porte could not wait. Mutual military preparations must be taken immediately.

I answered Enver that he had not convinced me of necessity for Turkey to have allies. Certainly Turkey's economic recovery will be put in question as result of an alliance. Would Russia and France sign the Accords, once Turkey enters the Triple Alliance?

Political implications are even more difficult. As a member of Triple Alliance, Turkey will have to reckon on open hostility of Russia. The Turkish frontier will then be weakest point of Triple Alliance's strategical arrangement and become logical point of Russian attack. The governments of the Triple Alliance would conceivably hesitate to burden themselves with obligations for which Turkey today can offer no corresponding counterperformance. Even Turkey and Bulgaria as a bloc are hardly capable of carrying out an alliance with Triple Alliance. It would be different if the bloc also included Rumania, for which, however, little prospect exists at present.

Enver Pasha listened attentively, but repeatedly emphasized that if Triple Alliance were to prevent the Bulgarian-Turkish pact, the Triple Entente's friends in the committee would come out on top.

Turkey may next attempt to persuade Bulgaria into concluding an alliance without sanction of Triple Alliance. If Bulgaria is drawn into Austro-Serbian conflict, then it is almost certain Turkey will not remain neutral, but will attempt to penetrate Greece through West Thrace.

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Therapia, July 23, 1914

Margrave Pallavicini was charged by his government to warn Grand Vizier against conclusion of an alliance with Greece. Such an agreement, Pallavicini said, would put Turkey into an awkward position, considering the imminent change of Austria's relations with Bulgaria.

The Grand Vizier declared with greatest certainty to my Austrian colleague that he would not agree upon any pact with Herr Venizelos, and that in event of war, Austria could depend on Turkey with same security as with Bulgaria. Rumania, too, would again turn toward Triple Alliance if Austria took strong action. Finally, the Grand Vizier repeated the desire expressed to me yesterday by Enver Pasha—Turkey desires her formal entry into Triple Alliance to be made possible. Pallavicini, who had spoken to me about the question in meantime, replied that an alliance with Turkey pro tem still places too great a burden on Triple Alliance. The Triple Alliance cannot protect Turkey against all opponents.

The Grand Vizier answered that Turkey demands exclusive protection against Russia on part of Triple Alliance, but not against France and England.

WANGENHEIM

KAISER'S PERSONAL MINISTER TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Balestrand, aboard *Hohenzollern* [Norway], July 24, 1914

His Majesty the King and Kaiser considers Freiherr von Wangenheim's statements theoretically correct, but is of opinion that at present moment Turkey's inclination toward Triple Alliance must be taken advantage of on grounds of opportunism.

Therefore, if Stamboul definitely wishes to conclude alliance "under sponsorship of Triple Alliance or by one of powers of same," then she should certainly attempt to bring Rumania and Bulgaria together, and place herself at Austria's disposal. Wangenheim should use his influence toward this end in Constantinople.

WEDEL

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Therapia, July 25, 1914

Herr von Giers [Russian ambassador], whom I met in Grand Vizier's anteroom, told me that Austria's demands on Serbia, although

not just, are certainly understandable with exception of demand providing for Austrian investigation officials in Serbia. This demand signifies encroachment on Serbia's sovereignty. Situation, therefore, is serious, von Giers said. My colleague's language was calm and concealed no threats. Later, he spoke briefly with the Grand Vizier in a manner which produced, above all, definite impression Russia would not intervene.

WANGENHEIM

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Therapia, July 27, 1914

Personally for the Foreign Minister

Turkish treaty proposal has materialized because, according to peremptory order, I have dropped misgivings which hitherto I expressed to Grand Vizier. Up to now, Bulgaria has approached Turkey with empty phrases only, without making any definite promises. Russia and France have not yet recovered from their bewilderment. But it can be foreseen that both will soon initiate vigorous attempts to intimidate Turkish government and refer them to pact with Greece under protection of Triple Entente.

Even if Turkey is not absolutely assured of protection against Russia on our part, Turkey still is not necessarily lost to Triple Entente, although the temptation to place herself under Russian protection will naturally loom large for Turkey.

I believe, however, that after our refusal the Bulgarians and Turks will come together in order to settle accounts with Greece at a time when Serbia has her hands full. In this way, the general déclanchement would begin.

It is in our interest to keep a finger on Bulgaria and the Young Turks as long as Austro-Serbian conflict remains localized.

If the Turkish army actually will be commanded by German officers, I must naturally readjust my opinion on whether Turkey is capable of fulfilling an alliance. Her military value would thereby be tripled. General Liman told me today that he takes full responsibility to defeat any opponent under any conditions as long as he is in command of the 5 Turkish army corps which can be put immediately into the field. A German command would also have inestimable value in fact that in event of war Turkey will then have to carry out her assumed obligations.

WANGENHEIM

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Constantinople, July 28, 1914

Grand Vizier has just summoned me and asked me to submit to his Majesty the Kaiser the following request from his sovereign: Would Germany conclude a temporary secret offensive and defensive alliance against Russia and thus render possible entry of Turkey into Triple Alliance. *Casus foederis* would become valid if Russia attacks Turkey, Germany or Austria-Hungary, or if Germany, or any member of Triple Alliance, attacks Russia. All other international questions, such as capitulations, debts, etc., should remain as before. The Turkish condition is that his Majesty the Kaiser leave the [German] military mission here in case of war. In return, Turkey would obligate itself to find some form under which Supreme Command of Turkish army and actual command of one-fourth of the army would be transferred, at outbreak of war, to the military mission.

The negotiations should be carried out in strict secrecy, even as regards Turkish ministers. Grand Vizier requested me not to say anything about this at present to any of my colleagues, labeling it as "indispensable," so much so that even Mahmud Muktar Pasha [Turkish ambassador in Berlin²] should not be informed.

WANGENHEIM

REICH CHANCELLOR TO AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE

Berlin, July 28, 1914

His Majesty agrees to Grand Vizier's proposal. The treaty should be concluded on the following basis:

1. Both powers pledge to observe strict neutrality in present conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
2. If Russia intervenes with active military steps and thus confronts Germany with the *casus foederis* toward Austria-Hungary, then *casus foederis* holds also for Turkey.
3. Germany turns over her military mission to Turkey in case of war. Turkey guarantees actual direction of [Turkish] High Command by the [German] military mission.
4. Treaty is binding for present conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia and possible international complications arising therefrom.

² See pages 114-116.

5. If this conflict does not develop into war between Germany and Russia, it is no longer in effect.

I authorize your Excellency to enter into appropriate negotiations with the Grand Vizier. Margrave Pallavicini has reported in detail to Vienna on your conversations hitherto with Grand Vizier.

To assure strictest secrecy in future, I ask you not to disclose anything at present, not even to your Austrian colleague, about your negotiations with Grand Vizier.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Therapia, July 29, 1914

Since beginning of the crisis, Margrave Pallavicini has informed me of the most secret incoming and outgoing correspondence of his embassy, even telegrams marked "decipher personally."

On the alliance question, our working together came about because the Grand Vizier, apart from his most recent attitude, always negotiated with both of us.

I do not believe an alliance can be realized without Austria's participation, since the Sublime Porte will not, under any circumstances, enter an alliance merely for duration of present crisis.

It is conceivable Russia will attack Turkey and not Austria, in which case we must declare war on Russia without the *casus foederis* holding good for Austria. Therefore, it is rather objectionable to leave Austria completely in dark from now on. Margrave Pallavicini would feel offended by my silence, particularly if he learns in other ways—perhaps through the Grand Vizier—that I am doing the negotiating here.

As soon as a working basis between the Grand Vizier and us has been found, I would request authorization to inform Pallavicini confidentially.

Negotiations will probably begin tonight.

WANGENHEIM

FOREIGN MINISTER TO AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE

Berlin, July 30, 1914

Strictly confidential communication with Pallavicini agreed to as soon as your Excellency is convinced through negotiations with Grand Vizier that Turkey consents essentially with sketched proposal of treaty.

JAGOW

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Therapia, July 30, 1914

Grand Vizier accepts articles 1 to 4, but points out article 5 is completely unacceptable. First, he says, it is impossible to fix date on which it can be assured Austro-Serbian conflict will not lead to war between Germany and Russia. War could set in as aftereffect of Austrian victory over Serbia even after 1 or 2 years. It cannot be demanded of Turkey that she commit herself currently to Germany but then be thrown on her own resources if Russia wishes to revenge herself on Turkey for her friendly attitude toward Triple Alliance.

We must also, the Grand Vizier continues, protect Turkey from possible consequences of her pact with Germany. When he spoke earlier of a treaty of short duration, it was not meant that a permanent treaty or one of long duration will be concluded. Both powers naturally must thoroughly test the treaty's value inside a brief space of time. Grand Vizier says he had thought of a 7-year duration but is prepared, if need be, to permit the treaty, with the contract given General Liman, to run until end of 1918.

It is only logical if he insists Germany guarantees Liman's activity will not be interrupted by a Russian attack, since Germany wishes to further military reforms [in Turkish Army] through General Liman's mission.

WANGENHEIM

REICH CHANCELLOR TO AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE

Berlin, July 31, 1914

Please notify Grand Vizier in return that we agree with Sublime Porte's desire for treaty duration until 1918 and are ready for immediate conclusion.

In Vienna and Rome we are advising extension of German-Turkish treaty provisions to all Triple Alliance powers.

Your Excellency is authorized to sign forthwith. It should be established beforehand, however, whether Turkey can and will undertake worth-while action against Russia. In case of negative answer, alliance would, of course, be worthless and should not be signed.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Therapia, July 31, 1914

Russian mobilization is making impression on Sublime Porte and causing apprehension of Russian attack on Turkey. Moreover, one sees

Triple Entente move in Greece's sudden cancellation again of Grand Vizier's meeting with Venizelos.

Triple Entente thus wishes evidently to prolong Greek-Turkish tension so that Greece can prevent entry of Turkish dreadnoughts into Dardanelles which could become uncomfortable for Russia.

If we want to conclude alliance with Turkey, then it is high time. Otherwise, we could have 300,000 Turks against us instead of with us. General Liman is beginning to doubt Turkey will declare herself for Germany. Austria's hesitation toward Bulgaria appears to be an over-refinement to my Austrian colleague.

WANGENHEIM

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Therapia, August 1, 1914

Pallavicini has just informed Grand Vizier in my presence that, according to present reliable information in Vienna, an attack of Russian fleet is planned on the Bosphorus.

In case the "Goaben" [German battleship] should not be absolutely needed in Mediterranean, then she would well be in position, strengthened by Turkish fleet, to keep Russian Black Sea Fleet in check, assure cable connections with Rumania, and prevent a Russian landing on Bulgarian coast.

If the cable should be severed nevertheless, then we here will be cut off from Europe. Austrian ambassadorial yacht has left Constantinople. "Lorelei" [German ambassadorial yacht] has no wireless.

WANGENHEIM

REICH CHANCELLOR TO AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE

Berlin, August 1, 1914

If General Liman is convinced Turkey will intervene actively and effectively for us even now in case of war with Russia, you are authorized to conclude an alliance until 1918 including clause on use of [Turkish] army.

BETHMANN-HOLLWEG

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Therapia, August 2, 1914

Treaty of Alliance signed 4 P.M. today. Text follows.

WANGENHEIM

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Therapia, August 2, 1914

TEXT OF TREATY OF ALLIANCE

Constantinople, August 2, 1914

Translation.

1. Both contracting parties pledge to preserve neutrality in present conflict between Austria-Hungary and Serbia.

2. If Russia should intervene with active military measures and thus invoke *casus foederis* for Germany in respect to Austria-Hungary, the *casus foederis* would likewise enter into effect for Turkey.

3. In case of war, Germany will leave her military mission at disposal of Turkey. According to the previous agreements, which were effective immediately, between his Excellency the [Turkish] war minister and his Excellency, chief of the [German] military mission, Turkey on her part assures said military mission of an effective influence on general command of [Turkish] army.

4. In event of a threat, Germany pledges, in case of need, to defend territory of Ottoman Empire with arms.

5. This agreement has been entered into to protect both countries from international complications which could arise out of present conflict; it enters into effect as soon as signed by plenipotentiaries mentioned and remains binding, together with present similar commitments, until December 31, 1918.

6. If this treaty is not given notice of cancellation by one of high contracting parties six months before expiration of term mentioned above, it remains in effect for a further period of 5 years.

7. The present document will be ratified by his Majesty the German Kaiser, King of Prussia, and his Majesty the Emperor of the Ottomans. The ratification will be exchanged within one month after date of signing.

8. The present treaty remains secret and can be made public by one of the high contracting parties only after an agreement by both said parties.
signed:

FREIHERR VON WANGENHEIM
SAID HALIM (Grand Vizier)

Note to article 3: The Turks desired this wording in consideration of fact his Majesty the sultan is commander in chief of Turkish army. General Liman, however, officially informed me beforehand he has effected

a detailed agreement with War Minister Enver Pasha which guarantees actual command to military mission.

Note to article 7: Grand Vizier wishes explicit ratification of treaty by both sovereigns so that Turkey remains committed unconditionally, even if he perhaps should be overthrown.

I request, therefore, above all to send soonest special Imperial authorization. Original of treaty I am holding until next opportunity here for courier.

WANGENHEIM

FOREIGN MINISTER TO AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE

Berlin, August 3, 1914

Please request Turkish government to observe temporary secrecy of alliance because of our ship movements in Mediterranean. Since England's intervention against us must be reckoned with,³ please prepare requisite measures so that British naval mission [in Turkey] cannot carry out any abuse to Turkish fleet. Also see that Mohammedan catchword is spread in English colonies, particularly toward India. Revolutionization of [Mohammedan] Caucasus is desired.

JAGOW

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Therapia, August 3, 1914

When I spoke sharply to Marquis Garroni [Italian ambassador] today because of Italy's attitude, my colleague attempted at first, as an ambassador, to excuse his government, but then told me, speaking as a private citizen, that he disapproves most sharply of [Premier] San Giulano's attitude and has already telegraphed him to that effect.

Italy's failure to act, Garroni says, can become an eternal blot on her national honor. He himself has not agreed with San Giulano for months and has already tendered his resignation twice, the last one a few days ago, both of which were not accepted. He will telegraph my opinion to Rome immediately, but urgently requests that Berlin put the strongest pressure possible on San Giulano, who is able to withstand the hardest knocks. Garroni himself believes Italy will ultimately march [with Triple Alliance].

WANGENHEIM

³ See page 116.

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Therapia, August 3, 1914

Enver Pasha and Liman wish to declare war on Russia immediately in order to capture 3 valuable wireless-equipped Russian ships in dock here. Grand Vizier and [undecipherable] are against it because, (1) Turkish mobilization, already vigorously begun, is not yet completed, (2) Bulgaria's position is not yet certain, and without Bulgaria, direct intervention against Russia is not possible, and (3) we fear that, after declaration of war, the *Osmane* [Turkish battleship being built in England], could be retained by England.

I have advised General Liman to await more particulars of Bulgaria's decision to join us. According to a telegram sent to Austrian embassy here, the Bulgarian minister to Turkey should resume treaty negotiations with the Sublime Porte with the support of Pallavicini and myself.

Until now we have no advice that Bulgarian minister has received instructions. Everything depends now on speed of Bulgarian decisions and actions. Rumania could perhaps be given the prospect that Turkey and Bulgaria would help to conquer Bessarabia for Rumania.

It is desirable that General Liman receive directives as soon as possible from our General Staff.

WANGENHEIM

NAVY MINISTER TO FOREIGN MINISTER

Berlin, August 3, 1914

Please communicate the following soonest to the ambassador in Constantinople:

"At official announcement of treaty of alliance, the *Goeben* and *Breslau* are ordered to proceed immediately to Constantinople. I leave it to [German] Admiral Souchon to place himself at disposal for command of Turkish fleet. Request cable answer whether we can help Turkish fleet by making German personnel available."

VON TIRPITZ

FOREIGN MINISTER TO AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE

Berlin, August 4, 1914

Great Britain will possibly declare war on us today or tomorrow. To prevent the Sublime Porte from deserting us at last moment under impression of England's action, a Turkish declaration of war on Russia this very day if possible appears to be of greatest importance.

JAGOW

FOREIGN MINISTER TO MINISTER IN SOFIA

Berlin, August 4, 1914

Freiherr von Wangenheim reports:

"According to instructions sent Austro-Hungarian embassy, the Bulgarian embassy here should resume negotiations with Sublime Porte, with support of Pallavicini and myself. We have no information that Bulgarian minister has been correspondingly instructed. Everything depends on speed of Bulgarian decisions and acts."

Please urge quick conclusion of our negotiations and those between Bulgarians and Turks. Russia apparently wants to win Bulgaria for herself by extensive promises.

JAGOW

AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO FOREIGN OFFICE

Constantinople, August 4, 1914

Enver Pasha informs me military authorities in Dardanelles are instructed to permit German and Austrian warships to enter Straits unhindered. Grand Vizier fears, however, that taking advantage of this privilege before adjustment of relations with Bulgaria would result in an accelerated development not yet desired at present by Turkey and Germany.

WANGENHEIM

FOREIGN MINISTER TO MINISTER IN SOFIA

Berlin, August 5, 1914

Please use every influence for quick conclusion of treaty alliance. Sending Imperial Authorization today for signature and ratification. Rumania has promised benevolent neutrality, guarantees frontier against Russia, and leaves free hand to Bulgaria against Serbia. Bulgaria's union with Triple Alliance will probably also bring about Rumania's active intervention against Russia.

JAGOW

KAISER WILHELM TO GERMAN AMBASSADOR IN CONSTANTINOPLE

Berlin, August 15, 1914

English fleet is at Pola. As soon as mines are laid, Dardanelles cannot be penetrated by any military or naval force in Mediterranean. Turkey must strike. His Majesty the Sultan must summon Mussulmans in Asia, India, Egypt, and Africa to holy war for Caliphate. Assistance of "Goeben" is also of greatest value for Dardanelles.

WILHELM

These were the diplomatic steps leading to the Ottoman-Russian war which extended the European two-front war, scheduled to take a year's time, into a world war which was not finished until four years had elapsed. In London I had the privilege in 1934 of discussing this matter with Lloyd George, Winston Churchill, and Field Marshal Viscount Allenby. We were able to compare the Allied plans and decisions with my notes on several missions to Ataturk, and on visits to the Kaiser, General von Moltke, and General von Falkenhayn. Our interpretation of events was remarkably similar.

The Ottoman-Russian war began October 29, 1914, as a direct consequence of the Ottoman-German-Austrian alliance. This alliance was renewed on October 18, 1917, in Constantinople by the two emperors.

A quarter of a century later, on October 19, 1939, in the second month of the global war, a Turkish-British-French alliance was signed.

3

RETURN TO ONE'S FIRST LOVE

AT 4:30 ON THE AFTERNOON OF OCTOBER 19, 1939, THE TURKISH-British-French treaty of alliance was signed in Ankara by Prime Minister Reyfik Saydam, Sir Hugh Knatchbull-Hugessen, and Monsieur Massigli in the presence of their military leaders—Marshal Chakmak, General Wavell, and General Weygand. At the same hour in London, the Turkish minister, Rushdi Aras, had invited me to celebrate the occasion with him and another old mutual friend, the Turkish General Kiazim Orbay, then a visitor in London for military negotiations, who was Enver Pasha's first adjutant in Constantinople during World War I.¹

I was impressed by a remark made by the Turkish ambassador: "It's very interesting. We three people had once something to do with bringing about a Turkish-German understanding and association. Now, here we are in London celebrating the Turkish-British alliance and the understanding between these two peoples. Actually, our points of view have not changed essentially nor have our conceptions of European geography as it affects policy. On the contrary, we have been fairly consistent throughout these years. Both alliances, the old and the new, have meant for us the defense of freedom and independence—the first time against aggressive Russian Czarism, and now against aggressive German Hitlerism." Then he raised his glass: "To our love, Turkey, now as then, the Rising Crescent. On revient toujours à son premier amour."²

General Orbay replied: "Indeed, although we have changed from the Ottoman Empire to a Turkish republic, and you have grown from a German liberal to a British world citizen, we have been consistent

¹ Now chief of the General Staff, since January, 1944.

² See Ahmed Emin Yalman's interview in *Aksham*, March 6, 1940.

in our aims, then and now, of freedom, independence and justice. Our loyalty to these ideas and to ourselves has never changed, in spite of all the changes of regimes, governments, and alliances of our native lands."

The British ambassador to Turkey, Sir Percy Lorraine, made a similar statement when he received me in Ankara in 1937: "Welcome home to the nation of your Rising Crescent! It is extraordinary how, until quite recently, world opinion has failed to understand the true qualities of the Turkish nation. In your diary of the Young Turkish revolution you set down those qualities honestly and accurately. Since then European opinion has changed and come around to your estimate of the Turks. They have had their ups and downs during those thirty years but you have never lost faith in their character. It is no wonder that they trust you—indeed, they have not changed."

There is, however, something quite new in the situation today. That is why the ambassador's words had a significance that went beyond any personal reference. They confirmed the fact that Great Britain had changed back to the earlier pro-Turkish attitude that had characterized her outstanding statesman and prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli. For Disraeli agreed with Bismarck when he termed the Turks "the gentlemen of the Orient," as well as with Lord Byron, who, although he was pro-Greek, had stated: "The Turks are neither turncoats nor cowards nor mass murderers. Neither do they burn heretics. They are loyal to their Sultan as long as he retains the ability to rule them, and they serve their God too, without indulging in inquisitions."

Disraeli defended the Turkish people and helped them consolidate their strength. He saw that Ottoman Turkey's position was Britain's barrier in the Near East against any aggression from the north toward the Mediterranean Sea and the Indian Ocean. Disraeli was following in the footsteps of "the Great Elchi," Lord Stratford Redcliffe, Great Britain's ambassador to Constantinople before and during the Crimean War. It was Gladstone who, after Disraeli, coined the epithet "the unspeakable Turk." He applied it correctly enough to the Ottoman sultan who was responsible for the Bulgarian atrocities, but unfortunately it was later applied in a general way

to the Turkish nation itself. The epithet was used to misrepresent and misinterpret them for half a century, long after 1909, the year in which they deposed and exiled the reprehensible sultan. It was in 1909 that a British expert in Turkish affairs, Marmaduke Pickthall, having lived for many years in Turkey, advised that his Foreign Office organize an "Anglo-Ottoman Society to advocate a political and commercial understanding between Great Britain and Turkey and firmly to oppose encroachment on the Ottoman Empire." But Britain was then bound by her entente with anti-Ottoman Russia and Pickthall could not find a following in London. Few then believed his assurance that "you will fall in love with the whole Turkish race if you come to know them," nor the experience of another British diplomat, Sir Mark Sykes, who had stated in 1908: "The Turk has something in his nature which may astound the world yet." In Berlin, at exactly the same time, the author was founding his very successful Turkish-German association.³

In contrast, Pickthall's Anglo-Ottoman Society could not succeed. When he was offered by his government the post of Inspector-General of the Eastern districts of Anatolia, Russia objected because she coveted these Turkish provinces for herself.

But if the change in England's attitude has been great, the change in the attitude of the rest of Europe has been even greater. Turkey's war of liberation at the conclusion of the Great War was a surprise to the world. Her subsequent peace policy was equally surprising. After centuries of interference and intervention from all sides, the Turks finally won the chance to be let alone and to concentrate on national culture and national policy. It is the judgment of the world, not Turkey, that has changed. The Turks have attained the goal which Atatürk set for them: "We want to be let alone to work out our own destiny."

One factor in the consistency of Turkish policy has to do with personnel. Many who were the leaders of the Young Turks' revolt in 1908 have played leading roles in the nation's life for three and a half decades and are in key positions in the state today. In fact, there

³ More than 5,000 members from all walks of life paid annual contributions of one-half million marks and organized an endowment fund of two million as well as the subsistence for 2,000 Turkish students, under the supervision in Berlin of Dr. Rushdi Tewfik, later foreign minister in Ankara and ambassador to London.

is hardly a leading man in Turkey whom I did not know during my first Turkish period, from 1908 to 1918, and with whom I could not celebrate our reunion during the years 1937 to 1940. They are all truly representative of the great Turkish bureaucracy as well as of the people. One reason why I feel that I understand something about Turkish character and policy is because these men have been close friends of mine for so many years. They have been foreign ministers and undersecretaries of state,⁴ chiefs of staff, generals and admirals, a prime minister or two, the first and second presidents of the Turkish Republic. They have changed their headdress and all of them have had to change their names as well, according to the law which makes family names obligatory. When I first knew President Inonu his name was Ismet, Marshal Chakmak was Fevzi, Foreign Minister Menemenjioglu was Numan, Rushdi Aras was Tewfik, General Orbay was Kiazim, Ambassador Ertegun was Munir, the veteran journalist Yalcin was Hussein,⁵ and so on. Age has brought these leaders increased experience and wisdom. The new republic itself has made it easier for young and competent leaders to develop. And the Turkish people themselves have a national character which makes it possible for the great qualities of leadership displayed by Atatürk to develop and mature. The people are older than any political regime. They have a deep-grained sense of honor, loyalty, and decency. They are proud and tough. They are a vigorous race and have shown great fortitude in adversity. They have a basic simplicity of outlook and, like the Russians, they have great powers to endure sufferings and make sacrifices for a cause they believe in.

In addition to a changed world attitude and the unchanging Turkish character, there has been through the years another constant factor—geography. For many centuries geographic determinism

⁴ One of them, now foreign minister, Numan Menemenjioglu, guides the policy of the Turkish-British alliance. His life was saved by a German refugee surgeon, who performed three skillful operations on the Turkish statesman's abscessed lung. Another operation on another Turkish statesman caused the latter's sister to say to Hitler's ambassador in Ankara: "Will your Excellency please convey to your Fuehrer all Turkey's gratitude for having saved the lives of Turkish statesmen—by making Professor Rudolf Nissen of Berlin an exile in Turkey." (It is now the United States that has the benefit of Dr. Nissen's presence.)

⁵ See Ahmed Ihsan's *Matbuat Hatıralarım*, 1931. The same leading publicists who had visited Germany with me in 1911 I was to meet in London in 1938 and in New York in 1942.

exerted a profound influence on the political destiny of Turkey, the middle land between the East and the West. Although Ataturk's Turkey no longer holds the position of a Triborough Bridge, extending over and binding together three continents and peninsulas—the European Balkans, Turkish Asia, and Asiatic-African Arabia—she still controls a drawbridge between the Allied and Axis fronts, and is capable of giving a red or a green light to either side. She has the power to open her bridge for Hitler's invasion of the Middle East between Asia and Africa or for the Allied "second front" in the southeast of Europe.

4

THE TURK AND SOME COMMON CATCHWORDS

WHO AND WHAT IS THE TURK?

I remember on my first visit to Turkey in 1908 standing on the Galata Bridge in Constantinople and pondering this question. I watched "the Turks" thronging past, watched them in their bazaars, listened to their polyglot conversation. It recalled that other throng talking in diverse tongues, "devout men, out of every nation under heaven . . . Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judaea, and Cappadocia, in Pontus, and Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in parts of Libya about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome, Jews and proselytes, Cretes and Arabians. . . ." This was Turkey, more varied even than the multitude of the first Pentecost because enlarged by Armenians and Kurds, Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs, Macedonians, and Albanians. This was Turkey in the days of the Ottoman Empire and in the decade of the Young Turks—races and nationalities by the score, and yet known vaguely to Europeans as *Turks*.

Today the problem is a little simpler. The great sprawling supra-national empire has dissolved. The scattered nationalities and religious minorities have been assimilated into adjacent states or even established as separate states. The Turkish Republic is homogeneous with a national consciousness and a national purpose. But the Turk is hardly a clearly defined racial type. For six centuries the Ottoman Empire was a melting pot of the races. Wars were constantly being fought on the tricontinental bridge of the Middle East and conquest and invasion brought the intermingling of many blood streams in their wake. Among the Turks today one will encounter the Mediterranean as well as the Mongoloid, Tartar and Caucasian types.

Many Turks bear a close resemblance to the northern European peoples. Atatürk, for example, the son of a Turkish mother and an Albanian father, had blue eyes, blond hair, and fair skin. Inonu, Sarajoglu, and Numan Menemenjioglu have exotic enough names but, as far as appearance is concerned, they might be American or British.

The average person's description of the Turk would likely be in terms of superficial attributes and common legends. The Turk wears a fez. The Turk is polygamous, veiling and enslaving his wives in a harem. The Turk is an infidel and a fanatic, and is frequently referred to as "the unspeakable Turk" because of his alleged propensities for massacring Armenians, Bulgarians, and other Christian minorities. The Turk is fatalistic, which had something to do with the steady and inevitable decline of his empire and with the epithet he carried, "the Sick Man of Europe."

The Fez

For the average American or European, the fez or the veil is the most obvious mark of a Turk. And yet both of these are not of Turkish or even Mohammedan origin but of Judaeo-Christian origin. For centuries in the Near East, the headgear meant more than just a headdress. It had a religious, spiritual, and political connotation. The Jew covers his head when he approaches God. So does the Mohammedan cover his head as a mark of reverence, as we Westerners uncover our heads when we enter a church or a home. It is interesting, by the way, that the top hat of the European had a grim political significance for people of the East; they thought it looked like the funnel of a foreign warship.

Sultan Mahmud II, the great reformer of the early nineteenth century, was responsible for the introduction of the fez. Just as he procured Prussian officers for the training of the Ottoman army as a part of his plan to remodel the empire along western European lines, he also ordered that the Mohammedan-Turkish turban and tarboosh be replaced by the Greek fez. The fez was a brimless truncated cone of red felt, made during the preceding century not in Turkey but in Austria. This westernizing cap became not the national Turkish but the supranational Ottoman headdress, the

"uniform" of twenty varieties of races and religions, languages and nationalities that were bound together in the empire. Only the Albanians and the Arabians proved "nonconformist," the former holding out in favor of their national white cap, the latter in favor of their turban. The fez was an emblem differing appreciably from the swastika or the yellow star in that it made no discrimination between Turks and other Mohammedans, between Christian and Jewish Ottomans.

The fez was worn by non-Turkish and anti-Turkish nationalities, by loyal Turkish patriots, and by fifth columnists. It was as if all the various nationalities that composed the old Austro-Hungarian Empire—Austrians and Hungarians, irridentist Italians, Rumanians, Serbs, Czechs, and Poles—had had a common neutralizing uniform to aid them in conspiring against the Hapsburg rule. The fez obliterated national differences. And, ironically, all words spoken and all deeds committed by any fez-wearer were held against "the Turk."

When Ataturk finally overthrew the Ottoman dynasty and confined Turkey to the single Turkish nation, he did away with the supranational Ottoman headdress. By the simple process of decappling or unfezzing he dis-Ottomanized the Turks. The old and the pious tended to spurn the international "hat of the unbelievers." Some of them even started counterrevolutionary riots and tried to retain the fez so that they could continue to pray in the traditional Mohammedan manner. During the last war, incidentally, the Turkish soldier was slow to adopt the steel helmet since it prevented his forehead from touching the ground when he said his daily prayers.

Outside of Turkey, in the former provinces of the Ottoman Empire, the fez has persisted. Today in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, in Syria, Iraq and Arabia, and in those parts of the Balkans and Russia where mosque and minaret survive, you will see the fez. Even in Greece, in the land of its origin, the troops of the Evzones wore it as part of their uniform. When Wendell Willkie dined in Cairo with the King of Egypt the monarch had his fez on. But in Ankara, the Turkish ministers' hats did not differ in any marked way from Mr. Willkie's Indiana model.

The Veil

The Mohammedan veil, like the man's headdress, is of Judaeo-Christian origin and is associated with the early Christian emphasis that the woman did not possess an individual soul of her own. The pious Jewess still keeps her hair covered. Christian Syrian sects and Christian Albanian women¹ still cover their faces more completely than any Mohammedan woman. The veil of a Turkish woman was part of a nunlike dress, the *charshaf*, which deindividualized the wearer before the gaze of a passer-by but which might well conceal an expensive and fashionable Paris garment. The Young Turks' revolution cleared the way for emancipation from the veil. In 1908 I noted in my Istanbul diary:

"We were on the quay when a gaily beflagged ship docked, bringing home to Turkey the body of a statesman who had been banished because he had fought for his country's freedom. Standing on the captain's bridge with her face unveiled stood a Turkish woman. She was addressing the crowds on the quay in Turkish, French, and English, celebrating not only the national rebirth of the Turkish people, but the liberation of the Turkish woman, who now, too, could participate with all her creative powers in the reconstruction of her country. Yassachyn Vatan! Long live the Turkish Fatherland!"

In the same diary, which I later published in book form, I was allowed to include the photograph of an unveiled woman, a friend of mine who was secretary of the Young Turkish Women Voters' League, and was courageous enough not only to be photographed but to autograph her charming picture for the public.

But the same Turkish woman once was threatened by an unpleasant experience with Istanbul suburbanites. Veilless, she was waiting for a street car and by chance saw me coming around the corner. She was just about to approach me to give me a message from her parents when she was stopped short and threatened by passers-by who had recognized me as a foreigner. That was still at

¹ See the author's books on the Young Turkish Revolution (1909) and on Albania (1911).

the time when the Young Turks felt themselves obliged to remind the women that carelessness in veiling constituted a grave religious offense.

In the first days of the Young Turkish revolution, on a walk outside Smyrna, I saw Turkish peasant women working in a field and, therefore, veiless. When they noticed me they frantically raised their skirts to cover their heads, thus exposing the nude body, but nonetheless covering and hiding the face. The habit of veiling originated from the theory that what characterizes and gives away the individual person, her soul, is not so much the form of the body as the features and expression of the face.

During the Young Turkish revolution the public enthusiastically acclaimed a play which set forth the thesis that the level of a nation's civilization is determined by the cultural standard of the woman.

When I returned to Ankara some thirty years later, I saw a monument celebrating the Turkish war of liberation. It showed a Turkish woman not as a grieving mother, bride or sister, or as a healing nurse—after the manner of Western war memorials—but as a soldier carrying munitions and shells on her shoulders to the trenches. It was a revolutionary idea for the time it was conceived, foreshadowing the total war today.

The Harem

On my annual visits to Turkey from 1908 to 1918 and again from 1937 to 1940, I was privileged to stay with many Turkish friends in their homes in town and in the country. I was able, therefore, to get much more than the average European's conception of the home life of the Turkish people.

As a matter of fact, during the Young Turkish period, whenever I was invited by a Turkish friend into his household, I found that the family life there did not differ in any way from that of the European or American household; that is, with the one exception that, if my host did not trust his servants, I was expected to wear a fez so as not to reveal that I was a foreigner. It should be remembered that the fez was not just a substitute for a hat, but was the obligatory head-dress all day long, even at the dining table. One was not dressed if one did not wear the fez.

When a Bosphorus boat once stopped at a landing close to the villa where my host, his wife, and I were lunching, passengers could look into our dining room and see that a Turk and a man without a fez—that is, a foreigner—were sitting with a Turkish woman who was without the Moslem-Jewish headdress which ought to cover the hair completely. My hostess, frightened to death, desperately hid her face behind the flowers and fruits of the table. Later, a Turkish friend of her husband called and she immediately vanished into her harem. I felt surprised that this old friend who embraced and kissed my host was not allowed to share my privilege of meeting his wife, and asked him the reason for this discrimination. His characteristic answer was: "We Turks must adhere to our tradition among ourselves and among all people who live among us permanently. But I may make an exception with a close friend who is a visitor and whom I trust to understand us and not give us away in our circles."

Incidentally, all the Turkish women I met were well-educated, usually by foreign governesses, intelligent, public-minded, and greatly interested in domestic and international politics. They all spoke French or German. They resented the false description of their harem by Pierre Loti's *Les Désenchantées*, but also the seclusion of the family circle in which they were kept.

Contrary to popular belief outside of the country, monogamy has been the rule in Turkey and polygamy the exception for a very long time. The average Turk's harem was no less monogamous than the family life of any American or European. Polygamy was unfashionable and was not as a rule practiced except by peasants as a means of adding to the female labor force. The polygamous harem of European imagination and the Arabian *Thousand and One Nights*—incidentally of Arabian, not Turkish, origin—did not correspond to the reality of Turkish practice. True, some sultans' harems during the period of the Ottoman decline had turned toward Abraham or Solomon's Oriental way of life. But the average middle-class Turkish harem meant simply that separate part of the house, that sanctum where the wife, the mother, the grandmother, and the daughter lived together apart from the husband, father, and son's apartment—the selamlık. By law, quatrogamy (of four wives) was allowed, but actually, it was not practiced on economic as well as

on moral grounds, since each wife was entitled to a separate household of her own.

And yet it frequently happened that European or American visitors to Constantinople would be guided by a fez-wearing "Turk" (who was likely a non-Turkish Levantine) to a harem where he would be shown "Turkish women" (who, in fact, would be Levantine or other Christian girls in masquerade). If he had visited a true Turkish harem he would have seen a house or an apartment with one housewife or her mother presiding and a Turkish man paying her the same respect as an American does in his home. This was the monogamous practice in the old days of the empire. In Ataturk's republic it became the law.

Infidels

The conception of woman as the warrior equal of man, portrayed in that war memorial in the Nation Square at Ankara, might have appeared revolutionary, even to Westerners. It was indeed revolutionary to orthodox Mohammedans, whom Christians used to class as "infidels." Actually they are infidels no more or less than the Lutherans or any other Christian denomination, as viewed by the Catholic Church; no more than Catholics, as viewed by most Protestant denominations. As a matter of fact, the Mohammedan or Moslem faith, Islam, is the grandchild of Judaeo-Christian parentage. The Mohammedan faith is not disloyal to Abraham and Moses or to Jesus and Mary; on the contrary, it recognizes them as authentic prophets and accepts them as forerunners of its own prophet. They are revered together with Mohammed and their names are used for Mohammedan places, as for instance Hill of Jesus in Egypt. However, Mohammedan monotheism, which combines Judaism and Christianity, has strictly applied the Jewish prohibition in regard to making any image of God, angel, or man. This does not apply to the Shiite sect, such as the Persians with their rugs and miniatures, but to the Sunnites, including the Turks. All Turkish public monuments have been water fountains, mosques, kiosks, and the like, but never statues or pictures of God or man. Mohammedans feel themselves to be less infidel than Jews or Christians, as they have possessed since the Byzantine times all the holy places of Judaeo-Christianity and

Islam for more than thirteen centuries—in Turkish history from 1518 to 1918, and in Arab history from 636 to 1518, with the exception of the one century of the short-lived Christian kingdom of Jerusalem. That means that Palestine has been Mohammedan almost as long as it had been Jewish, for nearly fifteen centuries.

Who but the infidel Turk opened up a Turkish haven, in the Middle Ages, to the Jewish refugees of Christian Spain and Italy? Ottoman sultans, Selim and Suleiman, early in the sixteenth century, invited them to Constantinople and to Salonika (the latter town having, until its separation from Turkey in the Balkan wars, the largest Jewish population of all walks of life in the empire). They offered the Jews the first Zionist colonization in Palestine, around Lake Tiberias, and on Cyprus. In the same manner Ataturk invited Jewish refugees from Germany for his universities and public works constructions in Ankara and Constantinople.²

A dispatch from Istanbul reported that Turkish and Greek authorities were trying to arrange for the transportation of half a million starving Greek children, for adoption by Turkish families for the duration. "There is irony," comments the New York *Herald Tribune*, "in the fact that it is the Turks, 'the terrible Turks,' whose name for generations was used to frighten children in Europe, who are extending a hand to succor the victims of those Christians who pretend to embody the highest culture of the Continent." The Greeks have thankfully grasped the hands of their Turkish friends.³

Fatalists

Of the six fundamental articles of the Moslem faith—belief in the one God, his angels, his prophets, his revealing book, the day of resurrection, and God's predestination determining the fate of man

² When the chief rabbi of Palestine arrived in Ankara in order to facilitate the travel of refugees through Turkey which has become the only gateway to safety for the Jews of all southeastern Europe, he stated that thousands of Jews have been allowed to pass through Turkey to various havens of refuge, particularly Palestine. The chief rabbi added: "This is not the first time in history that Turkey has come to the rescue of persecuted peoples. She has to her credit another great act of mercy. The supremely humane attitude of the Turkish government and people to the exiles from Spain many centuries ago was one of the great examples of humanitarianism in history for which Turkey has never been forgotten."

³ Herbert Hoover stated in a radio broadcast: "I wish that Belgium, Poland, Norway, and the others had a friend as compassionate as Turkey."

—the one which has most affected Moslem-Ottoman-Turkish history is the last. It has resulted in a sense of security and in a superiority complex. The sincere belief that your destiny is unalterably in the hands of God breeds that fatalism which built up the Ottoman Empire: you have nothing to lose, you have only to gain, as reward for faith and fortitude, eternal life after resurrection.

This is the quality of fatalism in the Turkish temperament and mentality. It is not so much a passive acquiescence in whatever may befall one; rather it resembles the active, Calvinistic sense of predestination which made Cromwell's soldiers some of the bravest fighters the world has seen. It was this heroic fatalism that enabled Ataturk to take his stand in the Dardanelles with his half-starved, badly equipped soldiers. Indomitable in defense and incomparable in attack, he successfully opposed the mighty armada of the combined British and French fleets and the valiant Anzacs armed with superior modern war equipment. It was the same heroism and dogged endurance that was displayed by the Turkish people, young and old, men and women, boys and girls, who—at first “without an army and without arms”—conquered the Greek army that had been organized and armed by the Western Great Powers.

This active fatalism is well-illustrated in a story told me by the Young Turkish leader, Enver Pasha, during the second Balkan War. “I had just reconquered Adrianople and made up my mind to return to Constantinople. As I entered my car, I received a telegram telling me that my intimate friend and colleague, Mahmud Schevket Pasha, the minister of war, had been assassinated in Constantinople. I was warned against coming back because the plot had singled me out for assassination too. For a moment I debated whether I should take no chances and keep away from Constantinople. But hardly had I begun to consider this course of action when I was ashamed of this Western approach to fate. So I faced the danger by accepting my destiny and returning to Constantinople as I had planned.”

During World War I, Enver Pasha once said to me: “Who knows the outcome of any war? Nobody but the Almighty who guides our destiny. Human beings themselves must create the prerequisites of victory. There must be no wavering in our determination to pursue

our aims steadfastly for the sake of our fatherland. Bravery comes out of contempt for death and from a faith in destiny. . . ."

On a later occasion, a Young Turk statesman, the ex-minister of education, was found guilty of conspiracy against Ataturk's life and was condemned to death at Smyrna. The rope with which the hangman had lifted his rather heavy body, broke, and he, still alive, fell to the ground. He got up, looked around, and scolded the hangman for "doing such a bad job"; then he asked for a cigarette and smoked while watching the hangman repair the rope. The man did "a better job" a half an hour later.

Ataturk himself, "atheist" as he occasionally boasted, could not help believing in his charisma just as his people were convinced of his kismet. During several crucial weeks in the Dardanelles Kemal had been under the severest fire and had often been far in advance alone when leading his regiments in the charge, but he had, strange to say, always remained unhurt. One afternoon he was sitting on the outer edge of a trench. One of the English field batteries had got the range accurately and was directing its fire on that very trench. The first shell fell exactly on the front edge of the trench, the second did the same, except that it was twenty yards nearer Kemal. The third shell was twenty yards nearer still. One of the officers besought Kemal to take cover. But he refused. "It's too late now. I cannot give my men a bad example," he said, putting his cigarette into his mouth again; his face was a trifle paler. It could be predicted with mathematical certainty that the fourth shell from the battery would fall exactly where he was sitting. The men in the trenches were watching and looking at him as if they were paralyzed. But by some happy accident the English battery sent only three shells instead of the usual number.⁴

Marshal Liman von Sanders told me the same story as reported by Dagobert von Mikusch³ about the decisive battle near Anaforta, the severest of all the battles in the Dardanelles: "The struggle for the hill ridge [dominating Gallipoli] lasted several days. In the ebb and flow of trench digging, advancing, retreating and trench digging again, the issue remains for a long time wavering in the balance.

⁴ *Gasi Mustafa Kemal*, 1929.

At last the English have to give up the idea of any further attacks. All their sacrifices have been fruitless. They have retained possession only of one commanding height. This has to be reconquered by the Turks, if the whole position is to be held. Kemal gives the command to storm the height. But the enemy's fire falls heavily on the newly dug trenches, and the soldiers, exhausted by so many days' severe fighting, are unwilling to leave their secure cover. Reports from all quarters reach Kemal that the troops will not venture to leave their trenches. But he knows how to deal with his men. Walking through the trenches he cries to the soldiers: 'You are too much in a hurry, lads! Don't rush things! Wait for the right moment! I shall go in front, and when I lift up my hand, then it is time.' He does what he says, and on that signal the troops actually rush forward and take the dangerous height. . . .

"When the fight was over, the leader at Anaforta, when giving his report to Marshal Liman, handed him his watch that had been smashed to pieces. It had received the bullet that might have killed him. Liman took out his own watch, and gave it to Kemal in exchange."

After the fiery ordeal of those weeks at Ariburnu and Anaforta, concluded the biographer, Kemal was filled with a strange assurance, a confidence in his future, resting on an inward certainty, that destiny had reserved an important task for him to accomplish.

A similar incident is reported from the other decisive battle at the Sakarya, in 1922; in Ataturk's words, the battle was "of the longest duration, not alone in the historical records of the new Turkish state, but also in the pages of the world's history."

"Kemal rode down the fighting lines two days before the Sakarya battle began. As he was ascending the rocky height of Kara Dag on the right wing, his horse stumbled and fell upon him. When he was dragged from under the animal he was able to move only with great difficulty. He had to be taken back to Ankara, as one of his ribs had been broken. . . .

"On the following day he made his appearance once more in the fighting line, and the soldiers repeated to one another what he had said, when still pale with vexation and pain, in answer to their lamentations: 'It is a sign from Allah. On the spot where one of my

bones has been broken the resistance of the enemy will also be broken.”

Thus it came to pass when “the great battle of the Sakarya which lasted from August 23 to September 13 and continued without interruption for twenty-two days and twenty-two nights” turned into an Eastern Marne miracle, the Greek defeat.

After the Ottoman defeat in World War I in the first year of his Turkish struggle, Kemal once asked: “In this emergency what ought I to have done? Go on and risk the danger? That was the only thing that could be done.”

This is Turkish active “fatalism.”

Fanatics

The British author, Marmaduke Pickthall, addressed the British people in 1912, regarding their anti-Turkish attitude, which on the basis of his Turkish experiences he considered unjustified. He said: “You had it fixed in your minds that the Turks were polygamous, the Turks were barbarians, the Turks were fanatics—ergo, down with the Turks.”⁵ But the issue of fanaticism in the Ottoman Empire has been political, not religious. No government of a Christian nation ever did what was an accepted rule in Old Turkey: namely, include in their cabinet Christian, Armenian, Greek, and Jewish ministers. There was rarely a cabinet without non-Mohammedan ministers. I myself have met Armenian as well as Jewish cabinet members. In fifty governments in two centuries, the minority of the members were Turkish and the largest part were Armenian, Greek, Albanian, or Slav. In fact, the grand vizier of the greatest of the sultans was Greek, so were great generals and admirals, and so was the diplomatic representative of the Ottoman Empire at the Congress of Berlin, in 1878, which was to determine Ottoman territory and frontiers. If you can imagine the famous Duke of Marlborough a Catholic, or the crusader Prince Eugene a Protestant, you will see that what was unthinkable in intolerant Christian Europe was practiced in tolerant Mohammedan Turkey.

Though the Turks did not care to conquer the soul of the defeated nationalities, in conquering their soil they exercised that po-

⁵ Ann Freemantle, *Life of Marmaduke Pickthall*, 1938.

litical and military fanaticism which was an internationally accepted practice in Medieval Europe. Mohammedan Turkey was medieval up to our twentieth century, the fourteenth century of the Mohammedan era. When Trevelyan, the British historian, compared the "devastation of North England" by William the Conqueror, 1069, to "Turkish cruelties," he added that "this action of those most Christian warriors was typically medieval."

This time factor must be borne in mind when dealing with fanaticism; we shall see later that Medieval Europe's religious fanaticism, as expressed in the Christian European practice of *cuius regio eius religio* (who rules the state dictates the faith) was never applied by Mohammedan Turkey.

To point to the distinctions between Turkish and Arab Moslems, the famous statement of the founder of the Senoussi Arabs may be remembered: "Les Turcs et les Chrétiens sont de la même farine. Je les écraserai ensemble."

Massacres

Massacring the enemy has been an age-old endemic instrument of total warfare all over the Near and Middle East, from Belgrade to Baghdad and from Ararat to Armageddon. All races and religions have participated in it. We read about it in the Biblical stories of Moses in Egypt, or the shibboleth slaughter of the Ephraimites, or Herod's extermination of the Jewish children, and the sad tale is carried on through the centuries up to the Bulgarian, Greek, Serbian, Armenian, and Turkish massacres. It has been a villainous, barbaric custom. But it has been a custom, not confined to any one particular race or people.

Europeans and Americans have shown quite a different reaction to the tales of Mohammedans being massacred and to the tales of Christians being massacred. When the Christians have been the unfortunate victims, the incident has been headlined and dramatized and used as just one more example of the practices of the "bloody Turk." On the other hand, when innocent Mohammedans have been the victims, likely as not the case has been disregarded or misrepresented. This has been particularly true since the Treaty of Berlin, which made the Armenians official wards of Britain.

But to distinguish between Mohammedans and Christians or to make the practice a religious issue is far from right. It is equally misleading to compare massacres in the Ottoman Empire with the pogroms against the Jews in Czarist Russia. For the Jews never took the hostile position, even to the point of violence and revolution, against the Russian government that the Christian nationalities were in the habit of taking against the Ottoman state. The British expert quoted above goes on to say, referring to the findings of the Carnegie investigation and report: "The Armenians had behaved in Turkey's struggle for existence as the Irish nationalists in regard to England, and with similar results. As far as murder and massacres went, Turks and Armenians were pretty well fifty-fifty." This was corroborated by the Russian Duma which, using the words of the Paris *Le Temps* and the London *Daily Chronicle* of September 23, 1915, called the revolution by Armenian secret societies behind the Turkish Caucasian army "our seventh ally."⁶ In other words, from the Turks' point of view, the Armenian revolutionaries, citizens of the Ottoman Empire, played the role of a "fifth column" more than twenty years before that term was coined during the Spanish Civil War. Many reports of eyewitnesses, such as American missionaries, have corroborated these statements.

The author's experience as a mediator between Turks and Armenians after the Adana massacres, in 1909, when he had interviews with the Armenian patriarch, and during World War I tends to confirm this point of view. On the first occasion he saw the guilty

⁶ *Daily Chronicle*, September 23, 1915: "Who is our seventh ally? The Armenian nation. The Armenians awaited no one's invitation. They began fighting on the side of the Allies right from the start. Over 100,000 of them are in the Russian army and about 20,000 Armenian volunteers are fighting in the Caucasus, and it is even said that General Alexieff, present commander-in-chief of the Russian army, is an Armenian by birth."—In *Russkoje Slovo*, No. 19, January 24, 1915, a letter from the Armenian lawyer, Calkus, is cited: "In Turkey's eyes, the Armenians deserved the horrors inflicted upon them by the Turks because we were guilty of treason. Armenians confess to this treason without any further ado. No Armenian shoots a Russian, because he sees a big brother or a defender in him. The Armenian is a traitor to Turkey because Turkey is not his mother but his stepmother. A growing number of Armenians are volunteering in the ranks of the Russian army. They are streaming toward Russia from the far corners of the world, from America, Asia, and Europe. They believe in Russia and Russia's mission."—The Armenian Deputy Papadzanov stated in the Russian Duma, January 28, 1915: "The Armenian population of Turkish Armenia joyously greeted our victorious [Russian] army. Armenians helped wherever and however they could, and prepared a hearty welcome for the Russians. . . ."

Mohammedan Kurds hanged by the Young Turkish governor and the order of religious toleration posted everywhere by the Ottoman government.⁷ At the time of World War I he introduced the Armenian protagonist, Dr. Lepsius, to the Turkish Generalissimo Enver Pasha, and through the author's intervention the lives of many Armenians, particularly women and children, were saved.⁸

It must be admitted that the mutual cruelty and destruction was appalling. The suffering and sacrifice of Armenians innocent of revolution or conspiracy is a tragic page of history. The Armenians are a very ancient race, their history antedating the Roman Empire. Since Roman times they have survived as a people but not as a nation or a state. Consequently, as a people they have been struggling continuously for the re-creation of an Armenian state on the ruins of the Ottoman Turkish Empire. Thus, the basic issues between Armenians and Turks have always been political. They were part of the struggles of nationalities seeking the disruption of the Ottoman Empire, struggles which were frequently exploited by the Great Powers interested in advantages of their own.

At long last, after World War I, the Armenians won back the heart of their homeland, in the form of a Soviet republic of Armenia. They have rebuilt a national life there, and are now prospering under the protectorate of the Russian Soviet Union.

The Unspeakable Turk

It was an Ottoman sultan, Abdul Hamid, who was singled out by Prime Minister Gladstone as "the unspeakable Turk." This sultan, in the beginning of his reign (1876), was held responsible for the Bulgarian atrocities and later for the Armenian massacres. The historic and national background of the revolts which occasioned these

⁷ See the author's "Armenian Massacres" in *Der Aufsteigende Halbmond*, 1910.

⁸ Letter from the Armenian plenipotentiary in Berlin, Dr. Greenfield, on November 29, 1916, to the author: ". . . I learned from Dr. Lepsius that you have succeeded in saving all the Armenian families in Konya as well as in Cilicia and Syria the relatives of Missirian, Boghossian, Adamian and Atayan by your intervention with Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha and General Djemal Pasha respectively. I feel I must thank you for all you are doing for the Armenian cause. It is indeed unique to be able to depend on the humanity of someone who has the confidence of both your Turkish friends and our Armenian representatives . . . May I be bold enough to approach you with another pitiful case—of the Hairanians from Sivas . . ."

acts of vengeance will be dealt with later. The epithet was well-deserved. A ruthless tyrant, Abdul Hamid spread terror throughout the whole empire, and exiled and murdered Turkish and other Ottoman patriots alike. His bloody rule was ended when his subjects—Turks, Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and others—united in a successful conspiracy against him. They first deprived him of power (1908) and a year later took away his throne. The “unspeakable Turk” was kept a state prisoner in Salonika until his death in 1918.

It is ironical that this product of the late and decadent days of the Ottoman dynasty, whose mother is believed to have been an Armenian girl of the harem, should be labeled “the Turk.” The Turkish nation came to be symbolized by one of its most un-Turkish and decadent specimens. It is doubtful if today Churchill, Roosevelt, or Stalin would call Hitler “the unspeakable German” although they might properly refer to him as “the unspeakable Nazi.” In the Turkish case, the sultan and the nation became so mixed up in popular prejudice that the stigma has remained to this day.

The Sick Man of Europe

Hundreds of *projets de partage*⁹ were drawn up for the disposition of the corpse of the dying patient, surgeons of state from all the Great Powers have stood ready with their knives, but the “Sick Man of Europe” refused to die. In fact, he showed every symptom of rejuvenated and robust health.

It was the Ottoman Empire’s hereditary enemy and neighbor, Nicholas I, Czar of Russia, who coined the term before the Crimean War, after the failure of the Russian attempt to gain a protectorate over the Holy Places in Palestine. The Czar suggested to the British ambassador, Lord Seymour, that an agreement should be reached between Russia and Great Britain in regard to a final partitioning of the Ottoman Empire. “We have on our hands,” he said, “a sick man, a very sick man. It would be a great misfortune if one of these days he should slip away before the necessary arrangements have been made.” Lord Palmerston, the British prime minister, refused the Russian proposal and prevented the sick man from being killed.

During the last century when all the major European crises

⁹ T. G. Djuvara, *Cent projets de partage de la Turquie*. Paris, 1914.

circled around the decline of the Ottoman Empire and its prospective partition, every European statesman thought of Turkey as the "Sick Man of Europe." It was a long time before the toughness of his nature and his refusal to admit mortality evoked some skepticism in regard to the traditional diagnosis. The author remembers once when he was dining with the late Kaiser, this monarch told him a story about an Austrian foreign minister, Count Kalnoky. The Austrian ambassador in Constantinople once stated in a report to Kalnoky that Turkey was a sick man and nothing could be done to save him. In his answer, Kalnoky replied that he had just found in the archives a report from the ambassador's predecessor to Empress Maria Theresa, in which Turkey had also been characterized as a "sick man" who could not be kept alive. Kalnoky added: "This sick man survived your predecessor's prognosis, and I expect him to survive yours too."

It was not necessary to be in Turkey a long time before one saw the shallowness of Western judgment about "the Turk." The fez was found not to be a Turkish symbol. The veil was not of Turkish origin. Polygamy of the harem had been practically out of fashion for a century. The fatalism and fanaticism of the infidels did not correspond to any European and American conception of these terms. Massacring has been an endemic Oriental habit of non-Christians and Christians alike. The "Sick Man of Europe" appeared to be kept sick by the deliberate intention and competition of European surgeons and reformers.

A Christian historian of the eighteenth century wrote: "European Christians should be ashamed of reaching into the gutter and fishing out those outdated stories of superstitious Oriental Christians." It is from such sources that common prejudices and misjudgments about "the Turk" have originated. It is for this reason—to use Ataturk's words—that "the manner of depicting Turkey in the eyes of the civilized world is bristling with faults."

The terms we have been discussing thus far are simply atavistic catchwords in what today we call psychological warfare. They go back to old and traditional antagonisms, Holy Wars between Cross and Crescent, wars for the Holy Places—holy alike to Jews, Greek

Catholics and Roman Catholics, Christians and Mohammedans. Later, the antagonism took the form of wars between the "white man's West" and a semicolonial East, wars for the possession of the Turkish Middle East—the bridge and the riches of three continents. Throughout all those holy and unholy wars the psychological motivation of all the antagonists gathered its support from the fact that the *Moslem Ottoman Empire of the Turkish Nation* found itself exactly between the *Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation* and the *Orthodox Greek Empire of the Russian Nation*.

PART TWO

*FIRST TURKEY OF THE
OTTOMAN EMPIRE*

Moslem Ottoman Empire of the Turkish Nation

From Turkish core to Ottoman circle—for six centuries

Tricontinental Bridge

From privileges to partition

Kemal—Imperial Osmanli for a decade to reform the Empire

5

THE LARGEST EMPIRE STANDS IN THE GAP

IN TERMING OTTOMAN TURKEY THE *Moslem Ottoman Empire of the Turkish Nation* and placing it in close juxtaposition with the two Christian empires of the Middle Ages we hit upon a formula that contains in essence the complex history of the three Turkeys and the basic problems that they faced.

However, this is no history book, nor does it pretend to be an exhaustive work of reference. Instead, it deliberately confines itself to the high spots of Ottoman and Turkish history and to the interpretation of what the author, perhaps in a rather dogmatic way, considers to be those matters which have been most different from the Western world and most decisive for the Turkish fate.

A great painter once said that picturing a character means stressing the essentials and suppressing the nonessentials. This applies to the sketch of a nation as truly as to a portrait of a man. A brief, even oversimplified, sketch of old Ottoman Turkey is indispensable to an understanding of Turkey today. All the more so, as the same constant factors which were responsible for the rise of the Ottoman Empire between the thirteenth and seventeenth centuries to the position of a world power have brought about the empire's decline during the last two centuries. Likewise, because New Turkey found a new and different answer to those same factors through which she became the strongest power in the Middle East—the factors of Islam and Ottomans, empire and nation.

That *Moslem Ottoman Empire of the Turkish Nation* was built on the dynamic *Moslem* religion by the longest-lasting *Ottoman* dynasty, which conquered a three-continental *empire* by the strength of the *Turkish nation*. Metaphorically speaking, the soul was the

Moslem faith, the brain was the Ottoman dynasty, and the body was the Turkish people which was stretched out from a single peninsula to embrace a tricontinental empire. These four factors were in constant interplay throughout the long course of Turkish history. Each assumed different degrees of significance at different stages in that history. The external factor that became of supreme importance was, of course, the attitude taken by the Christian nations and the great European powers toward the Moslem faith, the Ottoman rule, the empire, and the Turkish nation.

Until 1918, the Moslem Ottoman Empire was a supranational state, more heterogeneous than either of its neighboring temporal and spiritual rivals in the West and in the East.

The *Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation* under the joint authority of Roman pope and German emperor, held together for centuries the many races of Europe who professed the Christian Catholic faith. Its issues with the Ottoman Empire were political and spiritual. Politically, Vienna and the Danube provided the occasion for conflict. Spiritually, the control of Jerusalem and Palestine became the main issue under dispute.

Confronting the Moslem Ottoman Empire on its eastern borders stood the *Orthodox Greek Empire of the Russian Nation*. Its czar, as titular head of the Greek Orthodox Church, looked longingly toward Constantinople, once Byzantium and "East Rome," the historical center of the second main branch of Christendom. The recurring ambition of the czars of all the Russias was that one day Constantinople might once more become the counterpart of Rome. There were, of course, strategical issues beneath the spiritual longings. If the pope-czar aspired to be proprietor of the mosque of St. Sophia in Constantinople and protector of the holy places in Palestine, he also had his eye on the Greek Orthodox Balkans and the Dardanelles, as gateways into the Mediterranean.

Here, then, is the essence of six centuries of Ottoman-Turkish history—a conflict between the Crescent and the Roman Cross, on the one side, and between the Crescent and the Greek Cross, on the other. In the conflict, moral and spiritual forces were made to serve *holy* or *unholy* power politics. The holy places for which the *holy wars* raged had geopolitical significance for the three empires in the

contest whose leaders and peoples named each other "unholy" and "infidel," although their religions had sprung from the same Arabian desert between the Mount Sinai of Moses, the Jerusalem of Christ, and the Mecca of Mohammed.

Any American aircraft which flies from the Atlantic coast of Africa to Ataturk's Ankara travels over a land mass which for centuries had been ruled by the Crescent. When President Roosevelt met Mr. Churchill at Casablanca they met on old Arab-Turkish soil. It is not unlikely that when the conference between the Big Three of World War II is held, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin will meet somewhere in the Middle Land of the Middle Sea—again on old Ottoman Turkish soil.¹

Old Turkey stood in the gap between West and East, able to block the route eastward, when Spanish and Portuguese navigators set out in search of a new passage to the Orient. The greatest traveler of the Middle Ages, Marco Polo, on his way from Central Europe to Central Asia, crossed over that middle Asiatic passage. When Columbus discovered America the Ottoman Empire was at its height, a world power extending over three continents and controlling a territory the size of continental United States today. Only a few years after Columbus' death, the empire of the Moslem Ottoman Sultan and Caliph allied itself with the most Christian King of France to establish a second front against the Holy Roman Empire of Central Europe. The opening of the new sea routes, however, contributed a great deal to the decline of the importance of the Ottoman land routes and to the decay of the Ottoman Empire itself. Cities and firms of the Mediterranean and Middle Europe declined, such as Alexandria and Aleppo, Venice and Genoa, and the Fuggers in Augsburg, whereas the power and wealth of the nations bordering the Atlantic grew and flourished—Portugal and Spain, France and Holland, and Britain.

Islam reached out into Europe, westward and eastward in two successive waves, each of them extending over three continents.

The first expansion was led by the Arabian caliphs, the successors of the Prophet Mohammed, vicegerents of God and commanders of the faith. From the Arabian peninsula the Moslem wave swept

¹ This sentence was written several months before the Teheran conference.

along the North African coast toward the Atlantic gate. Then, led by Djebel of Tarik, the Arab conqueror, it crossed the Strait of Gibraltar, named after him, and overran Spain. The Pyrenees could not hold its onrush. France itself was engulfed as far as the Loire and Poitiers until at length Charles Martel and later Charlemagne stopped the invaders, leaving the Mediterranean a Moslem lake—their *mare nostrum*. The "Song of Roland" and the figure of Othello in Venice and on Cyprus are literary reminders of that history just as in Spain Cordoba gives evidence of the Arab culture, then outstanding in philosophy and poetry, law, mathematics (algebra), and science.

The western sweep was matched by conquests to the north and east. India was overrun, China was invaded until the Pacific itself was reached at the Strait of Malacca. Today the hundreds of millions of Mohammedan subjects in the Far Eastern empires of the Western powers tell of the once dominant empire of the Moslem caliphs. The presence of these many millions of Mohammedans provided the Ottoman successor of the Arab empire with the weapon of political Pan-Islamism until Ataturk liberated his Turkish nation from Moslem Ottoman imperialism.

The Ottoman Empire reached the summit of its power and glory in the sixteenth century, when the Mohammedan caliphate of the Semitic Arabs was taken over by the Ottoman sultans and removed from its Egyptian center. Two centuries earlier, driven out of Central Asia by the Mongol Genghis Khan, the Turks had acquired from the Arabs their Mohammedan faith and migrated westward into Asia Minor which they turned into a Turkish peninsula. They broke up the Byzantine Empire. Forcing an entrance into Europe via Gallipoli (1354), they conquered the Balkan peninsula and the Danubian capitals of Sofia, Belgrade, and Budapest. They took Athens and three times placed Vienna under siege. They penetrated northwestward to the gates of Venice and drove northeast as far as Lemberg in Poland. Finally, overrunning the Arabian peninsula, the Ottoman Empire took possession of all the Arab states west from Sinai and Suez to Morocco and the Atlantic shores, and eastward deep into Mesopotamia and Persia.

For centuries the Moslem Ottoman Empire was the largest in

the world, flourishing between the great days of Imperial Rome and the rise of the British Empire. But its greatness as a Mediterranean power extended far into modern times. Only in 1908 did the Ottoman Empire give up its most western—in fact, its Central European—province of Bosnia-Herzegovina to Austria-Hungary, at that time an adjacent state. In 1912, the last African colony, Libya, was given up to Italy. Egypt's last formal ties with the empire were severed in 1914 during the decade of the Young Turks. But as late as 1918, during World War I, Syria, Palestine, and Trans-Jordan, Iraq and part of Iran, Arabia—today all Arab states or mandates—were still parts of the Moslem Ottoman Empire. That empire with its German ally controlled the entire Middle East between Suez and the Persian Gulf—all the area which today, in World War II, serves as a high-road for American lend-lease supplies, as a land bridge between the British position and Soviet Russia.

On the hill in Ankara *saxa loquuntur*—the stones tell the story from the era of the ancient Hittites, a thousand years B.C., to *the monumentum Ancyranum*, the famous message of the Emperor Augustus to his Roman people around Ankara at the time of the birth of Christ. The record is there—Egypt, Assyria, Babylon, Persia, Greece, Macedonia, and Rome.

In the narrow gorge in the snow-covered Taurus Mountains, now reached by the Turkish branch of the Baghdad Railway, the old Greek stele and Roman milestone stand side by side. They too tell of conquest and of empire. Xenophon and Alexander the Great had gone through the pass; Mark Antony, Caesar's friend, and Julian the Apostate, Roman emperor, climbed up here some centuries later. Frederick Barbarossa, the crusading Hohenstaufen emperor, had crossed the mountains at this spot close to the treacherous river in which he was to meet his death soon afterward. Finally, Moltke, later commander in chief of the Prussian armies under King Wilhelm I, had been here with a Prussian military mission to Turkey.

Ottoman Turkey contained many of the important places of classical antiquity and all of the sites of the Biblical stories. Here were Homer's Olympus and Dardanus, Zeus' Europa, and Io's Bosphorus. In Istanbul you see the green marble columns from the temple of Diana in Ephesus as well as the sarcophagus of Alexander

the Great. The Garden of Eden, Noah's Mount Ararat, Abraham's oases and wells, Joseph and Moses' Nile were all within the empire borders. Bethlehem, the Mount of the Sermon, the Hill of Golgotha, Corinth, Philippi, Thessalonica, and other cities visited by the missionary apostle Paul, the scenes of the great church councils, all were Mohammedan, Ottoman, and Turkish until the days of Ataturk. Even today, nearly all this area of classical and Biblical fame is Mohammedan; part of it is Turkish.

It was a rich land, the source of most of the raw materials of the ancient world, the crossroads of the great caravan routes, from the East, to the North and to the other Mediterranean lands. The center of old Turkey—the middle land bordering the middle sea—was the center of the ancient world. But Turkey inherited not only the traditions and the riches of the former empires, she fell heir to the geographic and geostrategic advantages and liabilities of all the earlier empire builders.

Let us inspect the three principal geostrategical lines of the Ottoman Empire. The first involves the control of the European-Asiatic narrows of the Dardanelles, the Straits. The second, the Asiatic-African narrows of the Sinai-Suez peninsula. The third, the narrows of the Danubian Valley.

During the Gallipoli campaign in 1915, I stood with Kemal Ataturk on the site of Homeric Troy and looked down from Achilles' grave and Agamemnon's battlefield to the British battleship *Agamemnon* and the Anzacs that had been dispatched in accordance with Winston Churchill's brilliantly conceived but badly executed plan. The thoughts that passed through Ataturk's mind—as they must have passed through the minds of Agamemnon and Achilles—must have been echoed in the statement of Churchill's successor in 1922: "This channel of deep sea water, which separates Europe from Asia and unites the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, affects world interests, European interests and our interests of the first order." Such was the significance of this narrow strait from the prehistoric times of ancient Troy to the Dardanelles Conference at Montreux in 1936.²

These same words about this channel, one to four miles wide

² And to those in Moscow, Teheran, and Cairo in 1943.

and forty miles long, could have been voiced by Darius, Xerxes, and Alexander as they crossed westward or eastward. They might have been spoken by the Arabs when they attacked the empire of Byzantium, or by the Turks when they invaded the Balkans by way of the bridgehead of Gallipoli, or by the crusaders making the eastward passage. And the same formula applied to two centuries of British-Russian rivalry in the Near and Middle East. Moreover, it is safe to predict that where Achilles fell on land, and where Churchill failed at sea, Adolf Hitler is bound to fail on both sea and land.

The second historic transcontinental threshold is to be found on the Sinai peninsula lying at one of the important crossroads of the ancient world, on the ancient route between Egypt's Pyramids and Assyria's Nineveh, on the route that Joseph and Moses followed between Palestine and Egypt, on the route between Mecca and Gibraltar, between Suez and Alexandria. Whether it was Moses' leading his people from Mount Sinai or General Smuts' plan originating from the Suez Canal or Allenby and Lawrence's campaigns, the aim was always the same—Palestine. So, too, in our present scheme of things, both Mussolini and Hitler imitated the ancient strategy and made the vain attempt to strike across and against the Sinai land bridge, from west and east, to gain control of the "jugular vein" of the British Commonwealth—today the junction point of American-British-Russian power. The Sinai peninsula has been one of the important keys to Jewish Palestine's geopolitical fate, from west and east, not only in times of antiquity but during and following the period of the Ottoman Empire. Sir Halford Mackinder summarized the importance of this bridge or barrier as follows: "If the world island be inevitably the principal state of humanity on this globe, and if Arabia as the passageway from Europe to the Indies and from the Northern to the Southern lands, be centered in the world island, then the hill citadel of Jerusalem has a strategical position with reference to world realities, not differing essentially from its ideal position in the perspective of the Middle Ages or its strategical position between Egypt and Babylon."

Finally, let us look at the third geostrategical line—again a waterway—uniting Central Europe with or dividing it from the European and Asiatic peninsulas of the Ottoman Empire. The international

Danube has been the path of migration back as far as pre-Roman times. There again the Roman inscriptions on the rocks of the iron gates have their story to tell. For three centuries the Holy Roman Empire fought the Ottoman Empire for the control of the Danube. Later, the Holy Russian Empire joined battle with armies of the Moslem sultan. Now with reference to a Danube bordered by all Balkan and Central European states, there is more than a little truth in the saying: "He who controls the Danube controls South Europe's destiny." Adolf Hitler controls it for a brief time.

These three geostrategical lines at the European, Asiatic, and African thresholds of the Ottoman Empire suggest the heritage of political problems taken over by Ottoman Turkey from its predecessors. History may repeat itself with variations, but geography, that mother of politics, to use Napoleon's phrase, exerts an unvarying influence on a nation's fate. History is geography in motion. The geographic factor in Turkish history has especially great significance, since no other country, nation, or state—with the exception of Germany—is so strategically located. But, while Germany's political destiny is decided by her position in the midst of one continent, Ottoman Turkey had grown into a unique tricontinental center between and beyond the three geostrategical lines we have discussed, into the middle land of the middle sea between two oceans.

We can understand Napoleon's statement, "Whoever is master of Constantinople will rule the world," and we can understand the policy he based upon it. As a matter of fact, Constantinople's door-man has held not just a single key but a whole ring of keys to the back doors of too many neighbors for his comfort. Even dis-Ottomanized and unimperialist Turkey today holds seven keys to the doors of neighboring states, and five more to positions of geostrategical importance in the broad campaign plans of Axis and Allied nations. In the case of Napoleon, so deeply was he convinced of the prime importance of the Ottoman Empire's intercontinental and transoceanic position that he was the first—and, until World War I, the last—French statesman to sacrifice the immemorial Franco-Turkish friendship and France's most favored position, in order to gain a strategic advantage over England. Invading Egypt instead of England, he attempted to outflank British Mediterranean sea

power with French land power by driving straight into the middle land of Turkey. Napoleon should have known better. He was duplicating the classic geopolitical blunder of Hannibal when he tried to overcome Roman sea power in the Mediterranean by his land march across the western Iberian peninsula toward Rome. The strategy seemed successful at first, but it was doomed to defeat, with superior sea power deciding the balance while Rome's cunctator played for time.

Ottoman Turkey sat squarely on three peninsulas of three continents—the Balkans, the Turkish peninsula, and the Arabian peninsula. Turkey was truly a "Mediterranean" power in an amphibious sense, her seacoasts being as long as her land frontiers. She was both a central land mass and a central waterway. Her geographic position was of inestimable advantage to her in the days of her offensive, expansionist policy and of considerable value to her in the latter years when she was on the defensive and when all her policies were dictated by conservative considerations. The Carthaginian-Roman pattern of sea power versus land power has repeated itself countless times through history in the eastern Mediterranean. The Greeks and the Persians fought out the issue. Later, Spaniards, Portuguese, Genoans, Venetians, and Pisans fought it out with the Ottomans. England and Russia followed the same pattern in their diplomatic and warlike dealings in the nineteenth century. In our time, Mussolini, ambitious to overcome earlier frustrations and turn the Mediterranean into an Italian lake, ran head-on into the superior sea power of England and France. And in the present struggle there is the crucial Mediterranean and Middle Eastern strategy of the United Nations—combining the superior sea power of England and America with the superior land power of the Soviet Union—blocking Hitler's land-power drive from central Europe toward the Caucasus.

And at the center of the struggles throughout the centuries is Turkey.

Always Turkey has stood in the gap—between landlocked countries like Russia, Austria, and Germany, which marched their armies overland, as well as between countries confined to narrow seas—the Black, the Adriatic, or the Mediterranean—and countries which possessed oceanic power and world-circling bases which could draw

upon land power as well as sea power. Russia, Austria, and Italy, on the one hand; England, France, and the United States, on the other. The important diagonal lines of power intersected in Constantinople: St. Petersburg-Dardanelles, St. Petersburg-Palestine, Berlin-Baghdad, London-India. All lines of imperial expansion cut through the Ottoman Empire, strategically, politically, and economically. Turkey was to be consolidated as a strong sovereign power or weakened to become a dependent vassal state. Turkey was to be used as a buffer-block to protect the landlocked and the sea-ruling neighbors against one another. Or Turkey was to be protected by one group against the other or by both groups against a threatening newcomer, be he Napoleon from the southeast or Wilhelm II from the northwest. Turkey might even be degraded into a semisovereign protectorate by Pan-Slavism or Pan-Germanism or placed under a collective tutelage of great powers. These were the lines of imperialistic policy which was carried out by wars, waged sometimes against the Ottoman Empire itself, or between rival states somewhere on its tricontinental territories, or by appeasement and the pressing for special privileges, concessions, and Capitulations as a prelude to intervention and, eventually, partition.

Let us consider the case of one waterway, the Dardanelles. The control of this strait is the oldest and most crucial issue in the history of the Ottoman Empire and Ataturk's republic. It is an issue that concerns both the Mediterranean British, who guard the route to the Suez and India, and the Russians, who, whether under the czars or the soviets, are landlocked and lake-locked on the Black Sea behind the Balkans and the Bosphorus. Turkey has defended her control of this waterway of the Dardanelles from 1356 on. She had to fight no less than ten wars in a single century. She fought two wars against land armies marching from Egypt in the south—Napoleon in 1799 and Mehmet Ali in 1833, who got as close to the Dardanelles as Brusa. She fought five wars against Russia—1806, 1828, 1853, 1877, and 1914. Russia pressed down from the north into the Balkans and once succeeded in reaching San Stefano, just as her protégés, the Balkan states, reached the Chatalja line of Constantinople. Turkey fought two wars against sea powers driving in from the Mediterranean—Italy in 1911 and the British-French

navy in World War I. Four times Turkey was allied with and protected by Britain against the menace of land attack from the Balkans; twice she was allied with Russia also against a land attack, from Egypt. Whenever a third party showed up, such as Imperial Germany or Hitler Germany, Britain and Russia took joint action in regard to the Dardanelles.

A similar story could be told about the other great waterways of the Ottoman Empire: the Danube, which was the scene of a long struggle between the Ottomans and the Hapsburgs, Romanovs, Hohenzollerns, and their respective succession states; the immemorial Nile Valley—formerly Ottoman territory, now Egyptian; the Suez Canal, and the valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates. In all cases, Turkey's geography provided a political and economic background on which the savage competition, distrust, and enmities of the European powers fought themselves out to exhaustion if not to final conclusion.

At first the fight was concentrated on the control of the waterways. Later it shifted to competition for overland routes and railways, since great rivers and great highways are always bad neighbors. Any power which controls the Suez Canal is bound to control Britain's Mesopotamia, since both routes are approaches to India. The Constantinople-Baghdad railway was obviously needed to link distant parts of the Ottoman Empire to the capital. But it could not be planned as a domestic concern and so it grew into an international issue of first magnitude because of the immediate interest of rival outside imperialist powers. For a railway represents not merely a land route or a financial and economic activity, such as the irrigation of land or the cultivation of wheat or cotton, but a line of political influence, an indicated direction of political expansion, a possible road of invasion to colonies and to strategic positions. In the chart of Turkey's railways can be read the temperature of Europe's power struggle and diplomatic rivalry. Some of the lines invaded Turkey's distant provinces from the periphery of the Mediterranean and served to cut them off from the center. Others worked out from the center, strengthening the ties of Constantinople with economic and strategic outposts. But one served to bring into head-on collision two great imperialist powers with interests on opposite sides of the

Ottoman Empire: the Constantinople-Baghdad railway which was misnamed the Berlin-Baghdad railway. That very misnomer indicates what its significance was considered to be by one of the two great empires concerned.

This Baghdad railway is an interesting case in point. It had been a project of the Deutsche Bank as early as 1888, when the concession for the Anatolian railroad, Constantinople-Konia, was obtained from the Ottoman government. This Anatolian railroad reached Ankara in 1892 and Konia in 1896. But its continuation to Baghdad, although agreed to in 1899, had reached in 1908 only Eregli, where I boarded the train after I had come by covered wagon from the Taurus mountains in the south. Then it was conceived alternately as a German or a European (German-French-British) plan to develop the Near East. This economic project increasingly became a bone of political contention and a characteristic yardstick of distrust between the European powers. The Russians fought it because it served to strengthen their "hereditary enemy," Turkey. England alternately fought for and against it, depending on whether London took a friendly or a hostile view of a German-Turkish rail line to the Persian Gulf. France's attitude also varied with Entente policy. The international character of this economic undertaking, actually a sort of international highway, can be attested to by the German-French financial treaty concerning the Baghdad railway in 1899, the British government's agreement in 1902 to participate financially in the project, after a London conference attended by officials of the Foreign Office, the Admiralty, the War Ministry, and the Ministry for India, and Buelow's belief in 1899 that "Russia has dropped her previous opposition to construction of the Bagdad railway," as at long last Britain actually did, in 1913-14³—twenty-five years after its start.

Not only, therefore, had the Ottoman Empire inherited all the geopolitical advantages and disadvantages of the ancient empires of the Near Eastern and Mediterranean regions between the Danube and the Dardanelles, the Nile and the Tigris. It had also had to face the imperialist aspirations and rivalries of all the great powers of modern Europe. Turkey's history through the centuries has been

³ See page 101.

bound closely to her natural character as the middle land of the middle sea. And in addition, as we shall discover, Ottoman mentality and Moslem faith have produced political principles and practices that are at strange variance with those of the Western European powers. These, too, contributed to the problems of national interest which the Ottoman Empire and later the Turkish Republic had to attempt to solve.

6

THE LONGEST DYNASTY

EMPIRES USUALLY TAKE THEIR NAMES FROM PEOPLES AND RACES—Greek, Roman, French, British. Such was not the case with the Ottoman Empire which was named after its founder, Osman I, whose descendants and heirs were to reign for more than six centuries. The subjects of the empire, Turks and many other nationalities, were known as *Osmanli*. Their allegiance was not to a state or a nation, but to the Ottoman house. It was as if the Austrians had been known as Hapsburgians, or the Germans, up to the end of World War I, as Hohenzollerns. In fact, the relationship resembled that of the modern Germans, who take their oath of allegiance not to the state but to Hitler and are properly termed Hitlerites. Thus Turks and all the other nations were *ottomanized* and became *Osmanli*.

In the matter of longevity, the House of Osman stands up well in comparison with other imperial dynasties that have come down into modern times. The Romanovs survived three centuries, from 1613 to 1917. The Hohenzollerns held brief sway for less than half a century, from 1871 to 1918. The Hapsburgs began their dynastic career when Rudolf was elected Holy Roman emperor in 1273. That imperial dynasty was ended by Napoleon in 1806, after which time the Hapsburgs were restricted to Austria and Hungary. The other dynasties of the Holy Roman Empire—Carolingian, Franconian, and Hohenstaufen—averaged just over a century each.

The Ottoman dynasty began at a time when the hordes of Genghis Khan—the Pan-Asiatic Mongol—were sweeping westward and carrying the swastika into Asia Minor. It ended when the modern Genghis Khan—the Pan-European Hitler—was laying plans for the drive of his swastika-bearing armies toward the ends of the

earth. Ataturk dethroned the last Ottoman in the very year Hitler wrote *Mein Kampf*.

Osman I was the chief of the Ottoman Turks who, together with the Seljuk Turks from Central Asia, invaded the Byzantine Empire in Asia Minor. It is now common knowledge that these Turks were a civilized people and far above the level of the nomadic tribes they were previously thought to be. The pre-Ottoman history of the Turks has become the subject of thorough research by the Young Turks and particularly by Ataturk.

For four centuries the Ottoman rulers were known for their prowess in war. They bore such stirring titles as the Conqueror, the Thunderbolt, the Lightning, the Hurricane, the Grim, the Magnificent. Vigorous personalities, they carried on the administration of a vast empire with efficiency and breadth of vision. They were a race of natural leaders with pronounced intellectual tastes—well-educated, public-spirited, courageous, and generous. Some of them married Christian Balkan princesses of matching character and ability.

All of them took advantage of the best brains of their Christian subjects. They organized the first standing army in Europe. They applied science to both the strategy and the panoply of war—they were the first to use gunpowder and artillery. Their armies built up a reputation for "lightning wars" and invincibility until they were finally stopped at the gates of Vienna in 1683, a defeat that marked the turning point in Ottoman history.

Then the forces of disintegration began to work. The seignury system of succession, under which not the son but the eldest in the family succeeded to the throne, led to plots and intrigues, corruption and assassinations. The introduction of harem polygamy corrupted the moral principles of the rulers and sponsored the rivalries of slave girls, whose aspirations to become royal mothers were frustrated by the sultan's physicians. The fiber of the armies was weakened when the storm troopers, or janizaries, degenerated to the Byzantine type of palace intriguers and furtive conspirators, making and unmaking sultans, and pulling the strings which were attached to the throne. This condition of slow decay prevailed until the beginning of the nineteenth century when Mahmud II, one of the great reformer-

sultans, abolished these janizaries as part of his scheme of reform. But by then it was too late. Such was also the case with the greatest reform decree of all, the Hatti-sherif of Gulhané, which was issued by the next Ottoman, Abdul-Medjid, in 1839. The "Westernizing" decree promised military and taxational reforms, guaranteed the life, liberty, and property of all subjects, and resulted in mixed tribunals and a centralized administration on Western lines.

So runs the story of the House of the Ottomans, from the proud days of Mehmet II, conqueror of Constantinople, to the days of Mehmet the Last, the loser of World War I who in 1917 was well-content to be decorated by the King of Prussia with the uniform of a Prussian field marshal.

PROCRUSTES OF THE MIDDLE EAST

IN 1909, THE FORCES OF THE YOUNG TURKS UNDER THEIR GENERAL, Mahmud Shevket Pasha and his chief-of-staff, Mustafa Kemal Bey, conquered Constantinople and the notorious Yildiz palace held by the treacherous sultan, Abdul Hamid. At that time I was in Constantinople and had a conversation with the victorious general. We were discussing Ottoman and Turkish problems of the past and present. The general was one of the best of the Young Turkish leaders, a statesman, intelligent and decent, of Arab descent. He had had his military education in Germany, and was gifted in many ways. We had been speaking of the great sultan, Suleiman the Lawgiver, or the Magnificent. He remarked: "There's much to be said for your opinion. The Magnificent, as he is known to Westerners, seems to have been too magnificent. He overreached himself and overmortgaged the strength of the Turkish people. He pushed the Ottoman conquests up to the banks of the Danube and down to the Nile. He spread over the heterogeneous races and peoples of three continents, and invited the united hostility of the surrounding and adjacent great powers. And in all these conquests it was only one small part of the empire, Anatolia, that supplied the Turkish warriors who bought victories with their blood. As a result of these conquests not only was there a major war in every generation, but, in the 'peaceful' intervals, there was perpetual civil war between the various subject nationalities, Christian and Moslem."

The Ottoman Empire for centuries was an armed camp that left its mark of militarization, taxation, and poverty. It provided an astonishing parallel to the Roman Empire of the German nation—once stretching from the Rhine to Rome, to Palermo and Jerusalem, or at times from Austria to Spain and Spanish America—an empire which could not help losing all the un-German outposts in order to

gain the German core. Would the Ottoman Empire someday lose the un-Turkish outposts, Balkan as well as Arabian, in order to gain the Turkish core?

Seven years later, in the War Office in Constantinople, the German chief of staff, General von Seeckt, elaborated this point by saying: "Even in time of peace, Ottoman Turkey regularly lost 75,000 soldiers a year, not in attempts to extend her frontiers but simply in fighting for her very existence within her frontiers. She used up her armies defending one Ottoman nationality against another—Greek against Serb, Serb against Bulgarian, Arab against Kurd. In other words, in a purely police task and in times of peace the Ottoman Empire paid out each year 75,000 soldiers of the best Turkish blood."

The explanation, of course, is that no Christian nationality did any military service in the Ottoman Moslem Empire. The Christians were not admitted to it and thus were privileged to follow their own way of life. They paid taxes but no blood tax to their Ottoman Mohammedan overlord.

There were two historical exceptions, one of them extending over three centuries, the other lasting for three years. In the first case, the exception was the organization of the janizary troops to which we have referred. These were the "new troops," mobilized by the second Ottoman sultan and developed by the third sultan into the first standing infantry army of Europe. The troops were built up from levies of specially selected Christian youths from six to ten years old. They were converted to the Moslem faith and given military training. At the end of their preparatory training they entered the elite corps under the personal command of the sultan and were bound to the rigid discipline of a militant order. The Ottomans could thus present the world with a paradox: a Moslem empire run by ex-Christian brains and muscle.¹ So attractive were the chances in this select service of privileged storm troops that all races and religions, Moslem and Christian, competed to gain acceptance.

The second exception occurred when the Young Turks' revolution gave the empire a democratic constitution guaranteeing Christian subjects the same military rights and duties as Moslems. One

¹ Stoyan Pribichevich, *World Without End*.

outcome of this provision was that during the Balkan wars with the Christian peoples of the Balkans, the Christian soldiers in the Ottoman armies deserted to the Christian coreligionists and conationals on the enemy's side.

The myth of Procrustes illustrates the destiny of an oversized supranational empire that must rely on the body of a single nation. Procrustes was that Mediterranean giant who overstretched the body of his victim to fit the dimensions of his bed, or lopped off the victim's feet and legs if the bed was too small. The Eastern Ottomans were the ones who overstretched the national body of the Turks while the Western imperialistic powers at the Sèvres peace conference in 1919 lopped off the limbs of the Turkish people and attempted to confine their victim in a living space far too small for him.

JUDAEO-CHRISTIAN ISLAM'S FAITH

BASIC IN THE HISTORY AND DESTINY OF THE TURKISH PEOPLE IS THE faith of Islam. For the Moslem, the faith proclaimed by Mohammed is a restatement or revaluation of the religion and ethics of Judaism and Christianity. The ancient Hebrew prophets stand in the Moslem's religious tradition. Abraham, "the father of the faithful," is held to be the first "Moslem," according to a statement made to me by the highest Islam authority, the Sheik ul Islam himself, Hayry Effendim. (See page 266). Jesus, born of the Virgin Mary and taken away by God to return on the day of judgment to fight as a Moslem *Mahdi* (leader) against the Antichrist, is considered a mighty prophet indeed. Mohammed himself (570-632), molded by his associations and discussions with his Arab, Jewish, and Christian neighbors, considered himself merely the last of the prophets, the Messiah who was elected to fulfill the law of Moses and the gospel of Jesus. The Koran is but the third and last divine book to complete and, in a sense, supersede the revelation of truth contained in the Old and New Testaments.

Only to Christians has the faith of Islam been a new faith, the faith of the *unfaithful*, the faith of the *infidel*. The Moslem has been more tolerant of his Christian cousins, more appreciative of their faith. And in contrast with the satanic testament of *Mein Kampf*, which spews forth its bitter and hate-ridden doctrine of extermination against Jew and Christian alike, Mohammed and the Moslems have preached and practiced religious and racial tolerance toward the *believers of the books* (the Old and New Testaments) as an ethical obligation and as a normal part of wise statesmanship.

This tolerance does not extend to polytheistic pagans, who do not believe in the one God of Moses, Jesus, and Mohammed. But even in their case forcible conversion of adults is forbidden.

The tolerance of the Moslem has in it certain elements of pride and a sense of superiority. For the Moslem regards himself as a partaker of the latest revelation, as one who has transcended the limitations and corruptions of earlier revelations. His God is the one true God, Allah. His is the faith of perfect *submission to God's will* (Islam). He belongs to the chosen people and shares in the common *fate* (kismet), being destined as a member of a militant religious commonwealth to participate in the rule of a Moslem empire.

Mohammed came from that same Arabian desert whence Moses and Jesus had come 1,800 and 600 years respectively before his time. From Mecca, lying between Mount Sinai and Jerusalem, his followers spread out to conquer and rule the world of Moses and Jesus for more than a thousand years.¹ Jerusalem is to the Moslems as sacred a city as to the Jews, the very site of the former Jewish Temple being occupied by the great El Alsa Mosque (begun in 690 A.D.). The Mohammedan rule continued unbroken until Ataturk opened Turkey to the influences of scientific and technical advances, themselves the outcome of the civilizing force of Christianity as it developed in the nations of the West.

Three hundred million Moslems make up one-eighth of the world's population and their communities exist everywhere. In the United States there are small Moslem communities in Brooklyn and Detroit. Islam and Christendom stand side by side in most of Asia, in Africa, and in parts of Europe. Christian evangelism has made less progress with Islam than with any other religion as far as modern civilization is concerned, and possibly as far as growth and strength and importance are concerned. There was a time when the Mohammedan world had as high a degree of civilization as the Christian world, but Islam has been static for the last three centuries. Now un-

¹ See the author's *The War for Man's Soul*, and Henri Pirenne's *Mohammed and Charlemagne*: "The Arab Conquest, which brought confusion upon both Europe and Asia, was without precedent. The lightning-like rapidity of its diffusion was a veritable miracle as compared with the slow progress of Christianity. The Arabs were exalted by a new faith. In the beginning, at all events, they were not fanatical, and they did not expect to make converts of their subjects. What they proposed was not, as many have thought, their conversion, but their subjection. And this subjection they enforced wherever they went. The conquered were excluded from the community of the faithful. The barrier was insuperable. No fusion was possible between the conquered population and the Muslims."

doubtedly Islam has awakened, as is illustrated by the "Westernization" of the strongest Mohammedan power, Turkey, which has acquired the machinery, the product of the discovering and inventing soul, that has symbolized the rise of the Christian peoples.²

The Moslem domination has not always had the retrograde influence with which it was credited by somewhat biased critics. These forget the great contribution of Arabic culture, philosophy, law, and science in the eighth and ninth centuries in the East and in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in the West, in Spain. For a time the Ottoman Turks were the carriers of civilization in the Balkans. "Put the turban of the Prophet alongside of the tiara of the Pope," wrote a Byzantine grandee in 1453 when Constantinople was conquered. The Moslem Ottoman Empire was considered a force of liberation. The last King of Bosnia wrote to Pope Pius II: "The Turks in my kingdom showed smiling faces to the peasants and promised freedom to those who would go over to them." The papal nuncio in Hungary reported to Pope Clement: "The Hungarian peasants would, if the Sultan permitted, rise up more cruelly than in the days of the Crusades." And, indeed, when they were drafted for an anti-Turkish crusade in 1540 they turned on their Hungarian masters. In other words, the cultural and social state of most people was higher after they had become Ottomans and Moslems than before. Islam replaced political and class exploitation by democratic equality and provided the common people with opportunity for advancement to the highest posts in the empire.

The superstate of the Ottomans had its superreligion as well. Europe's Holy Roman Empire was divided by the centuries-old struggle between emperor and pope. Luther's revolt against the Pope provided a new disruption in European unity. But at the very time of the Reformation schism the Moslem Ottoman Empire of the Turkish nation gained new strength by unifying and identifying the Ottoman Empire with the Arab caliphate. The successors of the prophet Mohammed as vicegerent of God, the Arab caliphs, had ruled first at Medina until 661, then at Damascus until 750, and then at Baghdad until 1258, when the Ottoman sultans displaced them. Members of the Abbasside dynasty of the caliphs fled to Egypt and

² J. T. Adison, *The Christian Approach to the Moslem* (1942).

continued to rule there as caliphs. Then in 1517, the Ottoman sultan, Selim I, captured the last of these caliphs and took over the title of caliph. Since then, the sultans of the Ottoman Empire called themselves caliphs up to 1922-23, when Ataturk not only deposed the Ottoman sultan but abolished the Moslem caliphate too.

9

PRIDE AND PREJUDICE OF "MILLETS" AND "CAPITULATIONS"

A TURKISH HISTORIAN ONCE WROTE CONCERNING THE EXPANSION OF the Ottoman Empire:¹ "The net gain from the Ottoman emperor's career throughout three centuries was some two million square miles of territory containing a mixed population speaking twenty different languages." He might truthfully have added: "and divided into nearly as many Christian denominations."

In European and Christian history there have been two ways of dealing with conquered peoples of a faith differing from the conqueror's. One way is forcible conversion; the other, extermination by massacre. Charlemagne is notorious for having combined both ways when he defeated the pagan Saxons, some of whom fled to the British Isles, at the beginning of the ninth century. The Massacre of St. Bartholomew in 1572 is a later example of the method of attempted extermination. Luther, in posting his ninety-five theses on the door of the castle church in Wittenberg in 1517, prepared for the first breach in the accepted tradition of Christendom—*cuius regio eius religio*. But the first real attempt at religious toleration in Europe was contained in the provision of the Treaty of Westphalia, 1648, which brought to a close the Thirty Years' War.

In the Ottoman Empire a different story was being told. As early as 1453 Mehmed the Second, after having conquered Constantinople, granted special privileges to the Christian peoples who had belonged to the old Byzantine Empire. They became subjects of the Ottoman Empire but not subject to Moslem faith and law. On the contrary, the retention of their special rights as Christians made it possible at a later date for them to create the Christian Balkan

¹ Ahmed Emin, *Turkey in the World War*, 1930.

states. Constantinople itself was Turkified at least externally. The church of St. Sophia was converted into a Moslem mosque and the Byzantine mosaic murals of saints and angels were covered with colored plaster in keeping with the Moslem interdict against making any image of God, angels, or men. To avoid damaging the mosaics their coating was so carefully done that in 1935—after almost five centuries—the complete removal of the plaster could be carried out, when the Turkish government, "in the interest of art," declared Hagia Sophia neither a mosque nor a church, but a museum.

This very treatment of those old Christian mosaics—a treatment not of destruction but of conscious preservation—illustrates in a way the similar fate of the Christian peoples who likewise were enabled to resuscitate as nations and states.

Inasmuch as the Moslem state and empire was not a national but a religious community, called "The Commonwealth of Islam," and was administered by religious authorities according to the "holy law" called the *shariat*, Christians, although included in and subject to the supranational Ottoman community, were not admitted to the religious Moslem unity. The Christian population, however, was granted very special privileges, not only in the matter of freedom of worship but also, through the institution of *Millet*, in matters of administrative and political jurisdiction. Within the comprehensive supranational community of the Moslem Ottoman Empire the Christian religion was allowed to flourish and its adherents were designated to their national Christian church and community. This church community received the status of a Millet, a kind of ecclesiastical state within the Moslem superstate, and was granted autonomous privileges. The Christian patriarch had authority and was represented at the Ottoman court as if he were the ambassador of a foreign power. The Christian "state" had its own church, law and language, its own educational system, its own courts—civil as well as religious—and it even had some jurisdiction over taxation.

Immediately after the fall of Constantinople, Mehmet II granted these privileges to the Christian Greek Orthodox patriarch. Later similar privileges were granted to Jewish, Serbian, Albanian, Rumanian, Armenian, and Bulgarian Millets to form a conglomerate of Christian theocracies of coreligionists within the Moslem Empire.

Half a century later Sultan Selim I, foreseeing the disintegration of the empire by these centripetal forces, suggested compulsory conversion of all Christians and Jews, but was prevented from carrying out his plan by the Moslem clergy itself. They reminded him that the shariat, the holy law, forbade the compulsory conversion of adults according to Mohammed's advice: "Let there be no compulsion in religion." Thus the Koran itself saved the Christians from being absorbed by Islam. The preservation of national languages, customs, folklore, literature within the Christian communities made possible the rebirth of the Balkan states in the nineteenth century when the French Revolution stimulated the trend toward self-determination in all parts of Europe and promoted the wars of secession of the Balkan nationalities from the Ottoman Empire. If these churches and nationalities maintained keen rivalry with each other which at times amounted to the bloodiest and most barbaric warfare and mutual massacres, nevertheless, their very autonomous existence made it possible for them on occasion to join forces and conspire against the common overlord, the Ottoman Empire.

It should be noted that, at the outset at least, these special religious and national privileges were due, not to the external pressure of the Great Powers, but to the internal dispensation of the Moslem code and order. It so happened that this arrangement was very convenient for the powers when they made it their aim to break up the Ottoman Empire. For they had ready-organized groups, and even communities, of "fifth columnists" giving legal adherence to foreign powers—Roman Catholics to France, Austria, and Italy; Greek Orthodox members to Czarist Russia. This situation grew particularly important as the Ottoman Turks confined themselves to farming and soldiering and left the commercial and financial business to Ottoman non-Moslems, such as Armenians, Greeks and Jews, who actually controlled the economic foundations of the state.

The system of *Capitulations* is also unique in Moslem Ottoman practice. The word has its origin in the Latin *capitula*, which means decree, and had its early historical reference to the decrees of the kings of the Franks, which were known as "capitularies." In Ottoman tradition, the Capitulations were originally decrees of the sultans, particularly of the greatest sultan of them all, Suleiman the

Magnificent, who at the height of his victories in North Africa, Asia Minor, and Central Europe granted to the Most Christian King of France the first Capitulation of 1535. This action was to have the effect of placing the Turkish people in chains for the next four centuries. During World War I, a Young Turkish statesman said to me: "If Turkey gained the whole of Egypt and half of Russia and yet was unable to get free from the Capitulations we should have lost the war." For this reason Atatürk and İnönü, after their military victory in the war of liberation, were adamant at the peace conference in insisting that the abolition of Capitulations was of prime importance for the future development of Turkey.

The first Capitulation offered to Francis I was aimed at securing an alliance and a second front in Europe against the Holy Christian League and Hungary which Sultan Suleiman was fighting from the southeast. According to Mediterranean law, which extends jurisdiction of a sovereign state to its subjects anywhere, the Ottoman emperor granted to the Christian king a protectorate over Latin Christendom and the holy places within the Ottoman Empire. In addition he granted France consular jurisdiction, i.e., extraterritoriality, for French nationals who were Ottoman subjects, and he insisted upon the compulsory flying of the French flag by all European ships in Ottoman waters. "This granting of the privilege of Capitulations was a spontaneous act of the Ottoman government"; thus Marquis Garroni, the Italian representative, at the Lausanne Conference, in 1923, characterized the beginning of the Capitulations. This system of religious, judicial, and economic Capitulations laid the basis for French supremacy in the Near East for four centuries, so that "in 1630, when French influence was at its height in the Levant, the French ambassador at Constantinople was a veritable vice-emperor of the Orient, the Grand Vizier of the Christians."² This system became the model for subsequent treaties with other European powers—England in 1579, the Netherlands in 1598, the Hapsburg Empire in 1780, the Russian Empire in 1768, Germany and Italy in the nineteenth century—until all states had acquired like privileges except Switzerland and the Holy See. What had begun as "a spontaneous act" expressing military and political self-confidence

² *Atatürk*, by Gérard Tongas, Sorbonne, Paris.

was to end in a failing empire's weak concessions to the pressing demands of grasping powers. In the words of Halidé Edib: "The injustice of Capitulations represented the supreme symbol of Turkish humiliation." Although Capitulations were to be valid only for the lifetime of the sultan concerned, the decline in Ottoman power made any revocation practically impossible.

As late as World War I, even the Young Turks could not succeed in liberating the Ottoman Empire from these Capitulations. Their German allies themselves would not grant them a release. When in 1917 negotiations on the subject of Capitulations were going on between the Young Turkish and German governments, I made a personal appeal to the German chancellor³ in the interests of my Young Turkish friends. I summarized the destructive effects of the Capitulations as follows:

The system of Capitulations is extremely unjust and disadvantageous to the Turks. While it affords special privileges and prerogatives to foreigners, it constitutes a great hardship to Turkey, effecting judicial, legal and private rights as well as the state economy and political affairs. Turkey has no jurisdiction over foreigners in police matters or taxes, and cannot control or tax their imports, exports, or trade.⁴

The foreigner retains complete "extraterritoriality" and is bound only to the laws of his native country. Although Turkey is obliged to observe all his rights as a guest, the foreigner, in return, has no obligations toward Turkey or Turkish law. Foreign consular courts have complete jurisdiction over all controversies between their own nationals, with their judge presiding according to their own laws. Even controversies between Turks

³ See page 135.

⁴ Borne out by the following extract from the official American *Commerce Reports* of May 22, 1920, as reported in *Modern Turkey* by Eliot G. Mears: "There is no law in Turkey obliging any foreign bank, banking house, or mercantile firm wishing to establish a branch house in Turkey to submit itself to any official or legal formalities. Consequently, any bank or private firm is at liberty to establish a branch in Turkey and freely transact and conduct business. An illustration of this is shown by the presence in Constantinople and other parts of Turkey, of branches of foreign banks, like the *Crédit Lyonnais*, the Bank of Athens, the *Banca di Roma*, etc., which had not to ask the authorization of the Turkish Government for establishing their branches here. Another example is furnished by the branch of the *Standard Oil Co.*, of New York, which established itself in the same way some years ago. . . . Foreign firms conserve their nationality and are governed with regard to their internal organization, and to the rights and duties of its members, according to the law of their country."

and foreigners are not handled in Turkish courts, but are referred to a mixed court. Turkish police cannot arrest foreigners nor even their own nationals who had assigned themselves over by writ to the protection of a foreign consulate or legation. The Russian consulate developed a lucrative political and financial business trafficking in these "safe-conduct" papers for Turks.

The crassest example is that of the Turkish mayor of Constantinople, a friend of mine, who wanted to protect his city from the "civilization of syphilization," as he called it. But when the Mayor once attempted to invoke city health measures in the case of foreign prostitutes, the foreign ambassador in question immediately intervened and represented himself as the guardian angel of the diseased prostitute, thus preventing the Mayor from protecting the health of the capital.

Foreign states had the right to supervise and control their own postal traffic. All letters and packages from Europe and even mail between foreigners in Turkey were handled by a non-Turkish postal administration, thus depriving Turkey of postal income amounting to many millions a year. A Turkish minister once figured out that, if foreigners were taxed according to the German yardstick and if their postal privileges were canceled, the resulting income would be sufficient to cover the Turkish budget deficit.

It was the same with education. Foreign schools were better financed, taught an un-Turkish philosophy of life, and carried on a great deal of political propaganda. Almost every anti-Turkish representative of "Ottoman-Christian" nations came out of these extraterritorial schools.

Depreciation of Turkey's economic strength is still more important and dangerous than these judicial and cultural Capitulations. The foreigner has all the advantages of education, capital, experience, and connections. He enjoys every conceivable state and city privilege. He can count his profits in millions, but does not have to pay taxes. The native Turks, on the other hand, have inferior education, less experience and capital, little international connection, and moreover, have to pay all their taxes. Foreign commercial activity bloomed and expanded, while Turkish manufacturing enterprises were forced to stagnate.

Turkey's inability to control customs tariffs according to her needs had an even more disastrous effect. Only a uniform tariff could be raised—and not to protect their own products or to limit the importation of foreign wares according to what was needed. But even if an increase in the tariff were to be attained, it had to be approved unanimously by all foreign powers concerned and each power forced Turkey to pay for it by obtain-

ing additional political privileges and dictating to Turkey how the increased income was to be used. In the case of railroads, for instance, the Turkish government could not build rail lines according to her needs or desire.

Thus, when war broke out, Turkey found herself in the position of not having any rail connection between Anatolia and Syria or between Anatolia and Mesopotamia. Thus munitions and supplies have to be dragged wearily over mountain passes into Syria by ox, camel, and truck. The French had built a railway along the line of possible attack from the sea into Syria, but it had no connection with the line from Constantinople. Besides, it also has a different rail gauge than the Anatolian railroad. And it is well-known that twenty years before, England had threatened with arms to prevent a Turkish plan for building a Syrian-Egyptian rail line to Akaba. Likewise Russia has prevented any European concession in Eastern Anatolia.

Capitulations have always added up to the same old story. They were invoked when a loan was to be floated, a mining privilege granted, a bridge built, a railway constructed. In every case, the matter would be handled by the financial and political interests not of Turkey but of outside European powers. Most public utilities, such as electricity, tramways, telephone, gas, water, etc., are in French, German, Austrian, and British hands. The Ottoman debt is administered by an international council.

Railways in particular were not planned in regard to the economic or political advantage of Turkey but with reference to the advantage of the competing powers. What zone would the railway be built in? It must not be close to the Russian border or the British neighborhood in the Arabian provinces. What route would it follow? Will it be permitted inland, out of reach of the guns of battleships? What is to be the starting point? Will it be Constantinople in order to strengthen Ottoman administration in the provinces or will it be the Mediterranean coast so as to constitute an invasion route into the Ottoman Empire? In other words: is a railroad to serve centripetal or centrifugal purposes? What is to be the mileage? That will have to be bargained from time to time. How is the railroad to be financed? Certain customs duties must be agreed upon by the rival powers involved and certain compensations will be asked for by each in return for each new concession. The whole Turkish railroad system has been laid down as a result of such diplomatic and financial pulling and pushing by the outside powers. When the war broke out the Ottoman Empire owned no more than 31 per cent of the railroads. All the rest are owned

by German (36.8%), French (21%), British (10.5%), and Belgian (0.7%) companies. Neither Russia nor Italy controls any Ottoman railroad.

The abolition of these suicidal "treaties," or Capitulations, has become the war aim of all Turkish statesmen and military leaders in their war of liberation. I have had occasion to discuss some of the military consequences of Capitulations with Mustafa Kemal in the Dardanelles, with Enver Pasha when he returned from the Caucasus and Mesopotamia, and with Djemal Pasha after his experiences in Syria and Palestine. They faced the unsurmountable handicap of having to fight a war on four fronts without having any modern system of communication linking any one of the fronts to headquarters in Constantinople, let alone to other fronts. No government of Turkey, fettered by such treaties and facing such physical obstacles to national unity, could be considered master of its own destiny. As early as 1908 I advocated abrogation of the Capitulations, but at that time I did not begin to comprehend what the complexity of Turkey's enslavement amounted to. Now I do, and therefore urge anew that Turkey be released from these paralyzing "Capitulations."

It was a British diplomat, Sir Mark Sykes, who stated in the House of Commons: "The Turkish Empire has survived disaster, but it cannot survive exploitation."

Turkish Capitulations were the equivalent of the extraterritorial privileges which the Western powers claimed in every country where they did not trust the non-Christian concept of law and justice, e.g., in the Far East as late as 1943. (Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in his book *China's Destiny*, lays the deterioration of moral values in China to these foreign encroachments and humiliations of the last century.) True, these Capitulations sometimes worked well for individuals, such as Sun Yat-sen in China, or Halidé Edib in Turkey, and other political refugees who found shelter in the extra-territoriality of foreign embassies and institutions. However, this fact does not alter their destructive consequences.

But nowhere in the peripheral Far East were the consequences as devastating as they were in the central Middle East. For four long centuries the Ottoman Empire was subject to the special demands of the Western powers, particularly during that century which covered the commercial and industrial revolutions and introduced the technical changes that gave these powers their place in the modern

world. From these advantages Turkey was held back. Geographically surrounded and at times politically encircled, split internally owing to the special rights enjoyed by the Christian national minorities, her economic destiny in the hands of both these "enemy aliens" and those outsiders, the Ottoman Empire faced disruption and extinction at the hand of the great states of Europe.

The process of disintegration was slow but steady. It started when the farthest point of Ottoman expansion was reached, when Turkish armies had overrun the contiguous states of the Christian Balkans—Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece—and encountered the outposts of the bordering empires along and beyond the Danube.

The war between the Holy Roman Empire under the Hapsburgs and the Ottoman Empire went on for two centuries until the Ottoman retreat began with the lifting of the siege of Vienna in 1683 and the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz (1699). By it the Ottomans lost Hungary and Transylvania but retained possession of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a control which, though only formal, lasted until the Young Turks' revolution in 1908.

On the other side, the Ottoman Empire faced the increasing pressure of the Greek Orthodox Empire under the Russian Romanovs. After 1552 war with Russia became not the exception but the rule. As the Hapsburgs pressed down through the Balkans toward Salonika and the Mediterranean, so the Romanovs—Peter and Catherine—drove toward the Sea of Azov, the Crimea and the Black Sea, and farther on to Constantinople, whose name Catherine the Great significantly used for her grandson Constantine. At the end of the seventeenth century another disastrous peace treaty, that of Kuchuk Kainardje (1774), granted Russia a protectorate over the Greek Orthodox Christians of the Ottoman Empire.

The religious issue was a convenient and powerful political weapon to employ in the pincer movement of Capitulations and Millets. Now the privileged Christian protectors outside could press for "reforms" for the privileged Christian subjects of the Moslem Empire. The reforms demanded had to deal with the status of the Christian churches—Greek, Bulgarian, Serb, Macedonian, Albanian, Armenian, Syrian, and other denominations. Other reforms pressed for had to deal with civil rights and economic and political privi-

leges. The reforms were to be carried out under the supervision of the Christian powers through their Christian trustees, princes and governors from outside, in a word of today, "gauleiters." In some cases, the national minorities were to be granted varying and increasing degrees of autonomy until finally complete independence was achieved. This process of supervised disintegration was hastened by wars and military and political occupations or annexations. In times of peace, revolts were promoted, and the atrocities and massacres perpetrated by both sides stirred up the Christian world against the Moslem infidel. And along with this deliberate undermining, intervention, and open attack by imperialistic powers there were the positive forces of nationalism and self-determination seeking full realization in the loose and ungainly conglomerate of the Ottoman supranational state.

Thus, out of the Moslem Ottomans' systems of Millets and Capitulations emerged in the last century and a quarter the states of Serbia, Greece, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. With the one exception of the two indigenous Serbian dynasties, of the pro-Russian Karageorgevic and the pro-Austrian Obrenovic, all the "reforming" princes who later became kings were from Europe, most of them from Germany, which had a glut of princelings. Bavaria (and later Denmark) contributed a ruler for Greece; the mother of the present king was Wilhelm II's sister. A branch of the Hohenzollerns, the Sigmaringens, gave a king to Rumania; Saxe-Coburg-Gotha gave one to Bulgaria, whose son married into the Italian royal family. The Wieds provided a prince for Albania. Beginning as trustees, installed by the great powers to watch over the souls and the interests of the Christian communities within the Moslem Ottoman Empire, they developed into national patriots fully prepared to take advantage of the increasing weakness of the Ottomans and the positive forces of internal revolutionary explosion.

AN AMERICAN SIMILE

If we were to attempt to translate the Ottoman Moslem practice of Millets and Capitulations into American terms, the resulting picture would appear fantastic and incredible. It might serve, however, to bring home to us the extent of more than four centuries of

Turkish "generosity" or "humiliation," depending on how you regard it. It would help us understand the basic causes of the decline of the Ottoman Empire as well as the breadth of the vision and the magnitude of the achievement of Kemal Ataturk.

Suppose that George Washington, at the peak of victory and at the moment when the nation seemed most unified, strong and secure, had been anxious to show some special mark of gratitude to his comrades-in-arms Generals Steuben and Lafayette. Suppose that he decided that the most fitting gift would be to grant to the heads of their respective nations, the King of Prussia and the Government of France, the privilege of exercising supervision over what, for sake of argument, may be considered national churches in the United States—the Lutheran Church and the Roman Catholic Church. Suppose, in addition, that Prussia and France were allowed to exercise supervision over the national communities of Germans and Frenchmen that Steuben and Lafayette established. These communities would have grown more and more autonomous, not by any illegal means, but by the law which granted these privileges.

Now suppose that a British government had asked for and obtained a similar protectorate over the Episcopal Church in the United States. Suppose that in any negotiations with European governments similar privileges were granted and retained in regard to religious communities. The French would have retained certain privileges in Louisiana in 1803, the Spaniards in Florida in 1819 and in Mexico in 1848, the privileges of sending in gauleiters to supervise the Roman Catholic churches in all their activities. The Russians would then have been in a position to press the same claims with reference to the Greek Orthodox Church when Alaska and California were transferred to the United States in 1844 and 1867.

To make a long story short, out of these church autonomies under foreign direction would have grown up quite legally a number of nationalities with autonomous status—British, French, Spanish, Russian, Italian, German, Japanese, in fact, any nationality which had pressed for equal privileges in extraterritorial control. These minorities, all protégés of their respective protecting powers, would have been privileged to have their own courts and jurisdiction, their sepa-

rate schools and post offices, they would be exempt from income taxes and from the demands of military service.

The protecting powers would, of course, have taken an active hand in the competition to win over other minorities and races such as Negroes and Indians. They would have had the right to object to any scheme of customs duties and any plans for railways, highways, and canals. In the Far West, for example, the Japanese and Russians could have refused to give their consent to the Alaska Highway as well as the Panama Canal, both of which would likely need the unanimous approval of all the powers. The building of any strategic railway would have depended on the consent of any power even remotely involved—Canada, Britain, France, Japan, and Russia in the North, Spain and Italy in the South, and Germany in the Middle West. Thus Hitler, Mussolini, and Hirohito—not to mention the heads of other states—would have had in the United States not just illegal fifth columns of conationals, but completely legitimate colonies, with their loyalty to an outside protecting power transcending their American oath of allegiance.

No State Department, Congress, or FBI would be permitted to arrest the forces which were making for disintegration or successfully combat the external pressure of the "protecting" power.

This was the position of old Turkey—mortgaged by the heritage of the past, by a geography that had planted the Ottoman Empire at the intercontinental and interoceanic crossroads of all imperialistic European powers, and by a history that had cultivated Moslem mentality to grant Christian privileges—in a way that "reason turns to nonsense and benefit to worry" and "statutes and laws that we inherit, turn to external malady."

Into this heritage the Young Turks were born—around 1880—national patriots who attempted to reform and to defend the Moslem Ottoman Empire: the unlucky Enver and Talaat as well as the successful Kemal Ataturk and Ismet Inonu, the present President of Turkey.

PART THREE

SECOND TURKEY OF THE YOUNG TURKISH EMPIRE

Moslem Ottoman Empire of the Young Turkish Committee

Young Turks trying to square the circle

Triborobridge over three peninsulas

From Capitulations toward liberation

Kemal—Young Turkish Osmanli for a decade to defend the Empire

10

THE YOUNG TURKS' REVOLUTION: "TURKEY FOR THE TURKS!"

THE DECADE OF THE SECOND TURKEY DIVIDED THE SIX CENTURIES OF the Ottoman Empire from the modern Turkish Republic. This decade opened with the Young Turks' revolution in 1908. The revolution was under the direction of the Young Turkish Committee, aided by the military ability of Kemal Ataturk, who was frequently critical of its political ideas but gave it unstinting loyalty and service during the ten war-torn years. This era of the Second Turkey ended with the second revolution, carried through under the military and political leadership of Kemal Ataturk himself, who wiped out the last vestiges of the Ottoman system.

Some knowledge of this Second Turkey¹ is necessary to an understanding of the present situation in which Turkey is both determined and competent to resist Hitler's threats and Papen's flattery.

In 1908, the Young Turks' movement faced the basic question: How to preserve, liberate, and consolidate Turkey? The same question stated in a new context had to be faced by Ataturk in 1918. In seeking a satisfactory answer both revolutions had to wage wars with outside powers, wars directed toward the achievement of satisfactory internal and external relationships and, above all, toward the independence of Turkey from outside domination.

The revolutions were faced with a matter of definition: What was meant by *Turkey*? Was Turkey the Moslem Ottoman Empire or was it the Turkish nation? Various answers were attempted. The Young Turks attempted the task of "Westernizing" the Moslem Ottoman Empire. They failed. Made wiser by this experience, Ata-

¹ For further amplification beyond this sketch see the author's book, *Der Aufsteigende Halbmond*.

turk confined his efforts to Westernizing the Turkish nation—a more realistic objective. It is doubtful if Atatürk could have succeeded, had the Young Turks not played their historic role of attempting the impossible. At the height of his career Atatürk frankly stated that to a considerable extent his accomplishment “rested on Talaat’s shoulders.” (Besides Enver and Djemal, Talaat was the outstanding statesman among the Young Turks, the Grand Vizier of the Young Turkish Triumvirate, and at one time, along with Kemal, one of the driving forces in the secret patriotic societies in Salonika which prepared for the revolution of 1908.)

It was Reval that gave the signal for the revolution. At the Russian Baltic port of Reval (later Tallinn, the capital of Estonia) Czar Nicholas met Edward VII, King of England, and on June 9 agreed to intervene in Constantinople for the purpose of achieving administrative reforms for the Christian population in the Ottoman province of Macedonia. Here was the scene of the Christian Macedonian, Bulgarian, Greek, and Serb comitatchis, patriotic committees which practiced their atrocities against one another and against the Moslem population and the Turkish police. They pressed for fulfillment of the promises made by the Great Powers at the Berlin Congress of 1878 to the heterogeneous population of Macedonia. In accordance with the tradition of intervention and “reform,” the move by Russia and England was designed to prepare the way for Macedonian autonomy and the further partitioning of the Ottoman Empire.

The Reval action at once brought a response. Young officers of the Ottoman army in and around Macedonia, in Salonika, in Monastir, and in Albania countered this interventionist move by undertaking on their own initiative to carry through administrative reforms and “Westernization.” They were all members of the Young Turkish Committee, who for more than ten years had rallied to such slogans as “Country and Liberty” and “Union and Progress.” Young Kemal was active among them. Most of them had been exiled for their progressive opinions and activities. They were intellectuals who lived as refugees in Paris, Geneva, and London and from there nourished some underground movement at home. Others, the military people, had been banished by the despotic sultan to the periph-eric provinces in Ottoman Europe and Ottoman Asia. The great

majority of these officers were thoroughly Westernized by their professional European studies and by military instruction from Prussian army reformers—from the great Moltke on to General von der Goltz (since 1880). Prominent among these military Young Turks was Enver, Kemal's prospective rival, who later was to become military attaché in Berlin as Kemal was in Sofia.

Thus the irony of history made German imperial generals in the Prussian tradition the promoters of the Young Turkish officers' revolution against the Kaiser's friend, the Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. The Kaiser himself corroborated this accidental connection by his marginal statement on an ambassadorial report from London which expressed the fear that Britain would now get the upper hand in a new democratized Turkey: "The Revolution is not a product of the 'Young Turks' living in Paris and London, but was effected by the army, exclusively by Turkish officers trained by German generals. It is a purely military revolution! These officers have the power in their hands and are completely disposed toward everything German. Russia would not for very long tolerate the strengthening of Turkey through British aid. And it is precisely over this point that serious differences between Russia and Britain will arise in the future."

Neither the conspiring Young Turkish officers nor the exiled intellectuals had any elaborate program; their joint demands focused on the restoration of that democratic parliamentary constitution which had originally been proclaimed in the first year of Abdul Hamid's reign, 1876. In that year, the leader of the Reform party, Midhat Pasha, famous for his brilliant administration of the Bulgarian and Mesopotamian provinces, had succeeded in wresting from the new and young sultan a democratic constitution which provided for a parliamentary government, based on proportional representation of all nationalities, and declared the indivisibility of the Ottoman Empire, the liberty of the individual, the freedom of conscience, education and press, and the equality of taxation. The Sultan, however, was loath to dispense with the time-honored absolute power of his ancestors and rescinded the constitution almost immediately. Midhat himself was saved from execution only by intervention of the British government.

Now under threat of a march on the palace, the same sultan granted the Young Turks' demands for the reinstitution of that democratic parliamentary government which was to reform and Westernize the Ottoman Empire. But when the crisis seemed to have passed he once more went back on his promise. This treachery capping a thoroughly black record was too much even for the patient Young Turks, whose bloodless and human revolution was called all over Europe "the revolution of the gentlemen." They forced him to give up his throne and exiled him to Salonika. The capital city itself was occupied by the Young Turkish Ottoman army under the leadership of General Mahmud Shevket Pasha with both Enver and Kemal in his staff.

The successful revolution took the lid off long-suppressed political discussion. The cafés of the capital were packed with eagerly talking citizens. The streets were filled with marching troops singing patriotic songs. Everywhere the word repeated was *vatan*, fatherland. What was this fatherland? "Osmanli are we," the soldiers sang. "Long live the Emperor!" they shouted with great sincerity: *Padishahim Tchok Yasha!* Was the Ottoman dynasty still to be preserved? Were the far-extended frontiers of the Moslem Ottoman empire—still extending in 1908, as we pointed out, from the Austrian borders and the Albanian coasts, from the Balkan mountains to the Armenian Ararat and the Arabian and African provinces—still to be defended with the lives of Turkish soldiers? These were the vexing questions in the revolution that succeeded almost before its aims were defined. So swiftly, indeed, did the Young Turkish officers succeed that the refugees in Paris and London themselves were surprised by the victory of the military revolution.

Besides *vatan*, there was another word in everyone's mouth and in every newspaper: *hurriet*, liberty. At that time I frequently attended Masonic lodge meetings of the Young Turks. Among my brother Masons I would meet Moslems and Christians, Turks, Arabs, Armenians, Greeks, Bulgarians, Jews, and *Doenmés* (Jewish Moslems)—all with the common headdress, the fez, the mark of citizenship in the Ottoman Empire. When liberty was discussed it would be applied to all the national groups within the supranational

empire,² all now liberated from the Hamidian regime of absolutism and palace intrigue. Under the constitution renewed by the Young Turks the non-Moslem nationalities had their full share of "liberty, equality, and fraternity"—according to the ideas of the Western revolution of 1789 which were now taken up by the Eastern revolution. The Christian nationalities as well as the Jews were represented by their coreligionists in the cabinet and for the first time were admitted to military service.

Above all, liberty was thought of as freedom from the intervention of foreign powers, the protection of Ottoman integrity. The idea of the Turkish nation as distinct from the Ottoman Empire was slow in emerging and required the disciplinary and purifying experience of World War I and the later war of liberation before it became clearly defined.

But fundamentally the Ottoman Empire remained a Moslem state. It had to rely on Moslem law, the shariat and the sheik of Islam. For the law of Islam itself was required to sanction the national revolution and even the dethronement of the Sultan who, at the same time, was Moslem caliph and Pan-Islamic head, a kind of secular pope. The Young Turkish leaders were well aware of both the conservatism and the influence of the Islamic authorities. They took great pains not to challenge or offend religious feelings and prejudices. Even some years after the revolution, Enver Pasha's wife, for example, who was an imperial princess, would never appear in public. When we had dinner in the German embassy she would not take part, but waited outside the ambassadorial park in her car with the blinds drawn tightly. Talaat's wife, too, remained secluded behind her veil.

In brief, then, the "revolution" of the Young Turks, in spite of its terminology, was bound to be conservative. The Moslem Ottoman Empire was to be defended by conserving and reforming its historic attributes. The façade of the imperial palace was to be repaired and some of its inner recesses fumigated. The Young Turks' Com-

² The statistics available in 1908, though unreliable, counted about 34 millions of Ottoman subjects, in rough figures: 17 million Turks, 4 million Greeks, 1 million Serbs, ½ million Bulgarians, 2 million Albanians, 2 million Armenians, 1½ million Kurds, 6 million Arabs, 300,000 Jews, and some smaller minorities.

mittee set for themselves the task of adapting the complicated Moslem system of Millets and Capitulations and the supranational organization to the needs of a modern power. Of course, it soon became apparent that the Young Turks were attempting the impossible. The old Eastern bottle simply would not hold the new Western wine. This was a basic incompatibility between Western modernity and the concepts of Ottoman Islam, and of the confusion that resulted from the Young Turks' conservative compromise.

We have already mentioned the rather amusing spectacle of the Ottoman Sultan appearing in a Prussian uniform. Imagine the picture: to honor the German Kaiser, who was his guest in Constantinople in 1917, the Ottoman Emperor, caliph of all the Moslems, donned the uniform of a field marshal of the Prussian King. The successor of Mohammed, the commander of the Moslem faith, stood before the world as a servant and an officer of the Emperor of the unbelievers, the commander of a branch of the Christian Protestant faith! When I saw him in his palace in 1917, the Sultan was wearing the Prussian field marshal's uniform topped by an Ottoman fez—a compromise reached after long negotiations between Moslem lawyers and Christian politicians.

In the beginning, the Young Turkish Committee thought of their *vatan* as the fatherland of the Ottoman Empire. Later, some of them thought of it as the Turkish nation and established—under the intellectual leadership of the great sociologist, Ziya Goekalp, and aided by the propagandizing ability of the poet, Mehmed Emin—the organization of *Turkish Hearths*. It was part of a program of Turkish nationalization, of "Turkifying" the multifarious Ottoman nationalities—instead of "Ottomanizing" the Turks.

But any Pan-Ottoman or Pan-Turkish movement was bound to accentuate the historic conflict between the centripetal and the centrifugal forces within the empire—not to mention the magnetic pull on the peripheral provinces and nationalities exerted by the powers and conationalities outside. Trying desperately to escape history, the Young Turks had set themselves the task of squaring the circle. The Young Turks tried to deal with the consequences of the Moslem Ottoman Empire's failures and frustrations and preserve at the same time the form and substance of that empire. Atatürk, with no

a priori commitments, resolved to attack the problems at their roots, even if it meant sacrificing historic territorial boundaries and traditional forms and mores.

The preliminary work of the Young Turks is often forgotten in the face of the more spectacular achievements of Atatürk. But in that decade of inescapable transition many plans for Westernization were inaugurated and consummated and moral forces were set free which were sufficiently strong to carry through the program of Atatürk to its successful conclusion.

"Viewed in the perspective afforded by the passing of a score of years, the Young Turks period—in spite of its mistakes and more or less fruitless undertakings—cannot be recorded as an era of failures." Thus an American sociologist³ characterized the Young Turkish decade. "The rending of bonds with the past and the initiation of modernization projects, incomplete though they were and for the most part confined to Istanbul and the favored classes of society, were of inestimable value in helping to prepare the way for the great forward steps to be taken in the fullness of time and under the leadership of him whom the Fates preserved and reserved to do his greatest work at the strategic moment, Kemal Atatürk."

This is what Atatürk himself implied when, speaking of his former revolutionary comrade in spirit, the Young Turkish leader Talaat, he pointed to the latter's historic preparatory role.

This explains also the impressive public honors paid to Talaat's body when, in 1943, it was brought home to Istanbul from Berlin where Talaat had been assassinated and buried in 1921.⁴ In the funeral procession from the "Hill of Liberty" to Talaat's reburial in Turkish soil, personal representatives of the cabinet and a great popular crowd joined the troops, paying full military honors. It had been my privilege to make the funeral oration, at the time of his death in 1921. Now, the address was delivered by our mutual friend, the senior of the political publicists, Hussein Djahid Yalcin, who, weeping over the grave, personified the historic evolution from the Young Turkish period to Atatürk's era.

Another mutual friend and veteran publicist, representing these

³ Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Atatürk*, 1939.

⁴ See page 271.

two Turkeys, took part in the burial procession—Ahmed Emin Yalman, a Turkish sociologist, with a Columbia University Ph.D. In his monograph on World War Turkey⁵ he had given an account of Young Turkish domestic reforms, apart from the activity of the “Turkish Hearth.” These reforms included: new codes of civil and commercial law; family law revision, raising the position of women; employment of women as nurses and in charitable activities, in army shops and in labor battalions behind the front; training of boy scouts; the organization of a Society for National Education and Training; collecting of folklore and folksongs; extension of the University of Istanbul; new institutions in architecture, arts, and music; translation of the Koran into Turkish, and even conduction of the ritual in Turkish in a few mosques in the capital.

Each of these items indicates a first Young Turkish step toward Ataturk’s goal of building up national consciousness and a Turkish nation. But the Young Turks were not allowed to solve their own vital questions, unmolested by external intrigues and intrusion. To prove successful the Young Turkish revolution needed ten years of peace; instead, it got twelve years of war.

The Young Turks’ revolution had strange consequences. It led to a series of partitions by all their neighbors, to a British-German partnership, to an alliance between the Ottoman middle land and the German Middle Europe, and eventually to a war of liberation and the realization of national independence. It may almost be said that the Young Turks’ experience set the course of foreign policy which today places Turkey alongside of the forces arrayed to defeat the Axis armies.

⁵ *Turkey in the World War*, Yale University Press, 1930.

11

THE BALKANS' COUNTERREVOLUTION: "THE BALKANS FOR THE BALKAN PEOPLES!"

THE BASIC PROBLEM FACING THE YOUNG TURKS WAS THIS: COULD ANY revolution designed to be conservative and Pan-Ottoman reverse the century-old process of the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire? What was to be the reaction of the neighboring Balkan states such as Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia—all former Ottoman provinces and all extremely suspicious of any move toward Ottoman consolidation? And again, what was to be the reaction of those European powers directly interested in a Balkan balance of power—Russia, on the one hand, and Austria and Italy, on the other?

Out of these conflicting forces came events which shook three continents and eventually led to World War I. The first incident after the Young Turks' revolution was the annexation by the Austrian government of an Ottoman Serb-populated province in 1908—an action which Sir Edward Grey characterized as "that breach of the public law of Europe which initiated the new era of European anarchy." The final consequence of this action was the assassination of the Austrian archduke by an Austro-Serbian irredentist at Sarajevo in 1914. In all, there have been since 1908 five political and diplomatic actions involving military mobilization that flowed from the Young Turks' revolution and, in a sense, provided a dress rehearsal for World War I. (They were like those "incidents" of aggression from 1931 on, in China, Abyssinia, Spain, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Albania, which were a prelude to global war.)

Both historic processes—the Young Turkish revolution and the Balkan counterrevolution—referred back to readjustments which had taken place a generation previously. Just as in 1876 Young Turkish patriots had forced the democratic constitution of Midhat

Pasha on the Sultan Abdul Hamid, so in 1878 Russian imperialism and Balkan nationalism had been registered in two settlements.

The first was the Russo-Turkish Peace Treaty of San Stefano—that Constantinople suburb where the Russian armies were stopped by a British fleet protecting Constantinople. This treaty virtually swept the Ottoman Empire from the Balkans and satisfied nearly all claims of the Balkan States as well as Russian Pan-Slavism.

The second was the European Congress of Berlin, three months later, which reversed San Stefano under the joint influence of Disraeli and Bismarck, by restoring some Ottoman rule in the Balkans, promising administrative reforms and putting off dissatisfied imperialistic and nationalistic aspirations in the Balkans for the future. The Treaty of Berlin in 1878 paved the way for disappointed Russia's alliance with France, which later was extended to include Great Britain and form the Triple Entente, after Germany had concluded her Triple Alliance with Austria-Hungary and Italy.

Now, with the rise of the Young Turkish Crescent and their Pan-Ottomanism or Pan-Turkism, a new force appeared to consolidate the Ottoman Empire against any claim from outside. What if the Young Turks were to invite into their new parliament Ottoman representatives of such provinces as Macedonia, Albania, and Tripolitania, which were all coveted by their various creditors? What if the Young Turkish parliament should require representation from such possessions as the parts of Bulgaria or Bosnia which were formally Ottoman but actually under European mandates by Sofia and Vienna? In the face of such a possibility the powers which held mortgages of one kind or another against the Ottoman estate hastened to demand payment. The very energy of the Young Turks in speeding their integrating reforms hastened the disintegration of the empire. If the old Turkey had to wage war once a generation, the Young Turks were compelled to fight every year of their decade.

Six creditors held mortgages against the Ottoman Empire and they all hastened to make the Young Turks pay off the old debts contracted by their fathers in 1878, either at San Stefano or in Berlin: two great powers, Austria and Italy, and four of the five Balkan States—Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia, and Montenegro.

Here are the six acts of the historic drama, opened by the Young Turks' revolution and leading after six years to World War I:

1. The first repercussion was Bulgaria's action on October 5, 1908. She proclaimed her full independence from the Ottoman government, once attained through Russia by the San Stefano treaty, but again lost by the Berlin treaty which had left her still a semiautonomous tributary principality to the Ottoman government.

2. The Bosnian crisis followed the next day, October 6, 1908. This resulted in the annexation by Vienna of the Ottoman provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which had been occupied by Austria-Hungary under the European mandate of the Berlin treaty, now torn up by Vienna. It is this "unilateral breach of international law" to which Sir Edward Grey attributed the ensuing "era of European anarchy."¹ The result: rage and hatred in Russia, whose foreign minister, Iswolski, felt that he had been internationally duped and betrayed by his Austrian colleague, Count Aehrenthal; rage and hatred likewise in Serbia, which had coveted Bosnia-Herzegovina for its Serbian population, and where now secret anti-Austrian societies were founded, such as "Union or Death" whose members six years later were to assassinate the Austrian-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on his visit to that very Bosnia.

3. The Albanian crisis followed in 1910. The Albanian-Adriatic coast was coveted by the Russian protégés, Serbia and Montenegro, as well as by Russia's rivals, Austria and Italy, the latter holding the mortgage of the Berlin treaty. Each party stirred up the various Albanian tribes against the Young Turkish government.² In spite of successful warfare, Constantinople eventually had to give up Albania which later elected a German prince.

4. In a few distant parts of the empire, in Asia Minor, another mortgage was presented, also resulting from the Berlin treaty which promised reforms in Armenia. Here a minority now took the law into their own hands and pressed for hastening reforms by starting riots, one of which I witnessed in Adana in 1909.³

5. Across the Mediterranean, in Africa, the Tripolitanian War

¹ Thirty years later, 1938, Austria herself was to be annexed by the German Fuehrer Hitler in pursuance of that very "unilateral breach of international law."

² See the author's Albanian book: *Im Tuerkischen Kriegslager durch Albanien*, 1910. The copy at Columbia University Library bears the inscription: "This book has been loaned to the Government of the United States for use at the Peace Conference, Paris-Versailles, 1918/19." The German Foreign Office had used it for the London Conference, December 16, 1912, to January 6, 1913, during the Balkan War.

³ See *Der Aufsteigende Halbmond*, 1909.

broke out in 1911. Again an old mortgage, given to Italy by the other African powers, France and Britain, as compensation for their Tunisian and Egyptian policy, was presented to the Young Turkish government, which in spite of Enver's and Kemal's joint heroism was bound to lose the distant and last Ottoman province in Africa to the guns of the Italian fleet. The Italians also occupied the Dodecanese Islands.

6. Finally, in the same years the two Balkan wars followed, 1912-13. The first one united Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia-Montenegro in order to conquer Macedonia and to regain the Greater Bulgaria, Greater Greece, and Greater Serbia-Montenegro of the Russian treaty of San Stefano. They united against the Young Turks who defended the European treaty of Berlin. The second war united Greece, Serbia-Montenegro, Rumania, and the Young Turks against Greater Bulgaria, with the final result of a Bulgarian defeat and the Turkish reconquest of Adrianople, that strategical glacis necessary for the Turkish Dardanelles. But, aside from the Bulgarian losses, the San Stefano treaty had superseded the Berlin treaty by putting an end to any Ottoman rule in the Balkans.⁴

Yet by the loss of these heterogeneous European possessions—in fact, of two million Greeks and one million Serbs—Turkey has actually gained more strength and homogeneity. This was my thesis⁵ in 1912, at that time not yet accepted by my Turkish friends, who did not like my other suggestion to consider replacing the “peripheral Byzantine and Levantine capital Constantinople” by a Turkish center in Asia Minor, in their homeland Anatolia, by Konya or Kaisarieh or Ankara, for psychological as well as strategical reasons.

⁴ For further details beyond this cursory account, see Harry N. Howard, *Partition of Turkey*.

⁵ See E. G. Mears, *Modern Turkey*, 1924, and his estimate of my book *Deutschland im Orient nach dem Balkankrieg*, 1912-13.

BRITISH-GERMAN "PEACE OF BAGHDAD"

IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN ASIA MINOR, WHERE RUSSIAN AND BRITISH imperialism used to compete, a newcomer, Germany, was beginning to seek economic and political advantage. Germany was the late-and lastcomer in the history of nineteenth and twentieth century imperialism, in which all great powers participated by means of financial investments and economic expansion, "spheres of influence," and "peaceful penetration" leading to "peaceful partition" of undeveloped or semisovereign countries. In Asia Minor the new field of diplomatic maneuver centered around the proposed railroad which would connect Konya in Anatolia with Baghdad in Mesopotamia. In 1911, after an investigation of the whole issue and all the interests involved, the author, in a letter to his friend, the German foreign minister, Kiderlen-Waechter, advocated a policy of full British-German co-operation.

A year after this letter was written, in 1912, the German Kaiser cut out a cartoon from *Punch*, showing the Kaiser riding with Kiderlen on a locomotive to the Persian Gulf with the caption "A dream of Baghdad made in Germany," which intimated that the dream was about to come true with full British consent. With the inscription "Congratulations on the German-British peace of Baghdad" the Kaiser mailed it to Kiderlen-Waechter, who passed it on to me.

It was a fact that a most amazing British-German agreement had been reached on precisely that most disputed issue—the Constantinople-Baghdad (or rather, to be exact, Konya-Baghdad) railroad. Konya, old Greek Iconium—renowned from St. Paul's church and Barbarossa's crusades as well as from Genghis Khan and the Seljuks' invasions—is situated in the center of Anatolia and was the terminal

of the Anatolian railroad which was to be continued to Baghdad and the Persian Gulf and to be named the Baghdad Railroad (from Konya on). This at first purely financial and economic scheme of the Deutsche Bank was to be misnamed and misrepresented by the political slogan "Berlin-Baghdad," a slogan first used in a Pan-German pamphlet written by a pseudonymous "Winterstaetten" who put together into one unit different railroads which actually belonged to Germany, Austria-Hungary, Serbia, Bulgaria and Turkey, all being sovereign states.

The difference between the Turkish Constantinople-Baghdad plan and the Pan-German "Berlin-Baghdad" slogan was explained in a letter I wrote to my friend, Captain Hans Humann, on May 11, 1914: "The pamphlet 'Berlin-Baghdad' is a strange mixture of Pan-German slogans. The latter propagate a completely unreasonable German territorial policy in the Balkans and in Turkey. This 'Berlin-Baghdad' slogan distorts the authentic and economically workable pro-Turkish idea of strengthening Turkey's communications, into politically impossible and harmful Pan-German aims of annexation, against which I have always fought."

In fact, as early as 1908 and 1912, and again in 1916, I had publicly advocated that the Near Eastern nations "be the builders of their own states and live as independent states instead of being used as mortar in the edifice of any foreign power and to become protectorates of any alien imperialism."²

At long last, in 1913, the fundamental difference between Pan-German propaganda slogans and the authentic foreign policy of the German government was acknowledged in London. Despite suspicions created over a decade by Chancellor Buelow's unreliability and the distrust caused by Grand Admiral von Tirpitz's policy of naval rivalry, London and Berlin were able to come to an agreement over Turkey in the winter of 1913-14. The agreement was of such a satisfactory nature that Lloyd George could state before the House of Commons in June, 1914, that British-German relations were better than ever before and that, therefore, the next British armament budget would show a definite saving. All this, two months before the outbreak of World War I!

² See Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, Vol. XVIII, No. 6.

This agreement over Turkey finally ended German-British competition in Ottoman Asia Minor by defining two spheres of economic interests. Germany received England's consent to the German-Turkish Baghdad undertaking from Konya to Basra, including Anatolian irrigation works at Konya and harbor installations in Baghdad and Basra. England received Germany's approval of her Mesopotamian irrigation plans and of her position in Kuwait at the Persian Gulf. Germany and England were both to share in Tigris navigation to the Persian Gulf and in Mesopotamian oil production around Mosul.

This finally cleared up the twenty-five-year-old conflict over the Anatolian and Baghdad railway, and precisely in the manner suggested from the outset by Georg von Siemens, the engineer who proposed the railway—by a German-British community of interest, a German-British partnership agreement.

It was symbolical, too, that a German military mission under General Liman von Sanders and a British naval mission under Admiral Limpus were co-operating at the same time in reorganizing the Ottoman army and navy. To the suspicious Austrian ambassador in Constantinople the British-German understanding looked like "a kind of Anglo-German protectorate over Turkey."

During this same period, early in 1914, a similar agreement was reached by France and Germany regarding the Ottoman Empire. This also defined their respective economic and communication zones. Germany got the Anatolian and Baghdad network, while France took over the Syrian region and the Black Sea district. The German-Turkish rail line and the French-Turkish line were to meet at Aleppo. This agreement also was approved by the Ottoman government.

However, these British-German-French-Ottoman treaties, transacted during 1913-14, amounted to a "peaceful partition"³ of the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence.

The German-British treaty was initialed by London and Berlin on June 15, 1914. But it was never ratified. The authorization to ratify the agreement was sent from Berlin to Prince Lichnowsky, German ambassador in London, four weeks later. It was the last document

³For further details see the comprehensive study of Harry N. Howard, *The Partition of Turkey, 1913-1923*.

of this historic German-British agreement, which was swallowed up by the catastrophic events that developed out of the murder of the Austrian archduke at Sarajevo on June 28, 1914.

There were two diplomatic reasons for the tragic turn of events. In a word, Berlin had abandoned her previous attitude toward Vienna and London which had saved the peace in 1912 and 1913. The principles underlying this attitude had been established and applied by Minister von Kiderlen-Waechter, then responsible for Germany's foreign policy in the Bosnian Crisis and the Balkan Wars.

In 1909, the new chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, requested and received from Kiderlen-Waechter, then minister in Bucharest and a Near East specialist, a classic memorandum⁴ on the necessity and possibility of eliminating tension and effecting co-operation between Germany and England. From then on, the ideas expressed by Kiderlen-Waechter in his memorandum became his chief aim—Germany's role in world politics could be successful only through and with England, even at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. "Our primary aim must be to arrive at a political agreement with Britain," Kiderlen-Waechter maintained.

This was the cardinal principle of Kiderlen-Waechter's activity as long as he was German foreign minister, from 1910 to 1912. As the British historian, G. P. Gooch, put it: "The man of Agadir⁵ had developed into a pillar of European peace. In co-operation with Grey for this supreme purpose, he contributed to an Anglo-German *détente*."

Kiderlen-Waechter's conversations with me were reflected in the editorials I wrote against Pan-German arguments during those years. In March, 1911: "The present negotiations in Constantinople will introduce a way of thinking, starting with the Ottoman Baghdad railway, that will develop into a general Anglo-German understanding." In November, 1912: "Present events in the Near East will tell us whether to expect Anglo-German complications or an Anglo-German understanding over the central problem of Turkish Asia Minor. We have sufficient reason to believe that we are now able to count upon an end to the tension."

⁴ See his memoirs, edited by the author.

⁵ See page 264.

And later, in my conversations with von Jagow, Kiderlen-Waechter's successor. November, 1913: "Germany and England are entering a new era, not an era of brotherly enthusiasm or blind love, but one of sober calculation and understanding, advantageous to both parties." February, 1914: "Germany and England's standing against one another has turned gradually into a situation where they stand side by side. Perhaps it may yet develop into Germany and England standing *with* each other." April, 1914: "We are dependent on shaping world politics by continuous detailed activity rather than in great heroic moves. This will continue until an opportunity presents itself for exchanging the rewards of slow progress for the jackpot of a distant but visible political achievement."

This "political achievement" did, indeed, come in the form of an Anglo-German partnership over the Ottoman Empire, which "would have secured the peace of Europe for generations,"⁶ if . . .

In 1912, immediately after the outbreak of the Balkan War, actually a war for Constantinople, Kiderlen directed the Kaiser's attention to the moment "when the community of interest between England and Germany will be so striking to the naked eye that England will be completely unable to refuse mutual action with us." Kiderlen told the Kaiser: "It is certain that practical co-operation with England, in so important a question of general policy, would benefit our relations with our cousins on the other side of the channel much more than all the treaties on paper and all the expressions of solemn fraternization."

This kind of "practical co-operation with England" was reached when Grey and Kiderlen agreed to eliminate the oft-threatened Balkan conflict between Vienna and Belgrade-Petersburg. Co-operation was particularly effected when Germany switched to British

⁶ S. S. McClure, *Obstacles to Peace*: "On my way to Constantinople in the Balkanzug (1915) I was introduced by my friend Professor von Schultze-Gaevernitz to Dr. Jackh, an expert on Turkish affairs, who had been a close friend of the Foreign Minister Kiderlen-Waechter. He had helped in the preparation of the treaty, and he gave me its terms. I took the statement he gave me to the German Foreign Office in Berlin. Certain slight corrections were made . . . It settled the disputes between England and Germany, just as the treaties of 1904 and 1907 had settled the long-standing and war-provoking disputes between England and France and England and Russia. Sir Edward Grey had now completed his series of great agreements, and the German Government had demonstrated its pacific character. It would seem that this treaty would have secured the peace of Europe for generations."

tactics by establishing a permanent London Conference between ambassadors of the Great Powers. Grey had proposed the Conference, and Kiderlen had suggested London.

Thus Grey was able to write later, on March 5, 1913, to British Ambassador Goschen in Berlin: "Our relations with Germany have improved because Kiderlen worked for peace in the Balkan Crisis, and Jagow has done the same, and I shall do my part to keep relations cordial as long as the German Government will also do their part in good faith. To be sure of each other's good faith is all that is wanted to make our relations all that can be desired."

Then in 1914, a year later, and again in the face of a Balkan conflict between Vienna and Belgrade-Petersburg that meant war, Grey resorted to the same means—calling a Conference of Ambassadors in London in an attempt to mediate again between Vienna and Belgrade. This time it was in vain. Berlin, in consideration of her Austrian ally and Vienna's political inferiority complex, and afraid of losing face, rejected the instrument of a peace-saving Conference, although, shortly before, Grey and Kiderlen had agreed on its application as a means toward securing peace in Europe.

Two memoranda written by Sir Edward Grey illustrate the British and German viewpoints: "The more I think of it, the more horrible it seems to me that Germany refused to agree to a Conference in July last year. Serbia had accepted nine-tenths of the Austrian ultimatum, and the outstanding points could have been settled easily and honourably, if they had been referred to an international Conference: it would not have taken a fortnight to dispose of them. The invasion of Belgium, in my opinion, decided the overwhelming majority of our people to enter into the war; but the refusal of a Conference decided the fate of peace or war for Europe." And the other memorandum by Grey in 1918: "I see Jagow says [in his memoirs] I could have prevented the war, but the German veto on a Conference struck out of my hand the only effective instrument I could use for peace. I thought the Germans might object to a Conference on the ground that Russia would use it to mobilize, and if Germany had made that her objection I could have protested against Russian mobilization or preparation for war pending a Conference. But Bethmann-Hollweg's objection to a Conference was

absolute; and after he had refused and Russia had accepted a Conference I could not protest against Russian preparation for the event of war, especially as the German preparations were far ahead of the Russian, and I could not promise the armed support of this country to Russia. Von Jagow says Germany could not have accepted a Conference as she would have lost prestige, but he admits she lost no prestige in the London Conference of 1912-13, and the precedent of that was a guarantee that there would have been neither diplomatic defeat nor victory for anyone, but a fair conduct of another Conference composed of the same persons and conducted in the same way. And as Serbia had submitted to about nine-tenths of the Austrian ultimatum there could have been no loss of prestige in submitting the one or two points outstanding to a fair Conference."

Thus Kiderlen's principle and practice of not making decisions concerning the Near East without the co-operation of Great Britain had been abandoned by Berlin.

It was the same with Kiderlen's principle and practice of not permitting Vienna to create a *fait accompli* in the Balkans without his prior knowledge, as had happened in 1908 before he came into office, and in 1914 after he had died. In 1908, during the first Balkan Crisis, when Austria annexed Ottoman Bosnia without Germany's knowledge, Wilhelm II could state: "As an ally, my feelings have been deeply hurt, because Kaiser Franz Joseph failed to take me into his confidence. . . . Thus I am the last one in all Europe to whom anything is told."

Nevertheless, Prince von Buelow, the chancellor, assured Vienna of the "complete, unconditional loyalty of an ally" worthy of the "faith of the Nibelungs." To cope with this situation and the *fait accompli*, Kiderlen-Waechter was summoned in 1908 from his post as minister in Bucharest to become Acting Foreign Minister in Berlin for several months. Kiderlen was determined to permit no further infringements by Austria on the Austro-German alliance. Kiderlen not only took away from Austria all power of authorization, but demanded the full right to be informed immediately on all future plans of Austrian policy.

And again when Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg left for his conference with Count Berchtold, the Austrian foreign minister, in

September, 1912, during the Balkan War, it was Kiderlen who gave directives to the chancellor, directives which meant the opposite of a blank check to Austria.

Kiderlen advised Bethmann-Hollweg: "I lay greatest emphasis on our knowing Vienna's plans in advance, not after she has put them into effect. Otherwise, Vienna could involve us in a Balkan adventure overnight. . . . We must see to it that the Austro-Hungarian government informs us of its intentions beforehand, and that it does not confront us, as has already happened several times, with a *fait accompli*. Our treaties and agreements with Austria-Hungary do not oblige us to support her Near Eastern plans, let alone her political adventures. . . . We must constantly reserve our attitude on a case-to-case basis toward Austrian action on Near Eastern and Balkan questions. If Austrian actions should continue to take us by surprise, and if all other powers concerned are informed by the Austro-Hungarian minister of the steps he is taking without consulting us previously, then some special instance could easily arise where we would be forced to part from our ally. Naturally, in the interests of our common over-all policy, we would deeply regret such action. And it is precisely to avoid such a possibility that we must place extreme value on getting Austria to consult us before she makes her decisions, just as we do toward her. I would consider it very useful if your Excellency would express this viewpoint in Buchlau, in a friendly manner, of course, but certainly leaving no doubt of our attitude. We do not want to play the role of an Austrian satellite in the Near East. . . ."

And so it went on. Kiderlen reiterated this standpoint in September, October, and November of 1912,⁷ and when he died in December of the same year, he was lamented publicly by Grey, Sazonov and Poincaré as "the man who saved the peace."

But it was a different story in Vienna. There, they were not only "disconcerted," but "exasperated" by Kiderlen's stiff attitude. Archduke Franz Ferdinand personally complained to the Kaiser about Kiderlen. The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office issued a memorandum in regard to Kiderlen's policy: "Just when the historic moment seems to have come, for which the Austro-Hungarian monarchy has

⁷ See Kiderlen-Waechter's documents, published by the author.

prepared for decades, our German ally seeks to restrain our freedom of movement and deprive us of the benefit of our natural advantage on the Balkan peninsula, which is our due." This Austrian memorandum established the failure of the alliance with Germany "in regard to its main purpose" and reproached German policy for having almost "touched the core of German-Austrian relations and shaken its foundations."

But Kiderlen stood firm. "We must do everything," he said, "to prevent the control of policy from passing to Vienna from Berlin, just as Austrian Minister Aehrenthal, unfortunately, managed to accomplish with Chancellor Buelow. This eventuality could cost us very much someday!"

As it turned out, the control of the Near Eastern policy did pass again from Berlin to Vienna, owing to the German blank check given to Vienna, and resulted in Berlin's not knowing the exact wording of the notorious ultimatum which Vienna delivered in Belgrade.

Of course, the causes of World War I are manifold. However, in the diplomatic field it was these two main mistakes that occasioned its outbreak—the two mistakes Berlin made in her attitude toward London, not continuing the previous co-operation of 1912-13, and toward Vienna, not continuing the previous check on its diplomacy—two mistakes which Kiderlen had not only feared, but which he repeatedly had warned against in order to avoid a clash between the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente over the Balkans and Constantinople, which was bound to lead to a European war.

13

THE RUSSIAN-GERMAN "WAR FOR CONSTANTINOPLE"

SEEN FROM VIENNA, WORLD WAR I BEGAN AS A "WAR FOR BELGRADE." Seen from Berlin, it was a "war for the Teutonic position in the Balkans," and seen from Petersburg, it was a "war for Constantinople" and "for the Slavic position in the Near East."

Once again it proved correct what Leonard Woolf stated in London: "Constantinople and the narrow Straits upon which it stands have occasioned the world more trouble, have cost humanity more in blood and suffering during the last five hundred years, than any other single spot upon the earth. Certainly during the last hundred years it has been the chief European center of international unrest. From it and about it have radiated continually international rivalries and hatreds and suspicions. It was the direct origin and cause of a large number of the wars fought in the nineteenth century. It is not improbable that when Europe in her last ditch has fought the last battle of the great war, we shall find that what we have again been fighting about is really Constantinople."

Alluding to Russian aspirations toward Constantinople, Maurice Paléologue, French ambassador to Russia, declared to the Russian war minister in the fall of 1914: "If the world finds itself today in the midst of a bloody conflagration, then it has come about over a cause which primarily concerns Russia, or a prominently Russian cause which touches neither French nor British interests."

Sasonov, the Russian foreign minister, later confirmed this. "Only the possession of Constantinople counts," he said, "and not the evacuation of Lemberg nor the loss of Warsaw. Constantinople is our real goal. It is in Constantinople that Lemberg and Warsaw will be recaptured and much more won besides for Russia."

This same Sasonov had already gained the consent of the French (in August, 1914) and the British (in October, 1914) to the effect that the fate of Constantinople and the Dardanelles, in case of a German defeat, could be settled only by France and Britain agreeing to Russian wishes on the matter. In fact, the secret treaty concluded with Russia on March 18, 1915, promised Constantinople to Russia. This was confirmed by G. M. Trevelyan in his biography *Grey of Fallodon*. Trevelyan states: "It became necessary to promise Constantinople to Russia. The conservative leaders were consulted, and they agreed to this reversal of Disraelian policy. A secret treaty with Russia was drawn up on that principle." Grey himself, in a state paper issued in November, 1916, wrote: "Russia would never have stood five months of reverses in 1915 but for the hope of Constantinople. Even now, the assurance of it is essential to keep Russia up to the mark."

A few months before the start of military hostilities, Professor Mitrosanov, the Petersburg historian, issued a political declaration of war of classic importance in an open letter to Hans Delbrueck, his Berlin colleague and former teacher. "The Austro-German alliance makes the German Reich the principal opponent of Russia," Professor Mitrosanov wrote. "From the Russian standpoint, the Balkan question is not a *guerre de luxe* nor the adventurous dream of Slavophiles. Its solution is unmistakably an economic and political necessity. The entire Russian budget is based on our exports abroad. If our commercial balance should become passive, then the Russian Treasury will be bankrupt, because it will not be in a position to pay the interest on its enormous foreign debt. Two-thirds of our exports go out of the southern ports and through the Turkish Straits (Bosporus and Dardanelles). If this outlet were blocked, Russian commerce would stagnate, and the economic consequences of this blockade would be unforeseeable.¹ This was amply demonstrated in the last Turkish-Italian war in Tripolitania [in 1912]. Only the possession of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles by Russia can put

¹ In March, 1915, the Paris *Temps* estimated that Russia had lost more than a billion francs in her agricultural economy alone during the first four months after the Turks closed the Dardanelles. This does not include other losses in iron ore, coal, and oil. The *Temps* also estimated that Russia had been deprived of imports amounting to another billion.

an end to this intolerable situation, because the existence of Russia as a world power must not be left to chance and foreign discretion. On the other hand, Russia can hardly be completely indifferent to the fate of the South Slavs on the Balkan peninsula. First, the small Balkan states provide rear cover for the Straits and, second, too much Russian blood and gold have been expended over the course of centuries to produce Balkan heroes.

"To drop the whole thing now would be moral and political suicide for any Russian government. . . . And to repeat: The drive toward the south [Drang nach Sueden] is a historical, political, and economic necessity for Russia. And any nation that opposes this drive becomes an enemy nation *ipso facto*."

And yet, despite these Russian designs, the Turkish-German alliance against Russia did not come into being "at the instigation of Germany," as official documents claim, but came about in the face of the initial and continuous opposition of all German authorities involved in the alliance. (This is demonstrated by the wording of the official cables cited in Chapter 1.)

Five major points emerge from these cabled negotiations:

1. The secret alliance originated in an Austro-Hungarian suggestion, was favored by four Ottoman ministers in Constantinople, and was finally decided upon by one man in Germany, the Kaiser himself, despite the fact that the German ambassador in Constantinople and the foreign minister in Berlin had argued throughout against the Austro-Hungarian suggestion and a German-Austrian-Ottoman alliance.

2. Germany and Austria-Hungary, although allied since 1879 and facing the menace of approaching war ever since the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian archduke in Sarajevo on June 28, 1914, did not act in harmony, but in mutual suspicion and rivalry.

3. The alliance was intended at first to last only for the duration of the "crisis" which, however, owing to the Sarajevo assassination, resulted in political repercussions and diplomatic negotiations between Belgrade-Vienna-Berlin, on the one hand, and Belgrade-Petersburg-Paris-London, on the other.

4. The alliance was directed solely against Russia and not against Britain and France. It was meant only to guarantee Ottoman terri-

torial integrity in regard to Russia and did not consider the Ottoman position in Arabia or toward Britain and France.

5. The main evil which had served to stifle the Ottoman Empire was not lifted—the inequality and injustice of the "Capitulations." As we shall see, it took two years of war to obtain Germany's "theoretical" consent to liberate Turkey from this burden, and in fact, altogether nine years passed before Ataturk finally and definitely liberated Turkey in 1923 from this most ancient mortgage on the Ottoman Empire.

What motivated the Young Turks to seek an alliance with Germany? It was their conviction, built up over centuries, that Czarist Russia, with whom every Turkish generation had had to fight at least one war to maintain the Ottoman position in the Balkans and the Straits (Dardanelles and Bosphorus), was still the "eternal hereditary enemy" of the Turks. The Czarist cabinet, in discussing the Dardanelles on January 13 and February 21, 1914, definitely established that Russian aims and "the solution in our favor of the historic question of the Straits can be attained only in the event of a European war, but that Russia was now not ready nor willing to go to war. The cabinet further decided that immediately the Caucasus railroads should be constructed for military purposes and the Black Sea fleet should be strengthened in as short a time as possible by a squadron of the latest types of battle cruisers."

And now that European war was threatening—again in the Balkans—and Russia's intentions must have appeared to the Turks to be the same old goal, the control of the Straits. This seemed all the more true since Czarist Russia was allied for the first time in Turkish history with the former protectors of the Ottoman Empire—Great Britain and France. And in direct contrast to their previous policy, England and France could no longer be expected to defend the Ottoman Empire and the Dardanelles.

On the contrary, it was obvious that the Western Powers eventually would have to establish communications with Russia—via the Dardanelles and Constantinople—in the same way the Allies claimed they were forced to occupy neutral Athens despite Sir Edward Grey's hesitation and remorse. Thus, it seemed impossible for the Turks to maintain genuine neutrality in the long run, notwithstanding assurances of the Entente's envoys in Constantinople.

Enver Pasha, the leader of the Young Turkish Committee, was an army officer and had previously been Turkish military attaché in Berlin. He was convinced of the military superiority of the German army. But Enver made the mistake of overlooking the importance of oceanic sea power to a middle land placed between two oceans. He made this grave error in spite of his close friendship with the German naval attaché, Captain Humann.

From the German viewpoint the Kaiser held the same opportunistic and "geopolitical" opinion of Turkey as once formulated by Bismarck: "If Russian chauvinists, Pan-Slavists and other anti-German elements should attack us, then we could not be indifferent to Turkey's attitude and military capacity. Turkey could never be a danger to us, but under the circumstances, her enemies could well become our enemies."

The fact that three months passed between the signing of the German-Ottoman alliance on August 2, 1914, and the actual entry of Turkey in the war, on October 29, demonstrated two important points. First, it showed that the Ottoman Empire was not only not prepared for war, but was actually in a state of exhaustion as a result of losses suffered in Europe through the Balkan Wars, in Africa by the Tripolitanian War, and in Asia Minor by perpetual Arab revolts. Second, the delay demonstrated that this lack of preparedness had divided the Young Turkish statesmen into two distinct camps—one which wanted to strike only when Turkey was better prepared and if the opportunity was more favorable, and the other camp which was convinced of the inevitability of Russia's "war for Constantinople."

To put an end to this delay, General Mahmud Muktar Pasha, Turkish ambassador in Berlin and former navy minister, worked out a plan in September, 1914, to speed up Turkey's entry into the war against Russia. (This plan, incidentally, ran counter to Mahmud Muktar's later memoirs that he would have preferred a Turkish-Russian understanding.) His memorandum, which he gave me personally to hand over to the German Foreign Office, was worded as follows:

"The minister of marine, Djemal Pasha, or the German Admiral Souchon, or both, should invite the Grand Vizier, the Turkish minis-

ters, and the leading political figures to visit the *Goeben* [German battleship, then in the waters of Constantinople]; the pretext: maneuvers and torpedo shooting; the length of the maneuvers, two hours, a length of time from which no one could excuse himself. Among the guests the most important are the Grand Vizier (because you have to get the Great Seal from him), the finance minister, Djavid Bey, and the party leaders, Dr. Nazim Bey and Bahadin Shakir. Other individuals should be designated by Enver Pasha and Djemal Pasha. The guests should be welcomed with a champagne breakfast on board the *Goeben*.

"During that time a Turkish battalion, under the leadership of German officers, with dependable Turkish officers, should have ranged itself near the Sultan's Palace, Dolma Bagtshe. In the same way, a squadron should be ordered to be there. In the Taxim barracks, a machine-gun division should hold itself ready to march. On the Quai of Dolma Bagtshe near the mosque, four devoted officers wait for Djemal and Enver. Enver and Djemal betake themselves to the Quai of Dolma Bagtshe in a boat, where the four officers join them. They then go to the palace together, announce themselves to the highest chamberlain and express the wish to speak with the Sultan about a very urgent matter.

"They demonstrate to the Sultan that the army can no longer stand this state of uncertainty and wants war. The army is revolutionary and ready to march against the Sultan. A battalion and a squadron are standing ready in Dolma Bagtshe. Only their influence [Enver and Djemal's] succeeded in holding back the army with the promise that the ministry would be overthrown and reorganized. It is necessary for the Sultan to give his consent. Then the first chamberlain and the Sultan's adjutant go on board the *Goeben* and demand the Great Seal from the Grand Vizier. The Sultan names Djemal Pasha as Grand Vizier. Enver and Djemal ride in an open carriage accompanied by the squadron through the city to the Sublime Porte, where they read a proclamation which the Sultan has previously signed.

"The overthrown ministers and the untrustworthy politicians remain in protective confinement for a few days on board the *Goeben*. The following can be considered for new ministerial posts:

Fethi² for foreign minister, and Mahmud Kiamil for minister of marine."

Mahmud Muktar Pasha's adventurous plan naturally was not carried out.

Instead, it turned out that Ottoman-Russian hostilities were made possible by the presence in Turkish waters of two German cruisers, the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*. Although a British naval mission under Admiral Limpus was in Constantinople ostensibly to build up an Ottoman navy, the British withheld delivery of the two Ottoman warships *Sultan Osman* and *Reshadieh* which were built in England for the Turks and paid for by popular subscription, and thus weakened the Ottoman naval force and infuriated Turkish public opinion.³ Meanwhile, Germany had strengthened the Ottoman Navy by placing the battleships *Goeben* and *Breslau* at the disposal of the Turks. These two battleships, after a narrow escape from British naval patrols, had hurried from the Mediterranean to the Dardanelles and Constantinople, on August 10, where they were "sold" to the Ottoman government.⁴ In fact, the German naval commander, Admiral Souchon, together with his officers and men, put on the Ottoman fez and entered the Ottoman naval service.

The following telegrams describe how the Ottoman-Russian War actually started:

GERMAN NAVAL ATTACHÉ IN TURKEY TO WAR MINISTER ENVER PASHA'S AIDE-DE-CAMP

October 23, 1914

German ambassador is of opinion that Fleet Commander Admiral Souchon must have in his hands a written declaration from Enver Pasha

² Then Ottoman minister in Sofia with Mustafa Kemal, as military attaché; later Turkish ambassador in London.

³ Harry N. Howard: "On the very eve of the entrance of Britain into the world conflict, the British admiralty sequestered the *Sultan Osman* and the *Reshadieh*. While the government at London acted well within its rights according to international law, the fact remains that this one incident did more to arouse Turkish resentment against Great Britain than any other single event at the time. George V sent a personal message of regret to the sultan, but the incident was never closed. Though Turkey was technically bound by her [secret] treaty of alliance with Germany, signed one day previous to the British action [without any knowledge of the treaty], the seizure of her two ships gave an excuse for the entrance of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* into the Straits, their "purchase" by the Porte, and the consequent precipitation of Turkey into the world conflict on the side of the Central Powers."

⁴ See the unsuccessful attempt by Hitler in 1941 of a similar transfer, p. 247.

if Souchon is to carry out Enver's plan to cause a Russian incident. Otherwise, in case of military failure or political defeat for Enver, a grave compromise of German policy with extremely fatal consequences is inevitable.

KAPITAENLEUTNANT HUMANN

WAR MINISTER ENVER PASHA TO ADMIRAL SOUCHON

October 25, 1914

The entire fleet should maneuver in Black Sea. When you find a favorable opportunity, attack the Russian fleet. Before initiating hostilities, open my secret order personally given you this morning. To prevent transport of material to Serbia, act as already agreed upon.

ENVER PASHA

Secret Order: The Turkish fleet should gain mastery of Black Sea by force. Seek out the Russian fleet and attack her wherever you find her without declaration of war.

WAR MINISTER ENVER PASHA

GERMAN NAVAL ATTACHÉ IN CONSTANTINOPLE TO CAPTAIN OF "GOEBEN"

October 26, 1914

You have two documents on board which perhaps one day will have great historical significance—Enver's secret order and his note sent to Admiral Souchon yesterday. Even the Colossus, "Goeben," is perishable. Wouldn't you therefore want to deposit the papers here on land?

Request delivery of following from ambassador to Admiral Souchon:

- (1) put to sea immediately, (2) no aimlessness, but war by all means, (3) if possible, report soon to Berlin on "operative intentions" (both material and human, all-too-human!).

KAPITAENLEUTNANT HUMANN

KAPITAENLEUTNANT HUMANN TO BERLIN

November 2, 1914

Developments in the Black Sea are known to you through our telegrams. The Russians had actually foreseen the blockade of the Bosphorus and had started to move. Units of the Turkish-German fleet separated at a signal à la Nelson and simultaneously executed their task. The "Goeben" appeared before Sevastopol. The first shot came from the Russian side. Their fortifications, comprising 40 heavy guns, bombarded the "Goeben" for 22 minutes, firing 400 to 800 shells from about 5,000 yards. The "Goeben" was hit three times near her rear smokestack without resulting in any important damage. Our ship sensibly limited itself to firing only a

few salvos, which were well-placed, however, on the docks and in the city. A considerable number of fires was observed.

The "Goeben" also sank the mine-layer "Pruth" with 700 mines and 250 men aboard. The "Breslau" and "Berk" bombarded Novorossiisk while the "Hamidié" bombarded Theodosia, after issuing an unsuccessful ultimatum to the Russians demanding the surrender of all serviceable ships intended for military purposes. The "Breslau," the "Nilufer," and the "Samsun" also laid mines in several places. And the "Pruth" and the "Nilufer," which sank a cargo ship besides, brought in 121 prisoners altogether.

A total of 21 ships were destroyed and 55 oil tanks and many grain warehouses shot up in flames. All our ships returned safely. The fleet is now in the sea of Marmora and is standing to, ready for the expected counteraction.

Thus was the Near Eastern war theater opened up.

It was due to this Ottoman-German alliance that during the last war Germany had at her disposal all the wide area from the Dardanelles down to Mount Sinai and close to the Suez Canal, which was twice reached by German-Turkish armies, and across to the Russian Caucasus and to Baghdad's Mesopotamia where a British army was forced to surrender to Field Marshal von der Goltz. Germany was able to control all the territories of Turkey of today, and in addition Iraq, parts of Iran, Syria-Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, and the various Arabias—an area which in this war Hitler cannot reach, thanks to Turkey's attitude.

TWO FRIENDS WHO SHAPED HISTORY—HANS HUMANN AND ENVER PASHA

Who was Hans Humann—whose letters, reports, and advices the reader will find in this book? He was the liaison officer between the German admiral of the *Goeben* and the Ottoman Generalissimo Enver Pasha, the German naval attaché and Enver's closest friend to whom he had access day and night. Nobody else had this privilege. Personal relationship often shapes history. This held true for German-Turkish policy through the friendship between Humann and Enver, at first in Berlin, and later in Constantinople.

Hans Humann was the son of a Cologne scholar, Karl Humann,



Düğümlüklerimize
Petz inggindür; Hemen
ipe baslanılmasını
olilerim.

24/5/1937
K. Atatürk

I have studied your plans and find myself in complete agreement. .

I advise you to start your work immediately.



Bir milletin en büyük kaybı, kendine itimaden kaybetmesidir...


Sorgili ebedî Atatürk !

Tarih kurumundan beklediğin maksatları, biz ve
bizden sıra gelecekleri, aşk ile takip edeceğiz.


31.3.1939

İsmet İnönü


The greatest loss a nation may suffer is the loss of faith in itself . . .
Dear and immortal Atatürk, we and our successors will fervently
strive for the aims you have set for the Society of Turkish history.




VIEW OF THE AYASOFYA FROM THE SULTAN AHMET MOSQUE AT ISTANBUL




THE GALATA BRIDGE OVER THE GOLDEN HORN




CONSTANTINOPLE'S OLD FORTRESS OF RUMELI HISAR,
AND THE BOSPORUS




HARVEST ON THE FOOT OF THE ARARAT, THE MOUNT OF NOAH'S ARK




A VILLAGE MILL IN THE TAURUS MOUNTAINS, NORTH OF SYRIA




HERDS OF CATTLE PASSING THROUGH THE PASTURES OF KARS, NEAR RUSSIA




SEMI-COKE WORKS AT ZONGULDAK




THE ÇUBUK DAM ACROSS THE VALLEY IN THE VICINITY OF ANKARA




PARTIAL VIEW OF THE NEW TOWN AT ANKARA




MINISTERIAL QUARTERS AT ANKARA



THE BUILDING OF THE GENERAL STAFF



VIEW FROM THE ETHNOGRAPHIC MUSEUM, ATATURK'S TEMPORARY TOMB



A LESSON ON RUSSIA AT THE YOUNG WOMEN'S COLLEGE



THE CALL OF THE TURKISH YOUTH

who had been a director of the Oriental Museum in Berlin and spent much of his life in Ottoman Asia Minor, in Smyrna, excavating historic monuments, particularly the famous Altar of Pergamon. Hans Humann, a tall, handsome officer, had a sister, Mrs. Sarre, wife of Professor Sarre, a director of the Oriental Museum in Berlin, who was also active in excavation in Asia Minor. The scholarly mind of this family was concentrated on Turkey, and took great interest in Turkish personalities such as Enver Bey, the Young Turkish revolutionary who shortly afterward became military attaché in Berlin. He found in the Humann and Sarre families not only cultivated homes but warm friends.

Hans and Enver both had spent their infancy in Ottoman Asia, and there by chance were nurtured by the same Turkish-German wet nurse.

When Enver was military attaché in Berlin, Hans Humann was the heart of Admiral von Tirpitz's intelligence service and a devoted advocate of Tirpitz and of his naval policy, which had a Pan-German tinge. At the beginning of the Tripolitanian War, Enver disappeared from Berlin and rushed to Libya to organize and conduct together with Mustafa Kemal native resistance against the Italian invasion. He used to send to Humann's sister his reports, which I published in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*. When the Balkan War followed the Tripolitanian War, Enver rushed back to Constantinople to reconquer Adrianople, and finally headed with Talaat and Djemal the Young Turkish Triumvirate, which controlled the Ottoman Empire.

At the same time Hans Humann was transferred to Constantinople, first as captain of the ambassadorial yacht *Lorelei*, and then as naval attaché, partly because of his close relationship to the now powerful Enver Pasha. In fact, he became the unofficial German envoy whose collaboration was invaluable to Baron Wangenheim, the German ambassador. As naval attaché Hans Humann had direct access to the Kaiser's entourage over the head of any ambassador. It was an outstanding position of extraordinary influence, to say the least.

It is anomalous but nevertheless a fact that Humann did not adhere to the traditional attitude of German naval attachés who by

their pro-Tirpitz and Pan-German ambitions and intrigues were wont to embarrass and irritate the Foreign Office. On the contrary, although Humann had begun his career in Tirpitz's school, he grew broad-minded enough to think in long-range terms, and had enough historic sense to understand Turkish background, needs, and aspirations.

Humann and I worked together to help our Turkish friends build up an independent Turkish nation. He placed his official and personal contacts, including his wireless apparatus, at my disposal, and I collaborated with him as a "free-lance ambassador." He remained the stable unofficial German envoy, irrespective whether the official ambassador was pro-Turkish "Bohemian" Baron Wangenheim or the pessimistic anti-Turkish Count Metternich, the cynical Herr von Kuehlmann or the indifferent Count von Bernstorff. It did not matter to Humann whether these ambassadors took advantage of him or looked on him with disfavor. They all had to reckon with his close relationship with the Young Turkish generalissimo which actually shaped the history of German-Turkish relations.

THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE STANDS IN THE GAP

EXACTLY THREE YEARS AFTER WORLD WAR I HAD BEGUN, ON AUGUST 4, 1917, the same German naval attaché, Hans Humann, was compelled by the irony of history to take a greater interest in a land route than in any sea battle. He sent me the following telegram from Constantinople: "First railroad trial run made through Amanus tunnel." This meant that at long last a railroad line, connecting Constantinople with Syria and Palestine, had been driven through the Taurus and Amanus mountains, each route roughly a hundred miles. I wired Humann: "Congratulations—but two years too late!"

I might as well have answered: three years too late—since exactly three years had passed since my first memorandum had advocated the immediate start and accelerated construction of the indispensable communication which alone could enable the middle land of the Ottoman Empire to defend itself at its four widely separated corners—in the Dardanelles, in Arabia, particularly the Sinai peninsula, in Mesopotamia in the vicinity of Baghdad, and in the Caucasus.

Twenty years later, after I had left Hitler's Germany and made my home in London, in 1933, I had the opportunity to discuss this memorandum with Viscount Allenby and T. E. Lawrence, the two conquerors of Arabia, Palestine and Syria, as well as with Lloyd George and Winston Churchill, the two political strategists of the Mediterranean, the Dardanelles, and the Salonika campaigns. We discovered that the British War Council had decided on that middle sea strategy for the very reasons that my memorandum had advocated defensive measures for the Turkish middle land. By a strange coincidence two conferences on Near Eastern strategy took place in the same week of January, 1915—the London War Council on the 28, and my discussions with the Kaiser and the chief of the German General Staff on the 21 and 22.

The memorandum in question, written on August 6, 1914, almost three months before Turkey went to war, undertook to advise the Foreign Office in Berlin as follows:

Memorandum on Turkish participation in the war and its possible consequences

1. Because of my long and intimate association with Turkish statesmen, I am convinced that the Turkish triumvirate has decided to participate in the war. The date of Turkey's entry will be determined as much by German victories as by German aid in Turkish preparedness. Naturally, it also depends on the attitude of Turkey's two Balkan neighbors, her historical "hereditary enemies"—Bulgaria and Greece.

2. After two Balkan wars, another in Tripolitania, and her annual Albanian and Arabian military expeditions, Turkey will not be able to contribute much more in the near future than her geographical position as a neighbor of Russia in the Caucasus and the Black Sea, as England's neighbor at the Suez Canal and Persian Gulf, and as the guardian of the Dardanelles. In a word, as a bloc separating the Allies in the West and in the East, and thus preventing any joint action.

3. Turkey's military role in the near future will consist of drawing off Russian, French, and British strength from Germany's fronts—to the Caucasus front, the Dardanelles, and the Mesopotamian and Egyptian fronts. I cannot judge exactly how great a relief these four Turkish fronts will afford Germany's Eastern and Western fronts, but I would venture to estimate it at about one million troops.¹

4. Closing the Dardanelles will prove to be Turkey's most decisive role. Turkey can isolate Russia, cutting her off from all military, personal, political, and economic connection with her Western allies. Thus neither war supplies nor unity of Allied war plans can result. Although no Russian soldier will fight in the Dardanelles, Russia's future will be decisively determined there because she will be locked within her own territory.

5. Let us assume the opposite: If the Dardanelles remain open, then the consequences would be that neither Turkey nor any other Balkan state could join the Central Powers. On the contrary, the Entente, from their position in the Dardanelles and Constantinople, could force Turkey, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece to join up with Serbia against Austria-Hungary and lead a united Balkan army against the virtually unprotected Southern and Southeastern fronts of Hungary-Austria-Germany.

¹ Actually, the relief was twice as great.

6. To prevent such a defeat, it is imperative to give financial and organizational aid to Turkey to enable her to establish all necessary communications and rail connections: with Central Europe through Serbia-Bulgaria or Rumania-Bulgaria; between Anatolia and Mesopotamia (from Eregli through Taurus tunnels); and between Anatolia and Syria (through Amanus tunnels). [Technical details were annexed to the original document.] Without the assurance of these rail communications, the Southeastern theater of war would assume the character of a distant unreachable and uncontrollable colonial war in which land power will prove inferior to sea power in the long run.

When Lloyd George read this memorandum in London twenty years later, he told me that from November, 1914, on, he had been convinced that neither the Allies nor the Germans would be able to effect a break-through on either the Western or the Eastern front. Therefore, he said, he concentrated on the weakest spot—between the Dardanelles and the Suez Canal—which was weak because of a lack of communications. "If the German government had followed your advice," Lloyd George concluded, "and had filled out the gaps in the railroad system, we English could hardly have got through there either."

This statement was not quite correct, since all civil authorities had approved the memorandum but were all—including the Kaiser himself—overruled by the chief of the General Staff, General von Falkenhayn. This is a very strange and significant example, indeed, of the kind of Prussian militarism which was actually more powerful than any German civil government, even if and when the latter was backed by the Kaiser himself.

- What happened is recorded in my following letter to General Field Marshal von der Goltz, an old friend of mine, on February 2, 1915:

Conversations with the Kaiser and the Chief of the General Staff

. . . Immediately after my return to Berlin [from our missions to Constantinople, Sofia and Bucharest], a Major von Haeften of the General Staff telephoned me to arrange an urgent conference with von Moltke, till recently Chief of General Staff. Major von Haeften's call was made at the order of von Moltke himself.

When I arrived at his headquarters, von Haeften informed me in the antechamber that the subject to be discussed would be my "Memorandum on the Near East"—the securing of Serbian communications with Constantinople and the reinforcement of Turkey's position by completion of Constantinople's lines of communication with Syria and Mesopotamia.

When I entered von Moltke's office, the tall, broad-shouldered general stepped toward me, placed his bear-paws on my shoulders and said: "I read your memorandum and it was a revelation to me."

"That should sound very flattering, but actually it's depressing," I said. "My memorandum reveals nothing but material well known to any expert on the Near East."

"Let's not quibble. I asked you to come here to tell you that you must go and see the Kaiser at his headquarters and convince him you are right. Will you go?"

"But the Kaiser certainly knows all this as well as I do. His Near Eastern policy is well-known, and he realizes the consequences of Germany's present policy down there. I know this to be a fact from my first conference with him in 1911."

"Perhaps . . . but Falkenhayn doesn't know," von Moltke said. "And you must get to see him too. That must be the Kaiser's orders. I know that Falkenhayn, my successor as Chief of Staff, has no idea of Near Eastern politics and our job down there."

Von Moltke, who described himself as a "worn-out umbrella laid away in some corner," criticized General von Falkenhayn with obvious bitterness. Finally I said that if he thought it necessary and useful for me to be active at Headquarters, I would naturally be at his service. There was only one condition—that the chancellor and the Foreign Office would give their approval. I told him that, although I still work independently, my connections with the Foreign Office and with the chancellor are of such a personal nature that I would not consider it fair to undertake such a political action without informing them.

Von Moltke didn't believe there would be any difficulty, and indeed he called the chancellor immediately and got his approval. The chancellor also requested that I get in touch personally with Foreign Minister von Jagow in order to make necessary preparations for my work at Headquarters.

This was done, and I had a series of conferences with Geheimrat von Rosenberg, director of the Near Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, and with Dr. Helfferich, director of the Deutsche Bank. I received all the necessary information from them as well as material concerning the Serbian Danube corner and particularly the necessity for the tunnels through the Taurus and Amanus mountains.

Helfferich also advised me to go to Headquarters in uniform. I told him it was impossible because I had none, since I had never been a soldier. Helfferich said things would be difficult for me as a civilian and suggested that I wear any kind of uniform, anything that I could think up! Naturally I refused.

Helfferich turned out to be right, because I was stopped time and again en route and even at Headquarters in Charleville secret police questioned me repeatedly. My mere presence as a civilian was a sensation in the little French town jammed with German military personnel.

Even at dinner in the Kaiser's villa I was conspicuous in my black coat as the only civilian among half a dozen generals and admirals, all of whom were awaiting the Kaiser. When he entered, he shook my hand cordially, recalling in a few words our previous meetings on board the *Hohenzollern* in 1911 and again in 1912 when I had argued democracy with him.

I was seated next to the Kaiser and he started the conversation by saying he had just returned from the front where the troops were suffering badly from the "cold and wet weather fit only for a pig."

Taking the weather as a cue, I said, "In the coming theater of war, our troops will suffer from the opposite extreme."

"I don't understand. What are you trying to say?" he asked.

"Our troops won't suffer from the wet and cold in the coming theater of war but from heat and drought," I said.

The Kaiser was rather impatient with me. "I still don't understand. What do you mean?"

"I said that in the coming war theater . . . that is, in the Near East, . . . our troops will—"

"Are you mad!" the Kaiser interrupted angrily. "You mean my troops should fight in the Near East too? Don't you remember

Bismarck's phrase about the Balkans—that they're not worth the good bones of a single Pomeranian musketeer!"

It was an unpleasant situation and I felt the eyes of generals and admirals fixed on me.² But I also felt in that instant that it was win or lose for me. And luckily it occurred to me to answer calmly: "Certainly, your Majesty, I remember those words of Bismarck just as well as you probably remember another quotation of his."

"What is that?" he demanded peremptorily.

"I am thinking of Bismarck's opinion on how decisive Turkey's value would be for Germany in case of war with Russia—"

The Kaiser interrupted me. "Well, let's talk about that later." And he began a general conversation, rather than political, on the Near East. We exchanged Turkish experiences and other reminiscences.

What the Kaiser then said was news to me, and he firmly believed it. It concerned an alleged incident that occurred in 1911. According to von Tirpitz's report, British torpedo boats during the Morocco crisis followed the Kaiser on his trip into Norwegian waters with the intention of torpedoing the Kaiser's yacht (!).

The Kaiser also remarked, among other things, that he considered this war "a conspiracy of his two cousins" devised by them in his Berlin palace on the occasion of his daughter's wedding in May, 1913 (!).

In the drawing room after dinner I was alone with the Kaiser and two of his military advisers, Generals von der Plessen and von Lyncker. They discussed my memorandum, and as I had already told von Moltke, the Kaiser knows everything that I wrote about it. It was also substantiated that General von Falkenhayn, chief of the army, does not realize the importance of the Near East as a war theater, fails to see the necessity for completing the missing railway link between Anatolia, Syria, and Mesopotamia immediately, and thus refuses to grant twenty million marks to finish its construction, a sum amounting to the cost of a single day of war!

Here is the situation. Every competent authority—chancellor, Foreign Office, Treasury, Deutsche Bank, the Turkish government, and the Baghdad railway company—are agreed on the necessity of

² See page 269.

completing the railroad and granting the money required. The Kaiser approves too, but the chief of the army's signature is indispensable because the reasons as well as the final decision for constructing the rail link are of a military nature! But von Falkenhayn refuses.

The Kaiser declared he would ask Falkenhayn to see me the following day and listen to my report. . . .

The General received me the next day in his headquarters in Mezières on the other side of the Meuse River. He was cordial but his tone was somewhat condescending. "Well, young man," he said, "what's on your mind?"

I explained why we needed the "Baghdad railway" to consolidate the Turkish theater of war, and why this war would not be decided in the West or the East but down there in the Southeast, the weakest and most exposed part of our whole front. I said that this whole decision of win or lose down there depended on the Anatolian and Baghdad railway.

Falkenhayn had two objections: (1) the possibility that the railway would be destroyed in the Taurus mountains by a Russian invasion from the Caucasus (!); (2) the possibility that it might be destroyed by a British landing in the bay of Alexandretta.

It was not difficult to refute both these objections: the first, by pointing out the great distance between the Caucasus and Taurus mountains and the impassable ranges between; the second, by pointing to the distance between the coast and the Taurus Mountains and the fact that such an attack would require a full Allied expeditionary force, which might possibly be organized in Egypt but could certainly be stopped in the outer Taurus ranges by Turkish units.

The chief of staff finally admitted I might be right on those points.

Then we discussed the need for connecting the Serbian route with Bulgaria and Turkey. I emphasized what Admiral Souchon had told me in Constantinople—that the Dardanelles actually has sufficient ammunition only for a single encounter and Turkish gunboats have merely seven shells each, enough for just a single minute!

Falkenhayn declared that a winter campaign against Serbia would be impossible because of road and weather conditions. If these did

not improve, operations could not be carried out quickly enough to influence the situation in case of an immediate Allied attack on the Dardanelles. Nevertheless, the campaign would be expedited by all means in consideration of its importance for the over-all Balkan situation.

He concluded our conversation by saying that it had given him some new viewpoints and he would arrange a thorough study of both questions with the promise of a quick decision.

Accompanying me to the door, he asked, "How long would the completion of the Taurus-Amanus railway require?"

I quoted the engineers' calculations—about one and one-half years. He answered quickly but smilingly, "The war must and will be over before that time. And it will be decided here in the West at Calais in 1915."

He stuck to his opinion that the decision would come on the Western front, and that it would decide the war in the Near East too. Nevertheless, he referred me (as a sort of a consolation when he saw my disappointment) to General Groener, head of the Army Railroad Organization, for a discussion of further details.

And then, near the door, Falkenhayn called me a "pessimist" (me, the notorious "optimist") when I said, "Just as surely as we're saying good-bye now, you are going to lose Baghdad and Jerusalem before another two years have passed, all because of your decision today not to expedite the Taurus-Amanus railway by all possible means." I don't know how these final words happened to come out of my mouth, but I am afraid they will prove correct.³

It seemed that Falkenhayn wanted to compensate me for my efforts, and so he gave orders that I should be conducted on a tour of the entire front from the Argonnes and Ardennes to Ostend and Zeebrugge ("from the rock to the sea"). All the various staffs received me as a guest, including Prince Eitel Friedrich's party, and all expressed the hope that this first winter of war would be the last. When I showed my doubt, they shook their heads disbelievingly.

In spite of von Falkenhayn's shortcomings, action on one of Turkey's four fronts was going to be responsible for a succession of

³ See page 151.

events that had the most important bearing on the course of the war. The successful defense of the Dardanelles had the effect of keeping separated the powers of the middle sea and their Russian ally. The "gigantic consequences" of this defense were, in the words of Winston Churchill, "Bulgaria's decision in favor of the German-Turkish alliance; the defeat and occupation of Serbia; the long-drawn-out neutrality of Rumania and Greece; the defeat and occupation of Rumania; Turkish armed assistance for Austria in Galicia and the Caucasus; the German-Turkish threat to Mesopotamia and Egypt; the collapse of Russia."

In London I had the pleasure of meeting the English military critic, Captain Liddell Hart. As a matter of fact, it was he who introduced me to Lloyd George. He and I compared notes on the Near Eastern front in the World War and he expressed the opinion that an early Allied victory in the Dardanelles would have meant (1) not only saving Serbia, but a victorious offensive, (2) all the Balkan states deciding in favor of the Allies, (3) earlier entry of Italy into the war on the Allies' side, (4) keeping France's offensives from being too costly, (5) successful defense and strengthening of Russia through assurance of Allied help and co-operation, (6) greater and quicker economic pressure on Germany and the other Central Powers by depriving them of foodstuffs and raw materials from the Ukraine, the Balkans and Turkey, and (7) an early victorious attack on Germany and Austria-Hungary at their weakest and geographically most undefendable South and Southeast front by 1915, as General Gallieni had recommended.

Everything these British authorities said was to happen in 1918, a year after the warning to General von Falkenhayn, had proved true at the other two ends of the Ottoman Empire, in Mesopotamia and Arabia, and precisely because of the missing railroad link.

Field Marshal Viscount Allenby said to me in 1934: "While you Germans lost two decisive years arguing about the construction of the Anatolian-Syrian railroad, and then lost more precious time quarreling with your Turkish ally on the terms for financing and paying for it . . . we were acting and building our counterrailroad—from Egypt through the desert into Arabia and on to Palestine." This war measure was the beginning of today's Cairo-Constantinople

express which was completed by connecting Haifa and Beyrouth, once more for war purposes by Britain, in 1943.⁴

And Lawrence of Arabia, significantly called by the Arabs "the engine wrecker," confirmed that he would not have been as successful as he actually was if it had not been for the lack of Turkish railroad communications with Ottoman-Arabia; he said: "General Allenby told me that the War Cabinet were leaning heavily on him to repair the stalemate of the West. Turkey was to be put out of the war once and for all. . . . Conquest of Damascus meant the end of this war in the East, and, I believed, the end of the general war, too; because the Central Powers, being interdependent, the breaking of their weakest link—Turkey—would swing the whole cluster loose."

This is what Winston Churchill had attempted as early as 1915 by his Dardanelles offensive but failed to obtain because his politically correct conception of the possibilities was not backed by the military authorities with sufficient force—just as the correct defensive advice of the civil government in Berlin was not followed in time by the chief of the General Staff. The minds of statesmen and soldiers seldom run along the same lines, and a personality that combines military genius and political wisdom is an exceptional phenomenon.

Thus at first the sea powers of the middle sea were bound to fail—but in the end the land powers of the middle land were doomed.

This is the lesson the Turks learned in 1918, a lesson by which they are profiting in 1944.

⁴ As a dispatch to the New York *Times* said, it was the biggest job in this part of the world since King Solomon, with his allies, King Hiram and Hiram Abiff of Tyre, employed large labor forces to haul timber and hew rock for the first Temple in Jerusalem. Now, with the help of engineers and mechanics from South Africa, Australia and New Zealand, the Royal Pioneer Corps of the British army, and tribesmen from Bechuanaland and Basutoland, the task has been completed.

15

YOUNG TURKISH WAR AIMS: "TURKISH TURKEY"

THE YOUNG TURKISH LEADERS CALLED THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE war of 1914-1918 "a war of liberation." Ataturk also called his own Turkish war, 1920-1923, "a war of liberation." Both, Ataturk and the Young Turks, were fighting for the same aim.

As early as October 15, 1915, I wrote in one of my reports from Constantinople to the chancellor and the foreign minister:

"Turkish war aims are still the same as formulated to me by Foreign Minister Halil Bey last fall: 'Even if we were to win all Egypt and half of Russia, we should still lose the war if the Capitulations remained in effect.'

"National liberation was the topic of every conference I had with Enver, Talaat, Halil, the Grand Vizier, and other leaders. 'We desire no additional territory,' they say; 'we actually are losing land and even a population of a million people to Bulgaria. We are assuming tremendous economic burdens solely to gain our national freedom, self-determination, and independence.'"

My report went on: "The Turkish people know and feel this too, and they should know and feel it. That is why the government is instituting 'nationalistic' regulations and laws such as instructions on the use of the Turkish language on all public signs, posters, etc.—even on those of the German soldiers' mess. There is one major impression they wish to make on their people by these nationalistic measures—namely, that their Young Turkish government has become so strong in its attitude toward the rest of Europe and so successful in this war that it can risk becoming 'Turkish' in its feelings and actions.

"A cartoon in the 'Servet-y-Funun' illustrates this point: A Turk

asks a European why he's making such a sad face. The European answers, 'Because in order to get along in Turkey now, I have to understand a little Turkish.' The Turk answers, 'Well, up to now, I, as a Turk, had to behave like a European to get along in my own homeland.' In other magazines you find the poet Mehmed Emin's admonition: 'I am a Turk—my race and language are great.'

"Nationalism as a war aim has become at the same time a weapon of war, sustaining the national morale of a people who have fought so many wars and suffered under so many burdens. Naturally one can observe chauvinistic expression, misconceptions, even stupidities on their part—all the birth pains of a nation growing up. But would it not be the same case anywhere else?

"Turkish nationalism must be understood as a historical and political movement in the transition of a people from an empire to a nation. If we view Turkish nationalism as a historical necessity and accept it as a stage in their development, then we will get along with the Turks; but if we see it only as something 'inconvenient and unnecessary' and are constantly irked by it, then we will make things difficult for ourselves, without, however, being able to alter its historical basis.

"Turkey, hitherto always an object of intrigues of some foreign power, wants to make something out of herself through this war and stand on her own feet. Stated simply: Turkey wants to become Turkish. Even Turkey's ally, Germany, should not aim at gaining any privilege, let alone monopolies of any kind. Therefore I repeat: the Capitulations must capitulate."

Whoever is familiar with the disastrous effects of the Capitulations will understand why the first action of the Young Turkish government toward liberation and independence was bound to be an attempt to liberate itself from the same Capitulations, from any protectorate, and from the various spheres of influence which the Great Powers had agreed upon shortly before the outbreak of World War I and which amounted to a peaceful partition of Turkey.

In August, 1914, three months before Turkey entered the war, the Allies offered to abrogate the economic but not the judicial Capitulations in order to obtain Turkish neutrality. This, however, did not satisfy the Young Turks' desire for independence.

As early as September, 1914, the Young Turkish government

arbitrarily canceled the economic Capitulations by increasing the custom duties without the consent of the Capitulation powers. Then, on October 1, 1914, the foreign post offices were closed by the Young Turkish government, and on October 5, the foreign schools were taken over. All the Capitulation powers, even the Ottoman allies, Germany and Austria-Hungary, protested against these unilateral actions.

Not until January, 1916, did Turkey's two allies consent to abrogate the Capitulations, and then only in principle. The negotiations were frustrated for a long time by the pre-eminently legalistic attitude of the German Foreign Office. It was the French ambassador, Jules Cambon, who once pointed out the difference between the purely legal and political mind in saying: "The mind of the negotiator and that of the lawyer are worlds apart. . . . The application and interpretation of law demand a mental rigidity which should find no place in the empirical world of politics. The capacity to look facts in the face . . . and even to submit to injustice in order to obviate a greater evil, are foreign to a disposition to stand upon the letter of the law."

That the legal aspect was not itself unimportant may be illustrated by an experience of Dr. Heinze, later German minister of justice, who initiated the German reforms of the Moslem Ottoman judiciary during World War I. In an endeavor to find out whether his reforms had reached the Turkish provinces, Dr. Heinze made a tour through Asia Minor and attended a court trial in a small Turkish town. By chance, the fellow who appeared before the bar was a compatriot of Heinze's, a German citizen and a vagabond who had admitted to a charge of burglary. The case was clear and punishment should have been automatic. You can imagine Dr. Heinze's surprise and astonishment when the accused was acquitted. At a reception afterward, where Heinze, the reformer, was guest of honor, he was asked if he was satisfied with the outcome of the case. Heinze could not help asking why the accused had been acquitted after having confessed. He received a typical "Eastern" answer: It was thought that a debt of honor was due to Heinze as a guest of Turkey, and that this debt could be paid and satisfaction rendered by releasing a compatriot of his!

Just as this court disregarded the law, so could injustice arbitrarily

be turned into justice. This was shown by an experience I once had with Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha. A Swiss friend called my attention to the danger menacing hundreds of Armenian families in Konya. Although they had nothing to do with the Armenian conspirators, they were to be evacuated according to the general evacuation order for all Armenians.

At my next audience with Talaat, I remained seated after our political business was over, and said to him, "Well, and now I wish to discuss a personal matter with you." I told him about the Armenian situation in Konya, noticing that he did not like to hear about it, but he listened patiently. Finally he said, "You are my friend, so it will be done." I thought he was attempting to avoid further discussion on the matter, and so I asked if he would refer me to someone in the Sublime Porte in order to pursue the case further. He stood up, shook my hand and repeated, somewhat heatedly: "But didn't I tell you that it will be done?"

A few days later, I learned that the Grand Vizier actually had ordered that all Armenian families in Konya could remain there, and that this order had already been made effective.

In view of Ottoman history, the Young Turkish war aim of liberation from the Capitulations was understandable, justified, and inevitable. That is why I was satisfied to be able to give full assistance to the demands of my Turkish friends by making the special appeal to the chancellor as reported above.¹ This was done after I received from Constantinople the following complaint from Captain Humann, on March 10, 1917:

"A new conflict has arisen in the last few days. Contrary to her earlier attitude, Berlin refuses to acknowledge the complete abolition of the Capitulations, and proposes 'provisional abrogation' in due time. You can understand that this news has had a more disastrous effect on leading Turkish statesmen than, say, the fall of Baghdad

¹ See page 178. See also Kanner Papers at the Hoover War Library, Stanford University, California. During World War I, Dr. Kanner, chief editor of *Die Zeit* (*The Times*) in Vienna, used to come to Berlin to visit statesmen and political people. Kanner had long confidential conversations with us without telling anybody that afterward he would write down every detail for his diary. In this way firsthand material originated. Some of my contributions to the Kanner Papers were published by Professor Ralph H. Lutz in his *Documentary History of the Fall of the German Empire*.

or the loss of Armenia, or something similar in scope. If Germany, as the leading member of the Central Powers in Near Eastern policy, does not concede to the abolition of Capitulations, then certainly no other nation would acknowledge abolition, and we will deprive the present Turkish cabinet of the only reliable ground on which it stands and has built up its strength. If the Turkish cabinet does not obtain full acknowledgment of the repeal of Capitulations, then it becomes a criminal in the eyes of the Turkish people. In effect, this means that Turkey has fought a futile war without any future prospects, a war which can give them neither territory nor any other conceivable gain and which has finally thrown an exhausted country, by its involvement in long-drawn-out wars, into the abyss of all creation. The manifold difficulties and burdens of this war—loss of Egypt, Mesopotamia and Armenia, the tremendous sacrifice of its manhood, the hunger, misery and disease—could always be justified and endured by Turkey because of the ‘ideal’ that it was fighting a war of liberation. Taking into account Berlin’s present attitude, the specter of the Entente’s separate peace offer can become a reality overnight.”

Our intervention in Berlin succeeded—according to a telegram I received from the chancellor—in speeding up the abrogation of the Capitulations.

How the German residents in Constantinople reacted and behaved is shown by one of my reports addressed to the democratic leader, Friedrich Naumann, in January, 1918:

“You know from your own experience that ‘German colonies’ clustered amidst a foreign people are dissatisfied with everything, including their own ambassador. They don’t like the fact that he is interested in over-all policy instead of occupying himself with their own petty interests. They are mostly ignorant bourgeois snobs, viewing everything from the froglike perspective of their own advantages and disadvantages.

“Constantinople is even worse than the average of these German colonies. These eternal shopkeepers in the German colony shout bloody murder if anything is done to help Turkey to gain its strength and independence, which is the right of all peoples. So if I advocate abolition of the ‘Capitulations,’ these Germans blow up over the

'injustice' that will make them pay taxes, even though they haven't had to pay taxes for generations and thus grew rich at the expense of the country at large . . .

"Because I enjoy the confidence of the Turkish leaders through my understanding of their problems and needs, and because I want to help establish a sincere friendship with a genuinely independent Turkey, these persistent critics in the 'German colony' look upon my recognition of the Turkish national movement as if I were 'humiliating' myself as well as Germany. They particularly object to my decision to establish the 'Dostluk Yurdu' [House of Friendship] in the center of the Turkish quarter in Istanbul and not, as these Germans want, in the foreign district of Pera. As a matter of fact, they would rather have me give the two million marks at my disposal for the plan of the Turkish House of Friendship² to their own German club 'Teutonia.'

"This kind of thinking in the German colony has spoiled a great many German officers too. They come here without any knowledge of Turkey's being impoverished by all her wars of the last ten years. They expect Arabian fairytales of the *One Thousand and One Nights* variety. Instead they find suspicion and mistrust, and are confronted with the inferiority complex of an essentially proud old nation apprehensive of the Germans' slogan of a 'German Egypt' in Turkey as if proud and stubborn Turks ever could be treated like Levantines and Egyptians. . . . An atmosphere is growing in which gossip of a St. Bartholomew's night or Sicilian Vespers goes around, threatening German officers with wholesale murder! Stupid, of course, and not substantiated at all, but significant of the general atmosphere between these allied nations.

"Even General Liman von Sanders has unconsciously committed anti-Turkish, even anti-Islamic, blunders out there in the Dardanelles. History will certainly credit him, together with Mustafa Kemal, with having successfully defended the Dardanelles. Yet Liman is so shortsighted that he does not realize—and he doesn't want to, either—that he is constantly provoking Turkish peasants to fanatical fury by using their dogs as targets for shooting practice.

² For community and education purposes, similar to those of today's "Halkevleri" (People's Houses). See page 189.

Sometimes he kills the unsuspecting animals with a revolver while riding in his car, and other times he merely wounds them just to see them run away howling like mad probably dying somewhere in the fields. I saw this happen several times myself when Liman took me out to the front. . . . I objected strongly, but it failed to do any good.

“And finally, what do you think of this? A high colonial official, Geheimrat B., who is a specialist in fighting locusts and who is here to end the locust plague in Palestine, expressed his opinion of our Turkish allies by telling me that he loves to sit on his balcony in the Hotel Tokatlian more than anything else—because, as he put it, he can spit comfortably on the Turks from there! As if the Turks, with their ‘Eastern’ sensitivity, could not sense this contemptuous attitude and react in kind!”

All these blunders of the last war come home to roost in the present war.

*PAN-GERMAN WAR AIMS: "TURKEY—
A GERMAN EGYPT"*

IT IS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THE TURKISH WAR AIM OF LIBERATION AND independence did not tally with Pan-German goals.

The opinions of Colonel von Papen, now Hitler's ambassador to Ankara, illustrate the conflict. He had been ousted by the United States as military attaché in Washington for his subversive activity, and was sent to Turkey. He fought in Palestine side by side with Mustafa Kemal against the British army. But this strange comradeship-in-arms was based on no common war purpose. In 1917 Colonel von Papen wrote from Palestine to me:

"Your thesis in your pamphlet¹ seems to be a 'League of Nations' within a Greater Central Europe. The basic idea is sound but not in the form of a union between independent states and nations. You speak of a 'Turkish Turkey,' a 'Greek Greece,' a 'Serbian Serbia,' and so on. All these nations, on the contrary, should be German vassals. It would be the most wonderful job of my life to work for that kind of Pan-German Berlin-Baghdad. I hope that someday I shall be able to accomplish it."

Ambassador von Papen has been in Ankara for some time trying to accomplish his life dream. But he has no chance, although he has surrounded himself with some of the very same Pan-Germans I had to deal with in the last war, such as Mr. Ribbentrop's brother-in-law, Herr Jenke (born in Constantinople), Dr. Otto von Hentig (once Hitler's consul general in San Francisco), Dr. Franz Schmidt-Dumont (once secretary of the Baghdad Railroad Company), Dr. Schoenberg (once a notorious dragoman of the Capitulations era), and Dr. Schwoerbel (another dragoman).

¹ *Werkbund und Mitteleuropa*, June, 1916.

In the war memoirs of the military plenipotentiary to Turkey, Austrian Field Marshal J. Pomiankowski, who later became a Polish subject, it is noted: "It was significant that German officers used to express their relief whenever Professor Jackh had left Constantinople for home."²

What did their "relief" signify? The opposition of these Pan-German officers to what they called "pro-Turkish activity"—an attitude which eventually resulted, as we shall see, in a controversy between the Prussian Pan-German war minister, on the one hand, and the German chancellor and the Kaiser, on the other.

Those who try to define German war aims in the Near East find it difficult to give a definite answer. In fact, German war aims ranged from irresponsible Pan-Germanism—which treated the Ottoman Empire as a German vassal, a prospective "German Egypt," a stepping stone to British Egypt and India—to the authentic policy of the German Foreign Office, which ranged from a belief in "spheres of influence" to a wholehearted determination to grant full independence to a loyal and valuable ally.

As early as October 18, 1915, Captain Hans Humann wrote to me about the clash between German military and naval chiefs in Constantinople:

"The many men heading the German command here in Turkey [Generals Liman and Goltz and Admirals Usedom and Souchon] make our military work more difficult. There are many problems: (1) the impossibility of maintaining clearly defined spheres of action within a limited theater of war, (2) the differences in character, temperament and opinion, (3) the human, all-too-human imponderables such as ambition and envy, (4) the tactful reserve of Turkish Commander in Chief Enver Pasha, who doesn't interject his authority and interfere with their quarreling Excellencies, and so forth. All this has gradually created tremendous irritation among the individual authorities and it is now beginning to affect the officers. This state of affairs has had rather fatal consequences. . . .

"Unfortunately, many of the German officers are not very tactful. Most of them have not had any experience abroad, and they do not understand how to deal with people of another country. When they

² Joseph Pomiankowski, *Der Zusammenbruch des Ottomanischen Reichs*, 1928.

rage at Turkey in the presence of Turks or when they talk about the imminent partition of Austria (*sic!*), or when they complain that the 'Kaiser doesn't want them and that's why they have to stay in this lousy country,' well, the prospects don't look so good to me."

Among German naval authorities, Grand Admiral von Tirpitz stood for an aggressive policy of using Turkey as a passage to Egypt and India. Immediately after the outbreak of the European war and three months before the Turkish war started, he ordered Captain von Rheinbaben to prepare a memorandum on railroad facilities from Constantinople to the Suez Canal. Prior to the war, Tirpitz had not taken any interest in the Near East but now, because his High Seas Fleet was blocked in the North Sea, he needed a land route to approach Egypt, and thus provide future bases for German sea power north and south of the Suez Canal. "Our Ottoman ally is able to answer the 'Britain rules the waves' clique with the principle that waves can be broken by land."

General von Falkenhayn, the chief of the German General Staff, concurred with Tirpitz's aim of reaching the Suez Canal by land, and sent the following telegram to the Turkish General Staff, then headed by German General von Bronsart, on February 2, 1915:

"Following are views of German High Command affecting aims of Turkish operations: Offensive toward Persia and against Egypt, defensive in the Caucasus. Operations toward Suez Canal must be furthered by all means. It would be quite an achievement even though it may not produce anything more immediate than a permanent threat to England's position at the canal. Prospective results: Flaming up of Mohammedan movement in Sudan (of the Senussi) and in Afghanistan."

But when it came to financing this land strategy new difficulties arose between Germany and Turkey. Colonel von Lossow, the military attaché, and a close friend of Captain Humann, with whom he shared the understanding of the Young Turkish aims, wired from Constantinople on October 3, 1914:

"Enver Pasha admits he is in financial straits. The entire army, including officers, has been put on half pay. This has caused Enver great difficulties in the cabinet. Djavid Bey, the finance minister,

particularly tried to force him to partially demobilize. Enver raised the question of German subsidies in the cabinet. The Council of Ministers, however, fears that direct subsidies will make Turkey dependent on Germany. Therefore he proposed a loan as a way out. This was agreed upon . . . Enver needs money because his military preparations, particularly against Egypt, are beginning to stagnate. . . . Sheik Ibn Rashid, chief of the Northern Arab tribes, has placed himself at disposal for the venture against Egypt. . . . He needs money, too, to start moving."

And again: "Enver Pasha believes the 'Turkish National Bank' would have been founded long ago and bank notes already issued if we Germans had not demanded such harsh conditions. The Turks want a Turkish bank, but Berlin wants to force a German bank on them."

And again, on July 8, 1915, Enver Pasha himself appealed to the chief of the German General Staff:

"Turkey will remain loyal to her alliance to the last drop of blood. She will stay in the struggle on the side of Germany and Austria until the last shell has been fired. But before military operations are expanded to include an effective attack on the Suez Canal, our government must establish whether the Turkish people is able to stand the financial burden.

"The Council of Ministers unanimously believes that the economic burden, in the degree requested by the Baghdad Railroad Company, must not be imposed on the country. . . . Expenses for military purposes will amount to about twenty million marks. Should your Excellency attribute appropriate politico-military importance to the operations against Egypt, I request that your Excellency influence the authorities in question so that half the expenses resulting from the improvement of communications in the Amanus and Taurus mountains be assumed by Germany."

There were other disagreements with the German military authority, as shown in a conversation of the German military attaché with Enver Pasha, on April 11, 1915:

"Enver Pasha is very disappointed over the news given him by Field Marshal von der Goltz after his conversation with the Kaiser and General Plessen. The impression was all the stronger because just

before that Djavid Bey, the finance minister, had told of similar impressions he received from Germany in connection with his report on the separate peace meeting in Lausanne. Djavid Bey reported that only competent authorities in the German Foreign Office understand and approve German-Turkish policy. But military circles think that Germany has acquired nothing out of her Turkish ally but an additional handicap and that now she must aid Austria plus Turkey. Enver had to conjure up all his art of persuasion to make the Young Turkish cabinet understand that these opinions are tendentious attempts to mislead them, or at least consequences of the Lausanne meeting and more particularly of the well-known stubborn ideas of Djavid, who believes in the Triple Entente. This is a very bitter pill for Enver to take because he has not only assumed almost exclusive responsibility for his war policy, but has also demanded tremendous sacrifices from his country and has not been afraid of anything so as to be of real help to his ally.

"Wherever he could, Enver gave liberally. He even left the decision to his German ally on when Turkey should act instead of making it himself. He has let Austria have batteries of howitzers and mountain guns ordered and paid for by Turkey in Germany before the war but which had not yet been delivered. Despite all the wars she has engaged in during recent years, Turkey has managed to gather 1,223,000 men under her flag, and by reorganization she has succeeded in mobilizing an additional 60 battalions of police-soldiers and using them at the front.

"The Caucasian theater of war, which was primarily intended to relieve the German army on the Eastern front, must be supplied from over a distance of more than 900 miles! When lack of communications and bad roads endangered supplies for the Turkish army in the Caucasus, Enver pressed 50,000 carriers into service for this task! None of the German officers here can claim that they expected anything like that from Turkish mobilization. But only a few of us know what gigantic sacrifices Enver imposed on his country through these measures. . . .

"Concluding, Enver emphasized that in his opinion great things can be accomplished only by taking a determined stand. His main argument when the Lausanne propositions for a separate peace were

discussed by the cabinet was this: there is a wise and ancient saying that faithlessness produces only a short and temporary success, and that in the end it results in retaliation and disadvantage."

The naval attaché, Hans Humann, too, sent me a report on his conversation with Enver Pasha, on July 30, 1915:

"Enver Pasha called me immediately upon his return from the Dardanelles at night. The subject was the recall of Marshal Liman by the German G.H.Q. Enver asked me to help him write a telegram to General von Falkenhayn.

"In Enver's opinion, the telegram ordering Marshal Liman to report to General Headquarters is merely a polite form for a recall. There is no doubt about it. Enver sees the reason for the telegram in the ensuing steps taken by Field Marshal Goltz and General Bronsart against Marshal Liman. Enver admits criticism of Liman is justified to widest possible extent, but he points out that no one was forced to suffer the marshal's difficulties more than he, Enver, himself. On the other hand, Liman has special merits—courage and initiative—which are particularly important in his present position at just this period. Enver doesn't deny that Liman is a hard man to get along with. Undoubtedly this was known in Germany, but Enver believes that Liman's incompatibility is much less the case now than it was in peacetime.

"From our conversation I got the impression that the clumsiness, personality shortcomings, and the all-too-human behavior of higher-ranking German officers is weakening our position with Enver more than is necessary. For instance: Liman exhibits Admiral Souchon's letters; Admiral Usedom tells Enver that Goltz is always writing reports back home showing the activities of other German leaders in a wrong light; Liman directs Enver's attention to Usedom's ignorance of strategical matters and to his particularistic attitude on all problems of co-operation; Liman attempts to squeeze out Bronsart, and Bronsart tries to maintain his position by discrediting Liman, and saying that Enver wants to negotiate only with Falkenhayn. . . .

"From everywhere, even from Falkenhayn, comes news that hints at an imminent attack on the Dardanelles. I wonder if the highest in command, Liman, should be recalled just before such action? It

will actually be a shock to the army. Political circles here do not know the inside details and will get panicky."

Other officers were active along the lines advocated in a memorandum of a certain Max von Oppenheim which elaborated the idea of a "Moslem Holy War." Some of them were adventurers, and others were official agents. Their reports were published later in books such as O. von Hentig's *Meine Diplomatenreise ins verschlossene Land* (Afghanistan); O. von Niedermayer's *Unter der Glutsonne Irans: Kriegserlebnisse der deutschen Expedition nach Persien und Afghanistan*;³ Christopher Sykes', *Wassmuss, the German Lawrence* (in Persia).

On the Northeastern front, General Kress von Kressenstein, who had previously headed the campaign against the Suez Canal and managed to reach it twice for a few hours only, now was preparing at Tiflis for an invasion of Afghanistan and India. But the war ended before the attack was launched, and Soviet Russia disarmed his troops.

Not only Arabia, Persia, Afghanistan and India were intended to be won over by these Pan-German aims; Ethiopia too was a goal, as will be seen by my following report to the Foreign Office from Constantinople on December 20, 1914:

"Even Professor Frobenius, an internationally famous research scholar, has become active in the Holy War. He has already been in Constantinople for five weeks, and he told me that he is under German orders to organize contacts with Medina and then to establish communications with Abyssinia. The Turks object, and oppose his scheme. By demanding all sorts of titles and decorations which he took for granted belonged to him, however, he has antagonized every Turkish official so that they have even rejected his material demands such as men, flags, equipment, etc.

"Frobenius admitted to me that he has never had anything to do with Turks before. This may explain his mistakes in dealing with the Turks, whom he treated on the basis of his African experiences. The naval section of the German embassy finally told me that Professor Frobenius has turned Moslem for 'practical reasons,' since the sacred places which he plans to visit are banned to non-Moslems."

When I wrote him about this, Frobenius replied (on December

³ Significantly republished by Hitlerites before the global war.

27, 1935): "Anything that was done was in absolute agreement with and by order of the General Staff."

The famous scheme of "Mitteleuropa" advocated by the German democratic leader, F. Naumann, had nothing in common with all these Pan-German illusions. With a view to counter the continual misinterpretation of this "Middle Europe"⁴ a British expert, Professor R. W. Seton-Watson, known for his critical anti-German attitude, wrote about the proposal of "one of Germany's sanest and most serious political thinkers," as he called Naumann: "Without a trace of rant or sabre-rattling, on the basis of wide knowledge, both historical, political, and economic, and in eloquent yet sober language, he built up an elaborate argument for the fusion and consolidation of the two Central States after the war, as a single unit with a solid front to the outer world. . . . Nor must Naumann be regarded as a mere Jingo; for almost at the outset he protests against Bethmann-Hollweg's theory of the decisive struggle between Teuton and Slav and condemns it as an insult to the Czechs, Poles, and Slovenes. . . . The root fact upon which Naumann rests his whole argument is the argument that Germany must either abandon the idea of being a world power, or organize Central Europe under her aegis as an economic unit. . . . Throughout the book Naumann's tone remains eminently sane, and if all Germans shared his outlook and his moderation it is probable that there would long ago have been such a development on entirely peaceful lines."⁵

To most Germany military and naval politicians Turkey was not a country to be liberated, and a nation to be made independent, but an objective for Pan-German expansion—a passage to military outposts and potential naval bases, and a means of establishing a German position between British Egypt and British India with the final aim of menacing and eventually conquering by land the "rulers of the waves."

This was not the aim, however, of the German civil government. It is true, the German ambassadors to Constantinople varied from

⁴ Mitteleuropa has been superficially discussed in several publications, but only one American historian has made a thorough analysis of the many factors which determined and influenced the complex Mitteleuropa pattern. In his study, *Mitteleuropa—Concept and Reality, 1914-1917*, Henry Cord Meyer traces the ideological and economic origins of the idea and analyzes the role which it played during World War I in the military, economic, diplomatic, and political life of the Central Powers.

⁵ R. W. Seton-Watson, *Europe in the Melting Pot*, 1919.

the Turkophile outlook of Baron Wangenheim to the Turkophobia of Count Metternich, whom I characterized in a letter to Premier Dr. von Weizsaecker, on September 2, 1916:

"News from Constantinople concerning Ambassador Count Metternich gets worse and worse. Talaat, minister of the interior, declared recently that he would never again utter a word, no matter what the circumstances, to this German ambassador. If he should happen to meet him somewhere, he would leave the room so as not to be forced to see him. Halil Bey, the foreign minister, said that the ambassador is an evil caricature in the eyes of all Turks. He has not only lost all his own prestige but has degraded the reputation of the German ambassadorial post in Constantinople. The Grand Vizier has repeatedly stressed that Metternich associates mainly with Turkey's enemies, or rather with the present government's enemies, i.e., with Levantines, Armenians, and Greeks. Thus the situation is becoming more and more critical."

The Chancellery and the Foreign Office, particularly their Near Eastern expert, Geheimrat von Rosenberg (who after the war became ambassador in Ankara and died there), continued their honest friendship with the Young Turkish leaders, especially with the fair-minded Talaat and the ambitious Enver, sharing their aims of Turkish independence.

Whose position was stronger and more decisive in the end—the German Foreign Office or the Prussian Pan-German war minister? As I was to discover for myself—the Prussian war minister, who overruled the German chancellor. When the chancellor backed up my activity on Turkey's behalf, he was rebuffed by the Prussian war minister, and thus "the Jackh incident" became a constitutional issue between the German and the Prussian authorities. The Prussian war minister honored me with the citation that "such a post is more dangerous as a free-lance than in a post of responsibility." He kept on behaving as if he were a sadistic Salome, asking for the head of a preaching John. Eventually, the chancellor had to appeal to the Kaiser,⁶ who eventually decided against the Prussian war minister in favor of the Swabian democrat,

⁶ See page 268.

*THE SECOND FRONT
WITH ATATURK AND THE KAISER
IN THE DARDANELLES*

THE YOUNG TURKISH FORCES OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE WERE FIGHTING on eight fronts. I wrote to the prime minister of Wuerttemberg, Baron Weizsaecker, on September 4, 1916:

"It is a sign of Turkey's national strength and political will that two Turkish army corps have been placed at the service of Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria. Turkey—in addition to maintaining six war theaters in the Near East, in the Dardanelles, Caucasus, Mesopotamia, Persia, Arabia, and Suez, as well as defending her extensive coastline stretching from the Dardanelles to Palestine—has now joined the Galician and Balkan theater of war."

But not more than a year later the tide turned, and the reasons were given in another letter to the same prime minister on March 16, 1918:

"General Liman von Sanders has now succeeded General von Falkenhayn, taken over command in Palestine and moved his headquarters to Nazareth. Lack of rail facilities—for which Falkenhayn himself is wholly responsible—makes Liman's position difficult in the face of the enemy's adequate new railroad system. The enemy is building rail lines from Egypt and with the help of his fleet can supply all the necessary material for their construction. Coal is also lacking in Syria and Palestine. Even the existing meager rail facilities are run on wood. This source will soon end too, and even now locomotives are being fired by licorice and cottonseed. On the other front, in Mesopotamia, the rail network built by England from the Persian Gulf is already greater today than all the lines built in Turkey by Germany in the last thirty years. If Falkenhayn had only listened to our admonitions and warnings from December 1914 on!"

Falkenhayn's successor as chief of the General Staff, General

Ludendorff, had been warned too. I knew him personally and together with democratic leaders and Social Democratic labor union chiefs,¹ sent him a memorandum, nine pages long, on February 11, 1918, appealing to him not to risk a new offensive but give the civil government a chance to negotiate peace with the forces in Britain then advocating a peace without annexation and with Belgian reconstruction. Our emphasis was on Turkey's and Bulgaria's position, which should be safeguarded. To this General Ludendorff personally replied in a flamboyantly old-fashioned manner characteristic of the German military way of thinking, then as today:

General Ludendorff's Reply, General Headquarters, February 22, 1918

You and several other gentlemen were kind enough to send me your views on the present situation. With the request that you inform the other gentlemen concerned, I have the honor of replying to you as follows:

I will limit myself to speaking on the necessity and importance of an offensive. We have no choice between war and peace so long as we strive for an economically strong and secure Fatherland. But on the Western front, we are able to choose a strategy either of defense or of attack for the first time since the invasion of France.

Our choice should not be difficult, even if it does seem to be an enormous one. Only action brings results. This has been proved in the past by our success in arms in other war theaters and at present by our advance after termination of the armistice. Therefore, we cannot and do not want to wait until the Entente, by virtue of American help, feels itself strong enough to attack us. If we do not wait for this to happen, the war will be shortened and money and blood spared.

Experience has shown that because of the present-day effect of fire-power, losses are no less in the defensive than they are in an offensive well-supported by artillery. Attack has always been the German method of fighting. The German army, which desires peace as much as the home front, welcomes an opportunity to do away with the war of position. The offensive will not be, as you say, an "offensive of the General Staff," but an offensive of the German army, and thus also of the German people. Therefore, God willing, it will succeed.²

¹ Friedrich Naumann, Max Weber, Robert Bosch, Karl Legien, and Adam Stegerwald. See Bernhard Schwertfeger, *Amiliche Aktenstücke*, 1925.

² General Ludendorff's German letter calls the addressee *Euer Hochwohlgeboren* (literally translated: *Most well-born Sir*) and ends in the outdated flourish *Mit der Versicherung vorzüglicher Hochachtung Euer Hochwohlgeboren sehr ergebener* (*With assurances of greatest esteem your most well-born's devoted*) Ludendorff.

However, the eventual outcome of Ludendorff's decision was what he later called "the darkest day" in German military history—defeat on both the Western front and on the second front, in the Near East.

Land power without sea power and without communications had again proved inferior to sea power plus land power, being able to control all oceanic communications.³ This was just as Kemal had anticipated as early as September, 1915, at the height of his victories over the British-French fleets and forces. It was then that the prospective Atatürk conceived of a future alignment with sea power, which finally came about in 1939.

My report to General Zekki Pasha, the Sultan's general-adjutant, end of September, 1915, read as follows:

"As Marshal Liman-Sanders' guest in the Dardanelles, I was often with Fevzi Bey⁴ and Mustafa Kemal Bey, who saw to it that I made an inspection tour of the most advanced front-line trenches, stretching from the north corner of the Anaforte group leading down the peninsula and across the Straits to Troy and into the Meander Valley.

"Once, as we looked down on British battleships from the ancient burial mounds of Achilles and Patroclus, the historic greatness of what the Dardanelles troops had accomplished became evident to me by a comparison. Down there, the dreadnoughts were symbols of the great rise of European technology in the twentieth century—and on this side, the most primitive means of communications unchanged since the Trojan War, two-wheeled carts, pulled by heavy black oxen,

³ This historic experience still holds good in our era of air power when the weapon of air power is added to both sea power and land power. Modern sea power is ship-plane teamwork just as land power is combined ground-air work. Napoleon's statement, "Three guns in a well-constructed battery, properly placed, would beat off or destroy any ship in the world," was proved correct in the Dardanelles, and almost was borne out at Salerno, if it had not been for the Allied superiority of ship-plane teamwork over German ground-air work. With air power as an additional weapon, sea power will again prove superior to land-air power, according to Francis Bacon's advice: "He that commands the sea is at great liberty, and may take as much or as little of the war as he will." This vision guided Kemal Atatürk after his experiences in the Dardanelles and in Palestine. This is the reason that from the second week of the global war, I wrote in the *London Times* and in the *Daily Telegraph*, on September 13, 1939, and on October 6, 1939: "In the long run . . . Hitlerism is doomed to fail and to fall. . . . No victory on land is decisive against the nation which rules the waves."

⁴ In 1943 chief of the Turkish General Staff, Fevzi Çakmak.

were bringing modern munitions to the Turkish soldiers. No trucks or railways here! ⁵

"The achievements of the Turkish soldiers were acknowledged by every German officer. Their losses amounted to seventy-five per cent in some battles, and yet they were unshakable under shellfire, despite the fact they had received no pay and their officers only half pay since the beginning of the war. They lacked clothing and equipment, and even their food consumption had been curtailed because of transport difficulties.

"It was said by the Germans that only Turkish troops, because they demanded little, were equal to the overexertion, the fatigue, the climate, and undernourishment. In contrast, out of three hundred German pioneer troops in the Dardanelles, only twelve kept their health.

"Mustafa Kemal Bey was gravely ill, and so I had to go to his tent to visit him. Malaria had afflicted him again, and he had been so weakened that I scarcely recognized him at first. Nevertheless, his fiery nature plunged immediately into political talk, similar to the frequent all-night conversations we used to have and which he was so fond of. He agreed completely with my memorandum and developed it further to the thesis of the decisive superiority of sea power over land power.

"We are landlocked," he said, "just like the Russians. They are bound to collapse because I have locked them into the Black Sea by blockading the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. I have thus cut them off from their allies. But we, too, are bound to break down, and for the very same reason. True, we sit on the fringes of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean, but we are unable to venture out on any ocean. As a land power without sea power, we will never be able to defend our peninsula against sea powers which can bring up their land forces unchallenged."

This was, as I said, as early as in September, 1915.

I recalled this conversation with Mustafa Kemal on the superior-

⁵ "Down there" were, as I was to learn later in London, also my British colleague, Professor Harold Temperley and Marmaduke Pickthall who, from the British trenches, "shouted his affection through a megaphone to the Turkish soldiers on Christmas day, and as soon as the war was ended, started again to work for the future of Turkey." (Anne Freemantle).

ity of sea power over land power when I returned to the Dardanelles in October, 1917, with the Kaiser and his military entourage. A few days previously, on October 18, 1917, the German-Ottoman Treaty of Alliance of 1914 had been renewed. In the presence of the two emperors, the two war ministers, Enver Pasha and Freiherr vom Stein, signed a new military convention, after our dinner in the Sultan's Palace.

My letter to the democratic leader, F. Naumann, gives the following details:

"While visiting the German battleship 'Goeben,' the Kaiser and his generals discussed Enver Pasha's report on the 'Dardanelles miracle,' and they were not sparing in their admiration for the accomplishment of the Turks and the 'Goeben.'

"But to appraise the role of the 'Goeben' in the Dardanelles, we must view it not as one of the ships of the High Fleet, but as a land battery which partly subordinated itself to and supported the land fortifications. 'Grand Fleet of the High Seas,' indeed! *Lucus a non lucendo!* Was the Kaiser conscious of this *degradation* of his fleet during his stay on the 'Goeben'? If he had heard of Elias' command—'Go ye up on the mountain and look down on the sea'—he would have had to come to the same conclusion as Mustafa Kemal: 'We can look out at the sea, but we cannot venture out on it.'

"A few days previously, however, at a gala dinner in the Dolma Bagtshe palace—by the way a dinner with uncomfortable golden cutlery and dishes—I heard some German generals confirm this viewpoint. After the Kaiser and the Sultan had left the table, a surprise was in store for me. And it came from Adjutant-General von Plessen and General von Lyncker, chief of the Kaiser's military cabinet. Both came toward me and said: 'Unfortunately, you were right.' I answered: 'I don't understand what you mean.' They replied: 'We are referring to what you told us at Headquarters at the beginning of the war after your conference with the Kaiser and your interview with von Falkenhayn. You said Baghdad and Jerusalem would fall in two years if Mesopotamia and Syria were not assured of their security by immediate construction of adequate railways. Well, Baghdad has already fallen, and it appears Jerusalem will soon fall too.'

"But it is doubtful whether these German generals understood that these developments were nothing more than confirmation of the superiority of a sea power, which—ruling the waves—can utilize its land power, over a land power, which—landlocked—cannot exploit its sea power."

This is what happened—on that second front in the Near East—when sea power was able to exploit and transport land power, not only from the Indian Ocean into Mesopotamia and Arabia but also from the Mediterranean into Greece and Salonika—and break up the Bulgarian front, reach out for Serbia and Rumania, threaten Austria-Hungary as well as Germany itself, and at the same time outflank the Turkish Dardanelles from Salonika and conquer Constantinople by land—exactly as another memorandum by some friends of mine⁶ had anticipated nearly three years before it really happened. As early as the beginning of 1916, we had warned General von Falkenhayn again that some day a French-British army, setting out from Salonika, will break up the link between the Central European powers and the Turkish Near East, probably in 1917.

It was actually to come to pass in 1918. It was there between Constantinople and Salonika that the four imperialisms of landlocked land power collapsed one after the other, chronologically in this sequence: the Russian Romanovs, 1917, separated by the Dardanelles from their Western Allies; the Austrian Hapsburgs on September 14, 1918, threatened from Salonika with invasion via Bulgaria; the Czar of Bulgaria on September 15, 1918, when he too was threatened with invasion from Salonika; the Turkish Ottomans⁷ on September 19, 1918, now menaced from near-by Salonika after their defeat in Mesopotamia and Syria; and finally the German Hohenzollerns too.

In the words of the Maréshal Franchet d'Espérey, the head of the Allied army of the Orient:

⁶ Prince Max von Baden, *Erinnerungen und Dokumente*, 1927.

⁷ As to the Young Turkish leaders, every one thus far mentioned was to pay with his life, as refugee abroad. In the first few years after the war, Enver was killed in Bukhara in his struggle for "Pan-Turkism" against Soviet Russia; Talaat was assassinated in Berlin by an Armenian student (see page 271); Djemal was murdered, in Afghanistan, and Prince Sahid Halim in Rome. The others—Ministers Djavid, Halil and Shukri, and Party Secretaries Nazim and Bahadin Shakir—were later hanged in Smyrna for alleged participation in a conspiracy against Ataturk.

"1. The Bulgarian army being *hors de cause*, our principal objective is to liberate all Serbia and to menace Austria-Hungary. 2. To hold the important strategic points of Bulgaria in order to keep in touch with Rumania and to cut the communications between the Central Powers and Turkey. 3. To put into operation in the briefest delay the means necessary to act against Turkey for opening the Dardanelles by a sharp attack on the isthmus of Bulair in a way to permit the entrance of the Allied fleets in Marmora."

It was the Kaiser's brother-in-law, Prince Friedrich Karl von Hessen,⁸ who wrote to me, on October 30, 1918:

"Tonight, news came from Austria and Hungary that the situation is fast becoming as bad as it was feared. For Germany, too, the prospects are that not only Upper Silesia but even Saxony and Bavaria are drawing near for the Salonika armies, which are clearing a path through Hungary and Bohemia and can force their way through Innsbruck if the front collapses there. Think of it—Breslau, Dresden, Munich under enemy fliers and within hearing distance of the thunder of enemy cannon! Not within the next few weeks, but certainly within months!"

In 1944 his son, now Hitler-governor of Hessen, may have reason to express a similar view on a prospective invasion of Germany from the Balkans.

General Ludendorff himself testified to the same effect as the Kaiser's brother-in-law. In his memoirs Ludendorff admitted that the Southeastern collapse from Salonika, with the resulting loss of Rumanian oil, compelled Germany to sue for an armistice: "River traffic on the Danube is absolutely essential to our system of supply. . . . There only remained two months' reserve of aviation gas and ten months' fuel for the navy; further supplies from Rumania had been cut off."

All this tells another, the true, history in contrast to the later story and complete falsehood of the "stab in the back."

It was there, between Constantinople and Salonika, that the succession states of the imperial dynasties arose, old nationalities and nations, from the Black Sea up to the White Sea, and down to the Red Sea, all over in the East between the Arctic Sea and the Arabian

⁸ Elected by the Finnish Parliament as prospective King of Finland, in 1918.

Sea, including Russia and Turkey itself. This fact was corroborated by Russian Soviet delegates during our negotiations in Stockholm in 1918, as well as by Atatürk.

What an irony of history that Reval, the Baltic port of Czarist Russia, should become the capital of one of those old nations and new states: Tallinn of Estonia. It was in Reval that the Russian Czar had met the British King and proposed reforms in the Ottoman Empire's province of Macedonia, and thus set the Young Turkish revolution in motion. Europe had run the entire gamut of unbridled imperialism to national self-determination through the span of the Young Turkish decade.

That is why I wrote the following letter to Atatürk in November, 1937:

"On my trip from Ankara to Athens, I passed through the Dardanelles again. I recalled our meetings there and decided to make an attempt at outlining the historical importance of your victory at the Dardanelles. Here are my conclusions: (1) for Turkey—assurance of existence as a nation, of her way to liberation and independence; (2) for the Central Powers—averting in 1915, and preventing until 1918, a direct threat to Hungary, Austria and Germany from the southeast, with resulting defeat and collapse; (3) for Czarist Russia—political, military, and economic separation from her Western allies, thus effecting Russia's complete isolation, resulting in collapse and revolution, in fact, making a Soviet Russia possible; (4) for nationalities within Czarist Russia—making possible the foundation of Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Finland; and (5) for all Europe—averting and preventing a victory of Russian czarism over Western civilization."

As a matter of fact, it is due to the Ottoman-German alliance against Czarist Russia's "War for Constantinople" that a Czarist Russia, with all it stood for, does not dominate both Southeastern and Central Europe today.

Moreover, Kemal could hardly have established the military reputation and political stature of a national leader, whom his people would follow, out of the debris and depth of Ottoman Turkey up to the freedom and strength of a Turkish Turkey—if it had not been for his fame and glory as "Savior of Constantinople" against Czarist

Russia and as "Victor of the Dardanelles" over the joint British-French fleets and forces.

As it was pointed out, Mustafa Kemal's victory in the Dardanelles sounded the death knell of Czarist Russian imperialism which behind the Bosphorus had for centuries been reaching out from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

Just beyond the Bosphorus an Anatolian river joins the Black Sea—the river Sakarya along which a future victory of Kemal Ataturk was to put an end to Greek imperialism which reached out from the Mediterranean to the Black Sea.

Both imperialistic drives, westward and eastward, the one recalling the Persian Darius' expedition and the other the Macedonian Philip's designs, were to be crushed during one decade by the same soldier-statesman who on the same Bosphorus front first defended the Ottoman Empire and then the Turkish Nation.

PART FOUR

*THIRD TURKEY OF THE
TURKISH REPUBLIC*

Turkish Republic of the Turkish Nation
Turks saving Turkish core
Liberation from Moslem Ottoman Empire
Drawbridge between three peninsulas
Kemal Ataturk (Father of the Turks) to defend
and reform the Nation

*ATATURK'S REVOLUTION: "TURKEY
FOR THE TURKS"*

AN EMPIRE DIED AND A NATION AROSE.

An empire died—the largest between Roman times and the British era—an empire which for centuries was looked upon by 300 million Moslems all over the world as the homeland of their common faith.

A nation arose whose very name through those centuries had been a byword of dread or of contempt among the civilized nations of the West, and whose existence was held to be terminated and its memory interred by the Treaty of Sèvres, which "settled" the terms of peace in the Near East after World War I.

This Turkish nation—counted out and given a civilized burial—suddenly surprised the world by its powers of recuperation and by its willingness to throw off immemorial custom and live up to the ethical and political standards of a popular republic. It took only five years to build a bridge of constitutional law and democratic order across the five centuries that represented the historic gap between the end of Near Eastern Christendom in the form of the Byzantine Empire and the beginning of the modern secular Turkish Republic. In less than one generation the nation has developed a way of life that is in accordance with any bill of human rights. Nowhere has Woodrow Wilson's idea of self-determination been put into a more straightforward reality than in the Turkish nation. It is united in a more homogeneous national consciousness than any state created by the Paris Peace Conference—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Rumania, or any of the others.

The process of tradition from the anachronism of the Ottoman Empire to the modern model of the Turkish Republic is not com-

parable with any other revolution associated with World War I. No other state or people came so near to utter annihilation. And, after a brief two decades, the collaboration of no other state has been so eagerly sought by the opposing forces in the present global struggle.

One draws a natural comparison with the Russian change from Czarist Empire to Soviet Republic. Although there are striking parallels—for example, the national self-assertion against the interference and temporary invasion of foreign powers—the differences are even more basic. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk may have humiliated and partitioned parts of Russia; it did not threaten to exterminate the national life of 180 millions of Russians. The Treaty of Sèvres, on the other hand, was actually designed to end the national existence of 18 million Turks. The Russian opportunity for national rebirth was never so fundamentally threatened as was that of the Turks. So disastrous were the conditions of the Treaty of Sèvres that the Imperial Ottoman Sultan and his responsible advisers, grand viziers, and diplomats could think of no other hope of salvation than to apply for an American protectorate or a British mandate. Under such a scheme, Turkey would have become a forlorn relic of a once valiant nation, half of it under foreign tutelage far away from the middle sea on the Anatolian steppes, the other half, partitioned among the victorious powers and neighboring nationalities.

An American mandate had been proposed for the whole of Turkey, including the region of Constantinople and the Straits, the Anatolian region, and Armenia. This suggestion originated from the *King-Crane Commission*,¹ which was sent by President Woodrow Wilson to the Near East "to become as fully acquainted as possible with the state of public opinion and with the social, economic and political conditions of the region, and to form an opinion concerning such a division of territory and assignment of mandates as would be most likely to promote the order, peace and development of those peoples and countries." The official report of the King-Crane Commission urged that a mandate, under American or British administration, be established in Syria. Palestine was to be in-

¹ Harry N. Howard, "The King-Crane Commission," in *The Moslem World*, Vol. XXXII, No. 2. The commission was composed of Dr. Henry C. King, Charles R. Crane, A. H. Lybyer, George R. Montgomery, and Captain William Yale, with Captain Donald M. Brodie as secretary and Laurence Moore as business manager.

cluded within Syria. Great Britain was recommended as the mandator for Mesopotamia. A limited Armenian state under mandate was advised, as was one for a separate international Constantinopolitan state under the League of Nations, and one for a continued Turkish state in Anatolia. A general mandate was suggested for the non-Arabic portions of the Turkish Empire. Finally it was recommended that the United States be asked to take the whole mandate if reasonable conditions could be fulfilled, but not to take any part without the whole.²

Such were the prospects for the Ottoman Empire—the “solution of the Eastern Question” worked out on paper by Western imperialism and nationalism in the years 1918 and 1919. Acted out in historic events, the story was quite different. For when the Allied army of occupation and the last British warship left Constantinople in 1923 the British admiral saluted with respect the Crescent which had risen once more to symbolize no longer the dead Ottoman Empire but the Turkish nation and its new republic, victorious on all fronts. The war for liberation and independence had been won. Originally the Young Turks had fought for the preservation of the multinational Ottoman Empire against the historic forces of national liberty and self-determination. Now, at long last, these very forces were working on the side of the Turkish nation and its right to national existence. They were not to be denied. In London, Lloyd George's imperialist policy collapsed and he himself was forced to resign as prime minister. In Ankara, the Turkish National Assembly elevated their national hero, once outlawed by the Allies and the Ottoman government, to the rank of field marshal, and to the title of *Ghazi*, the Victor, and *Ataturk*, Father of the Turks.

The period of this second war of liberation extends from the unconditional surrender of the Turkish armies on October, 1918, to the unconditional recognition of the Turkish Republic in July, 1923. The Ottoman armistice was granted at Mudros on October 30,

² Harry N. Howard, in his study in 1942 of the King-Crane Commission concluded: “In the case of Turkey proper, it may well be that the Commission underestimated the resurgent forces of a rejuvenated Turkish nation under the able leadership of Mustapha Kemal, or Ata-Turk. . . . Indeed, it might be argued that the Turks had achieved for themselves almost exactly what a mandate might have accomplished along the road of secularization, nationalism and industrialization.”

1918, the Turks holding out chivalrously for the single concession that they be not forced to surrender their German comrades-in-arms. The Treaty of Lausanne was signed on July 24, 1923, and marked the close of a four-years war. At the conference³ that produced the treaty, the Turkish leader, General Ismet Inönü, won what has been termed "the greatest diplomatic victory in history."

A summary of the Turkish story of Little David's fight against half a dozen Goliaths is not without present interest and throws much light upon the nature and the temper of modern Turkey.

The Turk had to fight at the outset against four secret treaties by which Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece had partitioned the Turkish homeland proper, quite apart from what was done to the Arabian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Czarist Russia had once been a partner to this scheme of partition, which granted her Constantinople and the Straits, Armenia and Kurdistan, but Soviet Russia decided to renounce this imperialistic annexation. Italy, however, insisted on her share of the region adjacent to Adalia and Smyrna. (We have already suggested the enormously increased strategical problems the United Nations would have had to face in the Mediterranean campaign if Italy had possession of southwestern Turkey and been able to use it as a means of access for her own and Hitler's armies to Syria, Palestine, and Egypt.) Cilicia and Syria were allocated to France, and Mesopotamia to Britain.

The Turk had to fight against the Treaty of Sèvres-Paris—although it had been accepted by the Ottoman Sultan on August 10, 1920. This treaty had carved out of Turkey an Italian, a French, and a British colony, as well as a Greek, an Armenian, and a Kurdistan state, and in addition, an international zone around the Straits. This treaty made the Turks themselves minorities in all these colonies and states and reduced the Ottoman Empire to a small section of Anatolia, with Constantinople as seat of the Ottoman empire, but with the Straits under the control of an international commission in Constantinople which was to exercise its authority "in complete independence" of the local authority. In the words of the protesting memorandum of the Ottoman government: "At Constantinople

³ Of the members of the Turkish delegation to Lausanne, the Turkish Ambassador to Washington, Mehmet Munir Ertegun, is the only one still in service.

itself, Turkey would not be at home. At the side of his imperial majesty, the sultan, and of the Turkish government—even above them—a commission of the Straits would reign over the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmora and the Dardanelles. Turkey would not even be represented in this commission.” Not only did the treaty restore the disastrous system of Capitulations and concessions and demanded the payment of indemnities, debts, and the costs of armies of occupation, but “not a single item of the economic order in Turkey would have remained within the sole jurisdiction of the Turkish government. Currency improvement, economic regeneration, tax reform, government financing both domestic and foreign, tariff policy, concessions, all resources of the country (even those not assigned to meet charges on the foreign debt); all fell within the domain mapped out for the international financial commission. By this ring of economic servitudes Turkey would have become effectively shackled to the Allied Powers.”⁴

The Turk had also to fight against the occupation of his country and his capital by the troops of three great powers—Great Britain, France, and Italy—which encircled the center of the Turkish homeland of Anatolia and received support from the British fleet dominating the Straits. At Gallipoli, Ataturk again faced for a crucial moment the British-French-Italian army of occupation which, however, out of political considerations, was wisely ordered to withdraw before an actual clash occurred. This was during September and October, 1922.

Other events carried more immediate danger. In the east, the Armenians revolted and established a national state. In the west, the Greek army, supported and equipped by the Allied powers, landed at Smyrna under cover of American, British, and French warships. The Greeks nearly succeeded in reaching Ankara. They set up an autonomous Greek state, “Ionia.” They were preparing to refound the Greek empire in Asia Minor when they were defeated twice (January and March, 1921) by General Ismet. Because of these victories the general was given the name Inonu, from the scene of his last triumph over the Greeks; he bears that name as Turkish president today. The final and decisive battle was won by Ataturk, the

⁴ Donald C. Blaisdell, *European Financial Control in the Ottoman Empire, 1929.*

commander in chief. In a battle that lasted three weeks on the Sakarya River he overwhelmed the Greeks and drove them back to burning Smyrna and into the Mediterranean. These final events in the war took place during August and September, 1922.

The Turk had to fight his own appeasing Ottoman government, as we have noted. Much more serious was the defeatism of the people themselves. For ten years they had been engaged in perpetual warfare. The armistice terms had demilitarized the country. The army was exhausted and in rags. At a later time, some supplies and ammunition were secured from the Russians and the French. The people as a whole were apathetic or despairing. They were torn by dissensions and suspicions of all political parties and factions—from the religious fanatics on the right to the Communist partisans and other factions on the left. This strife and disunity was very apparent at the congresses held immediately after the war: Erzerum (July, 1919), Sivas (September, 1919), Istanbul (1920), Ankara (1920). These, by the way, are pure Turkish place names. Such Balkan or Arabian names as Salonika and Aleppo, which had played their roles in the Young Turkish decade, are no longer in evidence.

Then the "Anatolian Defense Rights Association" elaborated a National Pact that recognized self-determination for the Arabs, but demanded the same for the Turks. It insisted on Turkish territorial integrity and the abolition of the Capitulations and other foreign privileges. It developed the first Grand National Assembly of Ankara (April 23, 1920) which claimed to represent the Turkish nation instead of the Sultan, who was "the prisoner of a foreign army of occupation" in Constantinople. It chose Kemal to be its president. Three years later, in 1923, the National Assembly which proclaimed Turkey a republic and elected Ataturk as its first president, met on the twenty-ninth of October, which since then has been the Turkish "Fourth of July."

The Turks might equally well have chosen July 24, 1923, as their national independence day, as that was the date of the Treaty of Lausanne. This treaty completely abolished the Treaty of Sèvres, recognized the Ankara Assembly as the official Turkish government, conceded all the Turkish boundaries, and fulfilled all the principles of the National Pact for which the nation had fought and won its

second world war of liberation, its political, economic, financial, and judicial independence.

The most striking and destructive institution of Ottoman and Young Turkish history, the notorious Capitulations, were abolished after nearly five hundred years of existence. It was for the abrogation of the Capitulations that Ataturk and his representative in Lausanne, General Inonu, were adamant during all the eight months of the Conference. At one point the Conference threatened to break down when Inonu took advantage of a slight defect in hearing to feign complete deafness to Lord Curzon's stubborn and insistent demands. A new British representative had to be appointed to replace the infuriated Curzon. The only concession to which the Turks would agree was the appointment for a five years' period of European jurists as Turkish officials to serve in the Ministry of Justice and to take part in the legislative commissions but not to interfere in the administration of law.

Although the Treaty of Lausanne did not finally settle three Turkish claims—two regarding the boundaries of the Iraqi-Mosul district and of the French-Syrian mandate, and a military one concerning the Dardanelles—it is the only World War I liquidation that did not result in any revengeful policy. The satisfactory settlement in Turkey's case derived not only from the fact that their treaty was not dictated to them but was freely and fairly negotiated, but from the practical wisdom of Turkish statesmanship, in contrast to the old Bourbon trait of "forgetting nothing and learning nothing." Turkish statesmanship had learned from history to forget the multinational empire and to care for the one nation. Whenever Ataturk had fought for the status quo of the empire, around Macedonia and Albania, in Arabia and Tripolis, or in Armenia, he had felt that he was not in Turkey but among enemy alien communities. Even in Salonika, where the Young Turks' revolution and Ataturk's own career had started in 1908, the Turks were confined to a Turkish quarter, the town being mostly Greek, Jewish, and Levantine.

Thus, strange to say, in getting rid of the Ottoman empire the Allies had the Turk as a natural ally. But any attempt to dismember the Turkish nation itself brought into the open a bitter and tough enemy. Ataturk did not want to push the clock of Turkish history

back to the Ottoman Empire, but neither would he tolerate its being forced back to the twelfth century of a tribal existence, when the Turks lived on the poor steppes of Middle Asia Minor.

Instead, a "Turkish Turkey" was secured: "the political unit, composed of citizens, bound together with the bonds of language, culture and ideal . . . the sacred country within our present political boundaries, where the Turkish nation lives with its ancient and illustrious history, and with its past glories still living in the depth of its soil . . . a unity which does not accept separation under any circumstances." This is the definition in the program of the People's Party of the Republic.

As compared to the Ottoman Empire whose area once equaled that of the forty-eight United States of America, this Turkey is about the size of the states of Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Rhode Island, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland, Delaware, Ohio, Indiana, and two-thirds of Illinois; or twice the size of Montana. Turkey covers about 296,000 square miles of which about 9,000—that is, as much as New Hampshire—are in Europe, where they form the strategical glacis between the two lines of Constantinople and the Straits, on the one hand, and Adrianople and the Maritsa River on the other. Incidentally, the terms "European" and "Asiatic Turkey" may be misleading inasmuch as the usually implied discrimination between *European* and *Asiatic* standards does not apply to the region around the Straits, neither ethnically nor climatically nor spiritually. The country and the people there are just Mediterranean. In terms of Balkan and European geography, this Turkish territory is as large as that of the four Balkan neighbors combined—Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania—and is larger than Greater Germany. Although Turkey no longer covers the three peninsulas of the Ottoman Empire, it still lies at the crossroads between three continents and still holds the position of the middle land bordering the middle sea. Turkish Asia Minor is a rectangle, one and a half sides of which are land frontiers protected by mountains (in the northeast, the Caucasus, and in the southwest, the Taurus) and two and a half sides are seabords, on the Black Sea, the Straits, and the Mediterranean. This Turkish rectangle reaches from north of Adrianople to south of Alexandretta,

and from the fruitful plains in the west to the eastern corners near the Russian and the Mosul oil fields. In the center, where the diagonals meet, the new capital, Ankara, with its 200,000 inhabitants, a unique model of town planning, has sprung up out of a mountainous desert. It is not open to attack from sea and land as Constantinople's peripheric position was and is bound to be. Constantinople-Istanbul still has its 800,000 inhabitants, enjoying the great port, the Golden Horn, and the Bosphorus. All over Turkey there is only one other town with a population greater than 150,000: Izmir (Smyrna). Next comes Adana, with 80,000.

In contrast with all the Balkan states, Turkey is underpopulated—54 to the square mile. It could treble its population before feeling the lack of land. It has, however, one of the highest birth rates in the world—23 per 1,000. The 18 million Turks are more homogeneous than most of their neighbors: 98 per cent are Mohammedans. Only 15 per cent are racial minorities to whom the minority rights of the League of Nations apply—Greeks and Armenians, Jews and Arabs—each minority just around 100,000. Most of the Greek population of 1½ millions were repatriated from Turkey to Greece by the Turkish-Greek arrangement under the Treaty of Lausanne. As to the Jews, they almost secured the opportunity for wholesale immigration, when Ataturk one day discovered the fact that there is in South Russia a large population of Jewish Turks; that is, Turks who once had accepted Judaism. He concluded that Jews were Turks and suggested to the Jewish leader in Constantinople that a large number of European Jewish refugees might immigrate to Turkey. However, the chief rabbi did not agree to Ataturk's definition of Jews and Turks, and the proposition was dropped.

As far as the languages are concerned, Turkish is spoken by 86 per cent, Kurd by 9 per cent, Arabic by 1 per cent, Greek by 0.67 per cent, Armenian and Georgian by 0.36 per cent each, and Yiddish by 0.27 per cent.⁵ Of the foreign languages French is the most widespread, then follow German and Italian, while English is the least used.

Only one minority in Turkey, that of Mohammedan Kurds,

⁵ According to the most recent statistics of December 1943, published by the *Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie*, Bulletin No. 45.

amounts to more than a million. They are mostly mountaineers and nomads along the Iraquian and Iranian borders, notorious for their backwardness, for their Moslem fanaticism, their anti-Armenian massacres, and their revolts against any central government, particularly against Ataturk's secularization and Turkification.

For national Turkey has become Turkish: "The word 'Turk,' as a political term, shall be understood to include all citizens of the Turkish Republic, without distinction of, or reference to, race or religion. Every child born in Turkey, or in a foreign land of a Turkish father; any person whose father is a foreigner established in Turkey, who resides in Turkey, and who chooses upon attaining the age of twenty to become a Turkish subject; and any individual who acquires Turkish nationality by naturalization in conformity with the law, is a Turk."

This is the official definition of "citizen" contained in the constitution of the Republic of Turkey.

ANTAEUS OF THE MIDDLE EAST

"IT IS A TREMENDOUS UNDERTAKING TO AWAKEN A SLEEPING PEOPLE, but we are determined to awaken ourselves and to remain awake. Modern science is international. We shall use it to the full, but we shall take good care to remain Turkish."

Ataturk's statement sounds simple and may even seem trivial. But it actually covers a whole complex of national and international, social and economic problems. The Turkish nation was aroused first by the complete destruction of their empire at the hands of the Allies and then by the Greek invasion of the Turkish homeland. Ataturk accepted the historic verdict of inevitable historic forces.

But there were other historic forces and traditions which he refused to regard as inevitable: the continuous Ottoman and Moslem character of the first, second, and now the third Turkey. Not only had these two features been defended during the Young Turks' decade; they were even written into the Allies' dictated Treaty of Sèvres, which attempted to perpetuate in a partitioned Turkey the Ottoman dynasty and the Moslem caliphate. Ataturk took a firm line in his policy of reform. He had no wish to be revolutionary for the sake of a revolutionary tradition. Nor was he particularly concerned with continuing or destroying the old institutions. He was, however, much concerned with the dangerous mentality that resulted from their maintenance. He required a new Turkish nation to build up a new Turkish state.

The greatest of the Ottoman sultans reminded us of that legendary conqueror in Mediterranean mythology, that Procrustes who had the habit of distorting the body of his victim by overstretching it. The last Ottoman ruler of the second Turkey assumed another role in the Procrustean scheme by consenting to the Allies' policy of cutting off arms and limbs from the Turkish body so as to make the

mutilated corpse fit into the cramped bed of a shadow-sultan caliphate.

Now, at long last, had appeared that other mythological giant, Antaeus, son of Earth and Sea, who by touching his mother Earth regained his strength and grew invincible even against Hercules himself. For his strength came from the Earth. From Procrustean overexpansion to the reborn vigor of Antaeus was the course of Turkish development from the days of the first and second Turkey to the revolutionary period at the beginning of the republic. As early as 1908 the metamorphosis was potential in the vitality of the Young Turks' movement. I wrote then: "Will the Goliath of the Mediterranean East, the giant Antaeus, gain new strength by touching the earth and its technology? Suddenly he will stand upright to pour the quack remedies of foreign and superficial reforms into the Bosphorus and lavish out of his Golden Horn on the Western world the surprise of a wondrous, indigenous revolution. . . . And does it not look as if Persia, India, and China will take the same road to the same goal?"

What were to be the aims of this new Antaeus? Defeated and dissatisfied nations were the aftermath of World War I. Revolutionary Russia; disappointed Italy nursing irredentist and revisionist dreams; Germany, her revolution unfulfilled, her bitter sense of defeat and frustration about to be transformed into aggressive nationalism. For some of these nations the idea of the "have-not" powers began to take shape. Some crushed democracy and exalted the idea of the totalitarian significance of the state. Some projected domestic ideologies into the international order and imagined and schemed world revolution, world Fascism, world Nazism, world Communism—Mussolinism, Hitlerism, Leninism.

What was to be the course of the new Turkey? Was the policy of Mustafa Kemal to be built into a Kemalism—transmuted into an expansive Pan-Islamism or an aggressive Pan-Turkism? Such questions in the early days of the new republic were less academic than they may seem now. After all, there are 300 million Moslems, 17 millions of them next door in Russia—some of them around the oil fields of the Caucasus—and nearly 100 millions in India. All of them were deeply impressed with the victories of the new Turkey. They

looked upon the Moslem caliph, who had been appointed by the Turkish Republic, as their spiritual head even after the last sultan's deposition. Moreover, had not the Moslems of British India sent a delegation to London to plead with Lloyd George for favorable peace terms for the Turkish Moslems and another delegation to Ankara to plead with Ataturk in favor of a Turkish Pan-Islamic and supra-national caliph?

As to the extension of Turkish nationalism into a Pan-Turkism, a similar situation prevailed in the surrounding states. Outside of the Turkish Republic and within the bounds of the former Ottoman Empire there were at least a million Turkish-speaking people. Some of them were in the Balkans, some in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Syria, and on Cyprus. Within the boundaries of the Turks' "hereditary enemy," Russia, there were some 25 millions speaking Turkish languages, some of them forming majorities in Russian provinces. Could not Turkey's "Third Reich" turn toward a Pan-Turkish goal, just as the Young Turkish Committee had done, and just as Germany's Third Reich was to revive the schemes of Pan-Germanism?

Ataturk would have none of it. The Turkish Antaeus would not again change to any new Procrustes by an overreaching Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turkish program. He would discard the empty slogan of the "Protector of Pan-Islam," which Mussolini's old-fashioned and ill-fated imperialism adopted and which the Kaiser's noisy phraseology had misused. He would not consent to the distortion of home-rooted national consciousness into the narrow-minded aggressive nationalism which Hitler's doomed despotism incarnates. The authentic formulation of his reasons we shall learn from Ataturk's own manifesto in a later chapter. Ataturk dismissed Pan-Turks as he disappointed Pan-Islamists. He concentrated on a Turkish Turkey. He was great enough to want a small Turkey. He was convinced that in making her small he would make her great.¹

Had Ataturk appointed a brain trust of international experts, trained in the understanding of the Ottomans' six centuries and the Moslems' thirteen centuries, they would have arrived at the conclusions which were fulfilled by Ataturk's historic vision, his creative

¹ E. G. Mears' *Modern Turkey*, on two books of the author, dated of 1915 and 1916: "Jackh maintains that loss of European possessions has strengthened Turkey."

statesmanship, his courage and his patience. His national policy is summed up in his bold statement: "If the blood of foreign soldiers is shed thereafter on the Albanian mountains and in the Arabian deserts for the maintenance of public order, it will be Italian, Greek, Serbian, and English blood, not Turkish."

The task was not to "Westernize" Turkey by copying Western institutions developed in a different philosophy of life. He had no intention of patching up a Western façade on the Oriental palace of the Ottomans and the church-state of Islam, which together had been the historic sources of the catastrophic Capitulations and Millets. The age-old institutions of Ottoman sultanate and Moslem shariat had to go as well as the mentality behind them. This is the fundamental reform which Atatürk carried through. He removed the Ottoman palace and the Moslem state-church (although not religion) from Turkish life, and re-created the Turks both as a nation and as individuals, not as "Westerners" but as Turks.

If the liberation of Turkey from its empire took four years (1919-1923) with the Allies unconsciously co-operating with Atatürk's anti-imperialist aims, the historic process of the spiritual revolution took another twelve years. By 1935 the three attributes of the *Ottoman Empire of the Moslem Tradition* were definitely destroyed by the six arrows of the People's Party platform. These principles were embodied in the Constitution of the Republic in 1937, nine months before Atatürk's death. The "six arrows" express his philosophy of life, which may properly be termed Kemalism. The Turkish state is (1) republican (replacing the Ottoman dynastic empire)²; (2) nationalist; (3) populist; and (4) etatist (replacing the supranational empire by the national sovereignty of the people, for the people, by the people); (5) secular (replacing the Moslem church-state by the separation of state and church); revolutionary (replacing "Westernizing" reforms and Western privileges by revolutionizing the Turkish mind in favor of a Turkish Turkey).

Thus what survived the *Moslem Ottoman Empire of the Turkish Nation* is the Turkish nation itself, freed from its previous attributes and mortgages by Atatürk, the Liberator.

This Turkish revolution started at the same time and for the same

² The explanatory notes in parentheses are the author's insertions.

reason as the German revolution of 1918-19—after the defeat and collapse of an empire and the disappearance and dethronement of an imperial dynasty. But whereas the new German democratic constitution failed and paved the way back to the old Pan-Germanism and to Hitler's new superimperialism, Atatürk's democratization of Turkey developed into a brilliant and an enduring success. The reason is quite obvious. In Germany only the façade was changed; in Turkey new foundations were laid. It is always the old story: it is the spirit that creates the body, and not the body that creates the spirit.

To build up both the Turkish nation and the Turkish citizen it was not enough to free them from the Ottoman dynasty, which the National Assembly banished. Nor was it enough to free them from the Moslem shariat, the church law permeating all civic life, which was done by deposing the caliph and by separating church and state, after the French example.

What appeared necessary, and actually was carried through, was a unique democratic program of education in the broadest sense, applied to a nation whose majority was illiterate. It was a basic education of the mind and was not merely induced by a democratic constitution and by civil laws, though they were agreed to by the parliament of the National Assembly or by a variety of educational institutions. The education was aimed at the creation of a new outlook, national as well as international, and thus reached further and deeper than any so-called "Westernization." Indeed, it was much more than what we Westerners are accustomed to understand by this term.

There were some more obvious aspects of this program.

In all Ottoman history no Turk had any family name. He was a subject of the Ottomans, a property of the "slave household" but not an individual, a member of a family. When the law of the National Assembly, passed in June, 1934, enforced on every Turk a family name, the once Ottoman subject was dis-Ottomanized and turned into a national citizen. He was no longer the slave of a supranational master but a member of a national community, conscious of the individuality of both his person and his family.

Another means of dis-Ottomanizing the Turk was to unfez him,

the fez, as we explained, having been not a national Turkish but the supranational Ottoman headdress, compulsory for all nationalities in the Ottoman Empire. The fez buried the Turkish nation under its Ottoman past, and set it apart from the international community of nations of the West as well as of the East, Europe and America as well as Russia and China.

But unfezzing—again by law, November, 1925—went even farther than dis-Ottomanizing; it meant also dis-sheriatizing by substituting the international hat of the “unbeliever” and the “foreigner.” Indeed, it became not an issue of fashion but of politics and religion, intended not only to nationalize but also to internationalize the Turkish mind. In Ataturk’s words: “The fez sat on our heads as a sign of ignorance, of fanaticism, of hatred against progress and civilization. It was necessary to abolish it and to adopt in its place the hat, the customary headdress of the whole civilized world, thus showing, among other things, that no difference existed in the manner of thought between the Turkish nation and the whole family of civilized mankind.” And on another occasion: “Nations that persist in remaining at the intellectual stage of the Middle Ages are destined to disappear from the face of the earth. The Turk must become affiliated with an international civilization, and this fact must also be plainly shown in his external appearance. Civilized, international garments are the only ones worthy of our nation. We shall wear laced boots, trousers, jackets, collars, ties, and a headgear with a rim or peak—I am naming the articles of clothing, and I shall even utter an ominous word—this form of headgear is called a hat.”

It was always the *world* and *mankind*—not the *West*—that Ataturk stressed.

It was at Castamonu, a religious, conservative small town in the interior, that Ataturk threw away his Ottoman fez and with a challenging gesture put on the international hat. Thus he prepared for the visible abolition of Ottomanism and the shariat: out of sight, out of mind! By the outlawry of any headdress without a visor—by the enforcement of the hat—Ataturk educated the Turk to discriminate between his new civic life as an individual, a national member of the international society, and his religious duties as a Moslem. In the latter capacity he might still pray with his forehead

touching the ground and his head covered, no longer by the brimless fez but by an ordinary cap with visor reversed or a simple skullcap.

It is a strange fact that unfezzing the Turkish man turned out to be more revolutionary than unveiling the Turkish woman. In certain districts riots and revolts, arrests and even executions were a consequence, particularly in the case of the fanatic Kurds, a backward people in both the geographical and the spiritual sense. The law of unveiling the women had, of course, the same national and international significance of secularization. It meant a fundamental change in the legal, social, and economic position of the Turkish women, a liberation from the Moslem Holy Law, which was replaced by the Swiss Civil Code (1926), securing for Turkish women exactly the same rights as those enjoyed by Swiss women. In fact, ten years later the position of Turkish women was to surpass that of any Western nation. They not only had complete and full equality in voting and an opportunity for election to parliament³ and other representative bodies, but any profession whatsoever was open to them and equal pay for equal work in any occupation was guaranteed. The outlawry of polygamy meant nothing but legalizing the already existing habit and tradition of monogamy.

In short: the abolition of the sheriat resulted in the adoption not only of the Swiss Civil Code and the Code of Civil Procedure of the Swiss canton of Neuchâtel but also of the Italian Penal Code and the German Commercial Code. It meant also the abolition of the Ministry of Religious Affairs and the creation of both a Ministry of Justice and a Ministry of Education.

All these and other democratically enacted reforms—such as replacing the Moslem calendar, based on Mohammed's Hegira, in 622, by the Christian-Gregorian calendar—were thoroughly prepared for by psychological tactics extending over twelve years. There was no anti-God propaganda and no antireligious persecution. The real reason for the changes is explained by Ataturk's statement: "We recognize that it is indispensable in order to secure the revival of the Islamic Faith, to disengage it from the condition of being a political instrument, which it has been for centuries through habit." A few years later the Turkish foreign minister, in refusing an invitation to

³ Among the 424 members elected in 1943 there are 12 women.

a Congress of the Islamic Faith, added: "Such initiatives are of no value to any country . . . and distract peoples from the path of progress. In particular we are opposed to any internal or external policy which makes use of religion as a political instrument." While Ataturk himself was indifferent to religion, his most intimate colleague, his prime minister for more than a decade and his successor as president, is known as a deeply religious man, and so is the chief of the General Staff, Fevzi Chakmak.

Ataturk's attitude toward the church was the educator's fight against intolerance and ignorance on the part of the clergy. "One will be able to imagine," Ataturk explained to the parliament, "how necessary the carrying through of these measures was in order to prove that our nation, as a whole, was no primitive nation, filled with superstitions and prejudices. Could a civilized nation tolerate a mass of people who let themselves be led by the nose by a horde of sheikhs, Dedes, Seids, tschelebis, babas and emirs; who entrusted their destiny and their lives to chiromancers, magicians, dice-throwers, and amulet sellers? Ought one to conserve in the Turkish state, in the Turkish Republic, elements and institutions such as those which had for centuries given the nation the appearance of being other than it really was? Would one not therewith have committed the greatest, most irreparable harm to the cause of progress and reawakening?"

In other words: whereas the Holy Law of Islam had "outlawed" the Turkish nation in the non-Islamic world, Islam as state power was now outlawed by the Turkish nation. State law was separated from church law so that Turkey could be on equal terms with other nations in the international society. Just as building up the Turkish nation implied getting rid of Ottomanism not only as an institution but also as a political mentality, so it meant getting rid of the Holy Islamic Law not as a religious but as a political institution. Both had been supranational forces which had isolated and separated the Turkish nation from the international community.

The same applied to the alphabet. In accordance with its Islamic and imperial history the Moslem Ottoman Empire had used the Arabic script. This was now replaced by the international Latin script—even for the Koran after it was translated from Arabic into

Turkish. This again was a revolution in the same tentative and evolutionary, then exemplary, and finally parliamentary and legislative way that took five years. The reform was introduced first in Ataturk's private correspondence, then publicly on postage stamps and on paper money, then by the President himself, acting as a schoolteacher with the blackboard for his high officials as well as for villages all over the country, and finally by the unanimous vote of the National Assembly (1928), setting more than a million men to work propagandizing the new national international alphabet through the new folk schools all over Turkey. It helped to put an end to Turkish illiteracy, just as Gutenberg's printing press had brought new light to Europe's Middle Ages isolationism.

For Ataturk it was the same personal task and achievement as if Roosevelt or Churchill should tramp all over the United States or the United Kingdom preaching and teaching a new script of a phonetic English and, after a practically printless year of transition, should succeed in introducing a new writing and printing of English.

A last example of the liberation of the Turkish nation from the Moslem Ottoman Empire is the replacement of Constantinople by Ankara as the capital. It is a mistake to confuse it with the parallel of St. Petersburg and Moscow, which at the time the capital was moved were both symbols of national greatness. Another historic example may be more fitting—that of the Egyptian Pharaoh Amenhotep-Ikhnaton who, too, changed name and residence, abandoned old convention, and deposed a powerful priesthood.

What did Ataturk think of Constantinople as a spiritual symbol? Was it not a Greek name, full of the Levantine atmosphere of more than a thousand years of Byzantine Empire and of nearly five hundred years of the Ottoman Empire? A conglomerate of foreign names of foreign districts, such as Pera and Galata, and a Turkish quarter as well? The scene of autonomous Millets, ignominious Capitulations and concessions, threatening dragomans and conspiring powers, and finally ten years of humiliating occupation and domination by both allies and enemies? A romantic museum of sultans, seraglios and palaces and Moslem mosques and minarets? In a word, Constantinople typified the very past that Ataturk wanted to wipe out. Let the dead bury their dead!

But Ankara? In 1922 it was a heap of old ruins of all ages. I had visited it in 1909, in an *araba* (like the pioneers' covered wagon), escorted by two mounted gendarmes (*djauchs*). Ankara was situated on a swampy plain between twin mountain tops, "a cloud of dust in the desert," a bleak village without sewerage, without any accommodation other than army tents and primitive barracks for high and low, full of malaria and other diseases. The prolonged strain of those first years told on every Turkish statesman's health. But this Ankara was converted into a large and flourishing oasis by irrigation and beautified by parks and gardens.

Ankara is situated in the very heart of the Turkish homeland on the central plateau, hard for any enemy to reach; in Atatürk's words, "in surroundings and circumstances where human dignity and national pride are immune from any attack." It afforded an ideal opportunity to create out of nothing a model town, laid out according to the needs and purposes of various districts—governmental buildings and diplomatic centers uptown, business quarters downtown, and between, residential sections.

Up on one of the hills, overlooking his town and looking out beyond rolling steppes to a broad horizon of colorful snowy mountains is the President's home. He does not live in a luxurious and inaccessible palace, such as Hitler's Berghof, high up in the sky and behind the clouds, but in a comfortable mansion whose lights are visible to the townspeople. Close, around the corner, is the British embassy and near-by are the American and French embassies.

The services of modern architects⁴ of international reputation

⁴ The master plan for Ankara was laid out by a town-planning architect from Berlin, Hermann Jansen, who had gone to Turkey during World War I, at the time of my *Dostluk Yurdu* scheme (see page 136). Two other former German architects, who had been sent to Constantinople in 1917 to compete for this plan of the "House of Friendship," were later entrusted in Ankara with designing and building banks and schools—Martin Elsaesser and Bruno Taut—while the majority of the buildings were designed by Clemens Holzmeister from Vienna.

The former chairman of the building department of Berlin, Martin Wagner, who went to Turkey when Hitler pensioned him off in 1933, became a counselor of the Turkish Government in matters of regional and national planning, such as the planning of a superhighway net, of airports, of city masterplans, etc., until the approach of World War II compelled the Turkish government to put all available means into rearmament. Martin Wagner now heads the town-planning section of Harvard University's School of Design. Wagner's Turkish experience and impression could be summarized in his statement: "If one compares the building achievements of the Turkish people with their national income, they did a grander job than any other nation in the world."

were secured to plan the new capital, having regard to the national aspirations of the new Turkey.

This is what Turkish nationalism means: national consciousness, whose birth pains the author diagnosed in his report in 1916.⁵ It is not an expansive or aggressive nationalism. Turkish nationalism has no desire to include conationals living in any neighbor country, as this would mean inclusion of alien elements. During visits to Turkey from 1937 to 1940 I encountered only one responsible Turk who called himself "nationalistic," and who praised Germany's Nazism and criticized my anti-Nazism. He was the only minister, among all the honest and decent collaborators of Atatürk, who was notorious for his moral and financial scandals and his corruptibility. President İnönü's first act was the dismissal of this man.

The awakening consciousness of the Turkish nation attempted to do away with the superiority complex of the Imperial Ottoman Sultan-caliphs as well as with the inferiority complex of the mis-handled Turk, by bringing to life his history, tradition, mentality, and character. On his national monument is the admonition: "Turk—be proud, hard-working and self-confident!" This nationalism is not nationalistic in any virulent sense. It combines national self-respect with mutual respect for other peoples on the basis of equality, and it leads to determined international co-operation for the joint benefit of all.

"The People's Party recognizes the necessity of a large family of independent nations enjoying equal rights, of which the Turkish nation would be an essential member," Prime Minister Sarajoglu said in 1943. "Nationalism should be the means by which the Turkish nation will reach the highest level of human progress, and Turkish nationalism must be understood in a progressive and constructive sense, wishing no harm to other peoples, and conducive to an appreciation and encouragement of the contribution of other nations to the welfare of humanity."

⁵ See pages 131-132.

INDEPENDENT NATION OF FREE CITIZENS

Every *citizen* is born free and free he lives.

Liberty consists in the right to live and enjoy life without offense or injury to others.

The only limitations on liberty—which is one of the natural rights of all—are those imposed in the interest of the rights and liberties of others. Such limitations on personal liberty shall be defined only in strict accordance with the law.

All *citizens* are equal before the law and are obliged to respect the law. All privileges of whatever description claimed by groups, classes, families, and individuals are abolished and forbidden.

Inviolability of person; freedom of conscience, of thought, of speech, of press; freedom of travel and of contract; freedom of labor; freedom of private property, of assembly, of association; freedom of incorporation, are among the natural rights of the *citizens*.

The life, the property, the honor, and the home of each and all are inviolable.

No one shall be arrested or deprived of his goods and chattels except by due process of law. Torture, corporal punishment, confiscation, and extortion are prohibited.

No one may be molested on account of his religion, sect, his ritual or his philosophic convictions. All religious observances shall be free on condition that they do not disturb the public peace, or shock public decency, or exist in violation of social conventions or the law.

Primary education is obligatory for all *citizens* and shall be gratuitous in the government schools.

This Bill of Rights would quite obviously be impossible as a basis for the political structure of Hitler Germany or Fascist Italy. It belongs rather in the American, British, or French tradition of legislative guarantees of human freedom.

If you replace the italicized term “citizens” by the original word

"Turks" you have "The Common Law of the Turks," the fifth section of the Constitution of the Turkish Republic, as drafted by Atatürk and amended by the Grand National Assembly. These are laws—in Atatürk's words—"which promise the most fruitful results for the nation on the social and economic plane, and in general in all the forms of the expression of human activity . . . the Citizen's Law Book, which ensures the liberty of women and stabilizes the existence of the family . . . to raise the nation onto that step on which it is justified in standing in the civilized world."

If you read through the first section of the Republican Constitution you will see that there are eight basic provisions:

The Turkish State is republican, nationalist, populist, étatist, secular, and revolutionary.

The official language of the state is Turkish, its capital is the city of Ankara.

Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation.

The Grand National Assembly of Turkey is the sole lawful representative of the nation, and exercises sovereignty in the name of the nation.

The legislative function and executive power are manifest and concentrated in the Grand National Assembly.

The Assembly exercises its legislative function directly.

The Assembly exercises the executive power through the intermediary of the President of the Republic, whom it elects, and through a Cabinet chosen by him. The Assembly controls the acts of the government and may at any time withdraw power from it.

The judicial power is exercised in the name of the Assembly by independent tribunals constituted in accordance with the law.

These are the words of the Turkish Constitution. What is more essential is the fact that all observers and analysts of Turkish democracy agree that the rights and provisions mentioned in these sections have actually been put into practice—though in a way indicative of the initial state of a newly founded democracy.

In 1941, Sumner Welles was doing much more than making a polite speech when he welcomed Turkish journalists to Washington as representatives of "one of the greatest democracies of the world today, a democracy created by the genius of Atatürk and his associates, a country for which the people of the United States have

very high regard and admiration." Half a generation ago Ataturk's republic failed to receive the approval of the American Senate, which did not ratify the American-Turkish treaty of friendship and commerce that had been signed at the conference of Lausanne. Later American relations with Turkey were put on a formal basis by a *modus vivendi* reached at Ankara in 1927.

True, the democratic republic suffered two short attacks of birth pangs which are summarized by a thoroughly experienced American scholar¹: "The terror is characteristic of dictatorships. Although modern Turkey has had her Tribunals of Independence during a precarious period of her development, propaganda trials and the execution of men against whom there was no evidence have not been their function. . . . There have been but two purges, involving a total of sixty heads, for a plot against the President and for the murder by religious fanatics of an army officer. In the case of another reported plot, several men were rounded up for trial but dismissed for lack of evidence against them. Fairness rather than hysteria dominated these proceedings and those at the time of the Izmir plot when a number of the accused were found not guilty. Since the amnesty law of 1938, Turkey is unique among modern revolutionary nations in having no political prisoners or exiles. While the country is well policed, citizens do not live in fear that they are being watched all the time—that someone takes notes if they offer criticism of the Government or listen to a radio broadcast from the U. S. S. R. The Reformation is not dependent on a visible or invisible police force, or any other form of the terror which is a mark of dictatorships."

It is well to remember how many generations and what events it took to transform the European settlers on American soil into an American nation although they were educated and trained in liberal and democratic Western ideas. To achieve this it needed more than a century of historic happenings of great magnitude, such as the winning of a revolution, the acceptance of a constitution, the evolution of a two-party system, and a civil war.

This progress, which had taken many generations, had to be telescoped into one Turkish generation. To create the Turkish na-

¹ Donald Everett Webster, *The Turkey of Ataturk*, 1939.

tion, Eastern illiteracy, age-old isolation and world prejudice had to be overcome. Yet this was accomplished in less than one generation by the will and wisdom of a statesman who so completely personified a nation that he was elected its first, second, third and fourth president in 1923, 1927, 1931, and 1935. Had he desired it he could have assumed the title and position of sultan-caliph. In fact, several delegations from Mohammedan countries offered him this position. But he himself made it constitutionally certain that the first article, setting up the republic, could not be amended. More deified by popular adulation than any Ottoman "Shadow of God," he could move more freely among his people than most dictators, presidents, and monarchs.

It was on October 29, 1937, just a year before his death, that Ataturk took part as usual in the public celebration of the Turkish Independence Day. At dawn Boy and Girl Scout formations marched with their standards from many provincial districts into beflagged Ankara. At noon there was an impressive stadium show of the armed forces and the youth and sport organizations parading in front of the Republican President and Commander in Chief. Ataturk himself, significantly, wore no military uniform, but civilian mufti, his favorite black coat and top hat, just like his American and French colleagues. Independence Day closed with a custom not usual in democratic countries, let alone in any dictatorial state. The evening was reserved for the people to meet the President. In the largest public hall of Ankara, at the National Fair Building, opposite the Foreign Office, about two thousand people from all walks of life gathered with governmental officials, members of parliament, and diplomatic representatives. The crowd was informal and there was no ceremony. Ataturk came in at ten o'clock, accompanied by some of his ministers. Two little children were with him: each held a hand. They were his adopted children, officers' orphans. This was his "bodyguard," quite unlike any Storm Troops or Gestapo. He walked in slowly, not in any military uniform but in well-cut evening dress. He stopped the moment the national anthem started, standing at attention for some minutes, with the children—nobody else between him and the plain people. If by any chance a foreigner did not recognize him, he would be unable to differentiate between the

Turks and the "Father of the Turks." That is the way the democratic "dictator," Ataturk, used to appear in public among his people to celebrate with them the foundation day of their Turkish Republic.

A "democratic dictatorship" sounds like a contradiction in terms. But the classical dictatorship had a democratic origin and function. In modern times the term has been misused when applied to Hitlerism or Mussolinism or other examples of tyranny.

In the mother cities of democracy and dictatorship, Athens and Rome, in times of emergency and for a fixed period democracy entrusted extraordinary power to a dictator. Thus a Pericles or a Cincinnatus was nominated dictator by the will of a democratic government and by the consent of the governed, to save the security of the state and the freedom of the people from deadly dangers of external or internal warfare. The classical dictator was, therefore, the trustee and servant of classical democracy.

It was in 1937 that Ataturk argued about dictatorship and asked me why I had refused to accept "Dictator" Hitler, but had remained his friend although he was called a dictator. Part of my answer² was: "Your dictatorship frees an enslaved people while Hitler's tyranny enslaves a free people."

There are headmen who turn their people into an amorphous mass, a herd driven by bestial instincts. And there are leaders who train a people to recognize the dignity of the individual and to develop community consciousness, both of which are based on inalienable human rights and responsibilities. The essential difference between our Western and this Turkish democracy is not to be found in any constitutional variation: both constitutions are based on universal suffrage of Turkish men and women alike from their twenty-second year of age on, and provide for parliamentary representation by the National Assembly, elected for four years on the basis of one deputy for 40,000 people. The difference is that the one was forced by the governed on the government during a long process of evolution and self-assertion, and the other on the governed by the government, that is, by the revolutionary élan and endurance of a leader and his followers. "Mustafa Kemal is the master, we are only assistants," Inonu used to say. He was Ataturk's first collaborator for nearly

² See page 198.

twenty years in war and peace, his chief general, foreign minister and prime minister, and by his last will as well as by the unanimous vote of the National Assembly his successor as president.

The People's Party's Elective Committee suggests to the constituencies the candidates, one or several for each. This caucus is submitted to the President of the Republic for his approval or correction. The resulting definite list goes to the constituencies, which accordingly either *elect* one of the proposed candidates or, if only one is on the list, *nominate* this one. Thus the repository of final power is the state represented by a ruling group of the government. It is not the feudalism of a ruling class but the étatism of a governmental committee. Of course, this practice of democratic principles may promote multifold misuse. However, during the twenty years of the Turkish Republic the honesty and decency of the leaders has resulted in fair play.

Leadership does not mean to put the ear to the ground, to follow public opinion, but to have the vision of what is necessary and the courage to make it possible—not by force and violence but by persuasion, example, and law. Ataturk's own words summed up his whole experience: "History shows irrefutably that in all great enterprises the *conditio sine qua non* of success lies in the fact that there must be a leader available who possesses special qualifications and untiring energy. At a time when all statesmen have been seized with despair and are paralyzed by their impotence, when the nation is plunged into the darkness of night without anyone to show the way, when people of every possible description calling themselves patriots think and act in precisely as many different ways, is it possible for anybody to proceed with confidence, clearheadedness and energy, and succeed in the end to achieve one of the most difficult of all aims when he feels himself forced to accept this or that advice, to succumb under a host of varying influences and avoid hurting the feelings of a multitude of other persons? Can history point to a single human being who has had the good fortune to succeed in such circumstances?"

The steady continuity of so-called dictatorship from Kemalism to Inonu proves the stability and strength of the democratic constitution and the democratic consciousness of both the leaders and the

Turkish people even during the crisis of global war. Turkey stands in sharp contrast with all neighboring states where dictatorship has broken down and ended in assassination, abdication, or expatriation as in Rumania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Greece, as well as in Iran—not to speak of Italy's disintegration after the fall of Mussolini's Fascist despotism and Germany's almost certain fearful chaos after the end of Hitler's totalitarian tyranny. In conspicuous contrast, Turkey's democratic dictatorship has proved to have founded and secured the most stable and strong republic of all the Mediterranean states from Madrid to Ankara, or even between Portugal in the Atlantic and China in the Pacific.

New Turkey and New China have one characteristic in common: both are young as political democracies and very old as social democracies. Both—Confucius and Mohammed—based their society on the democratic way of life where any career is equally open to talent. This was one of the reasons why Ottoman Islam without any proselytizing easily won over the Byzantine Christians, oppressed as they were by their feudal class systems.³ In fact, every Turkish leader whom the author met, including Ataturk himself, came from the rank and file of the common people, mostly from the Anatolian peasant-soldier stock. Even in Ottoman Turkey one witnessed a secretary of state or a grand vizier visiting his father in the latter's workshop and sitting there in the open door before the eyes of all passers-by, proud of his simple origin.

There is another endemic factor to explain this old democracy as expressed by two old Koran quotations over the president's chair in the Turkish parliament and in his office: "Solve your problems by meeting together and discussing them" and "Consult the people in ruling." As well as by the new formula over the entrance to the parliament: "All power emanates from the people."

This other factor is the actual classlessness of the Turkish people. As Ataturk himself once analyzed it, in 1925⁴: "Consider our people. You know our country is essentially agricultural. Consequently most of our people are peasants. When we think of that majority of

³ See page 72.

⁴ Tekin Alp, *Le Kémalism*, quoted by John Parker and Charles Smith in *Modern Turkey*, 1940.

peasants we think, too, of the large landowners. How many of these large landowners do we have in our country? What is the extent of the land which they possess? If we examine the question closely we see that relative to the extent of our country there is not a single person in it who can be considered a large landowner. Consequently, those landowners themselves need and deserve to be protected.

"After them there are the craftsmen and the small traders operating in the town. We are naturally obliged to safeguard the interest of that class of citizens at present and in the future. Just as there are no large landowners ranged against the peasants, so there are no large capitalists ranged against the small traders. How many millionaires have we in our country? Not one. Consequently, we cannot be the enemies of those who have a little money. On the contrary, we shall work in order that we may have among us some millionaires and even some multimillionaires.

"Then there are the workers. Today the number of our factories and workshops is very limited. There are no more than twenty thousand industrial workers, while for the revival of our country we need many factories and for that we need labor. We must therefore protect the workers who are no different from the peasants who toil in the fields.

"Then there are the intellectuals and the men of science. Can that class of our fellow citizens isolate itself and act against the interest of the people? The duty of these citizens is to mix with the mass of the people, to guide them and to show them the best path to follow in order to ensure their progress and their renaissance.

"That is how I see our people. The interests of the different groups can be reconciled perfectly and there are no means of dividing them into classes. All our citizens enter into the group which we call the People. Thus the People's Party will be a school of education in citizenship for our people."

That is why even Ataturk's attempt to adopt the British democratic practice of "his Majesty's loyal opposition" failed. His advice to his closest friend, Fethy Okyar, called his "spiritual brother," that he should form in the National Assembly an oppositional group, the Independent Republican Party, resulted in a stillborn second party

in 1930, just as a revival of this experiment in 1939 did not meet with success.

Still, in 1942, the foreign minister, opening the new Institute of International Law at Istanbul University, stated that the Turkish people enjoyed a regime which did not recognize privileges or class discriminations, and which respected the rights of individuals and strove to attain solidarity between citizens in pursuit of a common ideal. They wished for a similar situation in international affairs. They believed that each nation should be free to determine the requirements of its vital interests and adapt them to the particular conditions of its national life. Those principles must remain intact, on condition that this right of self-determination did not constitute a danger of aggression against others, and that there would be a supreme law to frame and govern everything. Turkey believed in the efficacy of preventive measures to establish international harmony, and that nations should base their relations not on compulsion but on a general education conducive to happy future conditions.

"A school of education in citizenship for our people"—this is the educational task facing a young and, to a great extent, inexperienced, even illiterate people. Thus to the two old and endemic factors of social democracy and classlessness—both making for a democratic constitution—two new Kemalist features were added to secure democratic consciousness and strength: education by the state and "étatism."

While Hitlerism, putting the clock back for centuries, decided to thrive on the valor of ignorance, Kemalism, pressing ahead for centuries, preferred to enforce freedom from ignorance—that freedom from which all the other freedoms would follow naturally. While Hitlerism emptied universities and schools for the sake of its party and the party's state, Kemalism founded and filled all kinds of schools and made education compulsory to prepare for any profession, for an informed electorate, and for responsible officialdom. If leadership is the central problem of democracy, then education certainly is the central problem of leadership.

Therefore, a system of state education had to be built up—once more with Atatürk in person as exemplary chief schoolmaster, as the educator, even acknowledged in this capacity by Article 1 of the

law on the national schools: "The first teacher is the President of the Republic, Ghazi Mustafa Kemal." Not only did he write down for his ministers and high officials the new Latin alphabet on his blackboard in regular classes, but he traveled through towns and villages asking questions and learning his people's problems like an undisguised Harun-al-Rashid of the twentieth century.

The new state education secularized the previously religious schools and replaced them by free and compulsory elementary schools for all children from seven to twelve years of age. Thus far, however, not more than 60 per cent of the children have been able to attend classes (roughly about a million in 9,000 public schools). This is due to a shortage of schoolhouses, which are built by voluntary village labor, and also a shortage of teachers, although university students are used as itinerant instructors. In the large towns the elementary and secondary schools as well as institutions of higher learning do not differ from Western standards, nor do the two universities—the old in Istanbul and the new in Ankara—or the Institute for Education and the Agricultural Institute. In my capacity as founder and former president of the Hochschule fuer Politik in Berlin, I was privileged to be a guest of the School of Politics in Ankara. One could search in vain among most colleges of both Europe and America to find its equal. The most conspicuous graduate of this Ankara institute, which prepares for civil service positions, is present Prime Minister and former Foreign Minister Sarajoglu.

It was to promote adult education that Ataturk tramped the country with his blackboard. An excellent program is now carried on in the People's Houses (*Halkevleri*), built by the People's Party in most towns and many villages to be the centers for education. They are used for lectures on folklore, history, geography, literature, and arts, for motion pictures and broadcasts, for discussions by government officials and parliamentary representatives, in order to develop community consciousness, local as well as national. They are also centers of the federations of sports.

Ataturk was quite aware of the fact that it is not organization that prevails in the long run but a sound, strong organism, planted by the foresight and patience of a plowman, and cultivated by the courage of an inspiring statesman. The government announced a

four-year plan for agriculture, a five-year plan for industry, a three-year plan for mining, and a ten-year plan for road building. The visitor to a new factory or a modern farm would be told: "This is nothing now but you should see it in twenty years' time." The people were in full support of these plans. They were not looking back, but thinking ahead. Once in 1911 a Mohammedan clergyman who was my guest in Europe looked out the window at industrial chimneys and prayed for that day in a future Turkey when the number of her mosques and minarets would be equaled by that of her furnaces and factories. That prayer is now coming true.

This is being accomplished by another type of state education—by that Kemalist political philosophy and practice called "étatisme."

As we have seen, in Ottoman Turkey nearly all industrial and financial enterprise, including communications, was the privilege of aliens, representing foreign powers and stimulated by the Capitulations system. In addition, most of the economic and commercial business was transacted by those Osmanli (such as Greeks and Armenians) who were privileged by the system of Millets. It seemed a foregone conclusion that the "Turk" was nothing but a patient peasant and an excellent soldier, unable to do any job connected with the modern industrial era. Now, with the Capitulations, the Millets, and all their privileges canceled as a consequence of the Treaty of Lausanne, the liberated Turks found themselves left with the Ottoman debts, of which they had to pay 40 per cent, with foreign investments and public utilities, which they had to buy out, and with little capital of their own. However, they were determined to accept no foreign loans. They would not again endanger their hard-won independence by new concessions that might possibly lead to renewed economic exploitation and political dependency. Three terms were loathed by every Turk: Capitulations, concessions, and dragomans who interpreted the law on behalf and for the benefit of the foreign powers they represented. Thus National Turkey had to start from scratch in a land impoverished by wars, sultans, and the privileges of Millets and Capitulations.

What the Turkish Antaeus could rely on was his own good earth, rich in natural resources, in agricultural products as well as in industrial raw materials—a land underpopulated as no other southeastern country and largely undeveloped. The land is rich along the

Mediterranean coast and richest in the western plains and in Thrace. It is barren in the center and toward the east, where dry steppes awaited irrigation and wild valleys needed river control. These changing conditions the Turks met successfully, with the result that before World War II the country had become self-sufficient and an exporter of foodstuffs and raw materials. But since 1939, owing to the mobilization of the army and its need of wheat, Turkey is obliged to import wheat for the civilian population under agreements with Britain, the United States, and the Argentine.

In a classless state poor or peasant folk without a capitalistic bourgeoisie, without a thriving middle class and without skilled labor, a strong central government is needed to apply modern technology to the natural resources of the country by systematic state initiative and governmental planning, by some state monopolies, by governmental installation of productive machinery and transport facilities, and by the use of experts from all nations of the world.

Such étatism in a classless state is fundamentally and actually different from any socialism in a class state. There is no ideology whatsoever connected with it, nor any class problem, such as management or labor union, profits or wages. Such étatism is a matter of expediency in order to transform as quickly as possible an economically dependent old nation into an independent state, strong enough to defend its new freedom against any aggression. In Atatürk's own words: "Turkey's application of the system of étatism is not a mere translation taken from the socialism propagated by theorists since the nineteenth century. It is a system peculiar to Turkey, born of Turkey's needs. The meaning of étatism to us is: to hold to the principle of the individual's private initiative, but to take into state hands the fatherland's economy, keeping in mind all the needs and the unaccomplished tasks of a great nation and a vast country. The Turkish Republican state has succeeded, in a short time, in doing the things long perceived and desired but which the individual and private enterprise existent in the fatherland for many centuries had been unable to accomplish."

Let us first consider the agricultural conditions.⁵ Here is the list

⁵ The sources of the following statistics are: Bulletin No. 45, Banque Centrale de la République de Turquie, December, 1942; and Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, *South-Eastern Europe*, 1939.

of agricultural products, nearly all of which are exportable from an area under cultivation which was more than doubled by the republic, and whose quality was improved by the distribution of selected seeds by the state: wheat, maize, barley, rye, oats, and sugar beet (the acreage and the yield of all of them either doubled or trebled between 1925 and 1940); nuts, olives, grapes, figs; meat, milk and fats; tobacco (more than doubled) and cotton (more than trebled), both at the top of the export list; silk, hemp, wool, mohair, hides, skins and animals (sheep, goats, cattle, asses, horses, and buffaloes).

This improvement in agriculture and the increase of output could be achieved only as a result of education and étatism. Specific agricultural knowledge is made widely available by the use of itinerant experts, instruction in scientific methods, the setting up of experimental stations and exhibitions—all of which are under the supervision of the Institute of Agriculture. Once more it was Atatürk himself who acted as an educator on his own model farm near Ankara, which he eventually deeded to the state. The state has distributed land (thus far more than two million acres), seeds, and livestock. It has organized centers called *Kombinats* for the co-operative use of modern tractors and agricultural machinery which replace the wooden plow, the threshing sleigh, and the winnowing shovel of Biblical times. It has established an agricultural bank (*Ziraat Bank*). Finally, it has organized river control as well as irrigation, and it has begun to build a road system.

We have seen how weak and defenseless the Ottoman Empire was because of its lack of railroad communications. Today Turkish étatism has built as many miles as Turkey had to buy from the previous foreign investors (German, French, British, and Belgian), and thus has doubled its railroad system: 4,634 miles, of which 4,380 miles belong to the state. The Ottoman railroads, financed by Central European and Mediterranean powers, had been confined to the west and the south of the Ottoman Empire. The east and the north of the Turkish homeland had been barricaded to any concessionary by Czarist Russia's veto. Now, new railroads have opened the eastern provinces to Ankara and extend to Russia itself. Railroads link together Ankara, the iron-steel center Karabük, and the coal fields

and Black Sea ports of Zonguldak and Ereğli. They connect Ankara, the cotton center Kaisariëh, and the Black Sea port of Samsun. They also connect Sivas-Erzërum-Kars-Russia, and Sivas and Diarbëkr's mining center, as well as Sivas and Siirt's oil fields. Turkey is linked also with Iraq and Syria. In fact, the Ankara Express, part of the old Anatolian and Baghdad railroad, binds together Constantinople-Balkans-Simplon-Paris-London to the west and Syria-Jerusalem-Cairo to the east, with two boat or ferry links, a short one across the Bosphorus between Haidar Pasha and Constantinople, a longer one across the Channel between Calais and Dover.

As to the mineral resources a similar initiative in planning and financing has originated from a governmental bank which conducts the Institute of Mining Studies and Research, the Eti Bank, recalling the old Hittite culture. Here is the list of Turkish minerals:

chrome, of which 120 deposits are known and 24 are being worked, producing a quarter of the world output, so priceless to Germany that a "chrome test" was to become a diplomatic issue between Turkey, Britain, and Germany;

black coal—estimated to amount to 1.5 billion tons of which the annual output is three millions;

ore—that contains 65 per cent iron;

two reserves of iron—with 20 million tons a year;

copper—three mines with 10,000 tons a year;

lead mines which yield some silver and gold as well; and in addition manganese, lignite, zinc, borax, mercury, antimony, and arsenic.

Turkey has struck oil near the Iraq frontier; in addition, she is able to rely on one of the four neighboring oil fields of Iraq (the British-Turkish Mosul agreement entitling Turkey to 10 per cent), Iran, Russia, and Rumania, so that there has been no war rationing of gasoline until recently. The only staples Turkey lacks are rubber and tin.

Thus the main ingredients for industrialization are available. Just as the agricultural and mining progress is due to governmental banks, so is the much more difficult and complicated task of industrialization being promoted by a special state bank (Sumer Bank, recalling the old Sumerian civilization). After twenty years of indus-

trialization, 10 per cent of the population, instead of 2 per cent as previously, are employed in modern factories for consumer goods and heavy industry. Roughly 50 per cent of the factories are owned by the state—especially all key industries, important for military equipment, and most of them located far inland—and 50 per cent are run by private enterprise. Turkish industries produce sugar, textiles, spinning, linen, silk and jute; paper and cellulose; ceramics and glass; and cement. The last plan announced shortly before the outbreak of the war, in 1939, includes factories for aluminum, agricultural machines, motors, and the extraction of benzene from brown coal. Most important of all are the steelworks at Karabuk, built by a British firm, H. A. Brasserts, complete with blast furnaces, coke ovens, foundry, and tube works, and with an output estimated sufficient for the country; and the water power station in the Zonguldak area, built also by a British firm, Metropolitan Vickers Co. In addition, three other centers will serve Ankara, Istanbul, and the Aegean coast.

As to military equipment, Turkish industrialization is still too young to make the country completely independent. There are four arms factories and one airplane assembly plant. For sinews of modern warfare, such as tanks, trucks, planes, and big guns, Turkey must rely on the war industries of the Allies. According to the Turkish-British-French treaty of alliance, Syria, under the command of General Weygand, was intended to serve as the arsenal of democracy for the Near East. When, with France, Syria fell, Turkish diplomats considered building on the unattackable Anatolian plateau a center of war industry producing supplies not only for Turkey herself but for the whole region between the Danubian Valley and the Arabian Sea—another “Czechoslovakia with her Skoda works”—making the Near Eastern Allies less dependent on the long line of communication from Europe. They thought of a regional succursale of Great Britain (just as France had had hers in Russia), and they called such an organization of war industry in Anatolia “the wheels by which the British fleet of the Mediterranean could be enabled to march on land.” However, in view of Britain’s own needs after Dunkerque, it is American Lend-Lease material, paid for by cash, that has contributed to Turkish equipment.

As compulsory savings, heavy taxations,⁶ and high tariffs did not furnish the necessary capital, loans were finally contracted: the first one from Ivar Kreuger, two from Russia, one from Germany (for

⁶ The prime minister, speaking at the opening of "Savings Week," in December, 1943, said the annual expenditure had risen from an average of some £T300 million before the war to £T900 million (about £130 million) including extraordinary expenditure, 70 per cent of which was for the army. Paper currency had more than trebled, but gold cover was larger—143 tons (including 51½ tons given by Britain and France in 1939 at the signing of the Treaty of Alliance) as against 26 tons.

A new extraordinary "tax on wealth," called *Varlık Vergisi*, was enacted into law by the Turkish National Assembly on November 11, 1942. Its principal objective was stated to be the raising of huge sums to curb inflationary conditions prevailing because of the war and the necessity for Turkey to maintain an army numbering almost a million, thus reducing tremendously the country's productive capacity and its taxable income. Its opponents complained about "unfair discrimination in that Mohammedan Turks were largely exempt and assessments were often the results of carelessness or revenge, and that ruthless measures were adopted to enforce payment or to inflict deportation." They charged this tax to be a direct effort to cripple the Greek, Armenian and Jewish minorities. To this the New York *Times* correspondent, C. L. Sulzberger, replies that he does not believe that the destruction of the minority group was intended. He quotes "one of the wisest observers he knows" as explaining that "the intention of the Government is to collect as much money from the wealthy Turkish, Christian, and Jewish populations as can be collected without destroying their ability to continue working." The official views on *Varlık Vergisi* are expressed by Prime Minister Sarajoglu as follows:

"The Turkish peasant, who makes up the bulk of our land's population [and provides the backbone of the army] is generally poor and ill-housed. Because of world circumstances we have been forced to spend enormous sums maintaining a big army which the country could not afford. We were forced to find new sources of payment to keep going financially last year and this. If you need a new tax you must find those able to pay. Always, for centuries in the past, the Turkish peasant has been forced to pay. Faced as we were with an enormous budget deficit, we had two sources for taxation—the rich and the common Turkish people. We have been taking, under *Varlık*, a portion of the fortunes of the rich. The rich are still rich. The peasant, right along, has been forced to surrender a large fraction of his crop production at fixed low governmental prices even if he loses thereby. They have been paying 8 per cent of their crops into the government as a direct levy and 12 per cent in sales at fixed government prices. It was evident that we could not tax the peasants any more heavily. We had another idea—to make all the factories work on a twenty-four-hour schedule of three eight-hour shifts—but there was not enough coal for this and they are still working eight or sixteen hours at most. This would have raised industrial output and employed all those not already in the army or doing obligatory work in the mines. We still had a gravely mounting public debt in October, 1942, and the Cabinet devoted most of its time to the financial crisis. We decided on the idea of *Varlık*, which would tax the rich and profiteers. Originally we hoped to secure thereby two hundred and fifty million lira. Actually we have been able to get three hundred million lira so far." (Parity value of the Turkish lira is about 80 cents.)

The penalty for failure to pay the full assessment within a month was transportation to forced labor on the roads in Eastern Anatolia. By a law passed in November, 1943, these people were released, Christians, Jews and Moslems alike.

trade credit) and, since 1938, from Britain and France, especially for armaments.

Thus we have the four cornerstones of Turkish independence—a national homogeneity, which prevents minority trouble; political unity, promoted by democratic education; economic self-sufficiency, obtained by state planning, though not complete; and, as we shall see, military strength, though dependent on war equipment from industrial nations.

*THUS SPEAKS THE NATIONAL
INTERNATIONALIST*

THE VIEWS WHICH ATATURK HELD, ABOUT HIS TWO COLLEAGUES, Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler, are significant of each of these three revolutionaries, and appear to be confirmed by history. Ataturk was so deeply convinced of the outstanding qualities of the Soviet premier, one year his senior, that, when discussing Russia's social and military accomplishments, he expressed the opinion that in a hundred years "when the fame of all other dictators will have vanished" history will single out Stalin as "the most important statesman of the contemporary twentieth century in Europe and on the international stage." Yet, the Soviet Stalin and the "Turkish Stalin" not only respected but suspected each other.

The humility revealed by this statement is matched by the contempt he had for Hitler, nine years his junior. He seldom called him by his name or title but termed him "tenekedshi"—something like the French quincailier or a tin-peddler—or, as I once described him, "mousetrap peddler."¹ Ataturk had studied Voltaire and Rousseau, who had taught him both rational thinking and a beautiful French. When he had taken the trouble to go through the French edition of Hitler's *Mein Kampf* he felt horrified by the meanness of his language and the madness of his "thoughts."

There is another *My Struggle* of quite a different sort—that of Ataturk himself. It is a large book, covering 716 pages in the English edition, and recording his speech which lasted for six days and was delivered to the National Assembly, from October 15 to 20, 1927. It nearly coincided with the first publication of Hitler's *Mein Kampf*. Yet—"how differently upon us works this sign."

¹ See *The War for Man's Soul*, Farrar & Rinehart, New York, 1943.

Although these two proclamations appealed to Third Germany and Third Turkey at the same time, everything in their programs is in contrast.

The one is written in a prison cell, by somebody who then was nothing but an inexperienced and irresponsible demagogue, an ex-corporal who felt defeated and an underdog, the psychopathic chief of a gang of criminals. It is the self-expression of frustration, an inferiority complex, and ignorance. It contains a program promising a millennium of everything to everybody, propaganda that preaches prejudices and hatred and prepares for aggression, war, and slavery.

The other volume emanates from a liberator and educator, a great soldier and still greater statesman, in the prime of his life. When he made the speech Ataturk was forty-seven years of age, at the height of his national and international achievements between the first and second terms of his democratic presidency. He was conscious of the lessons of history and geography, broad-minded and tolerant. He longed for peace and was preparing both for vigorous national independence and for determined international interdependence. Indeed, there is not one speech of Ataturk's in which are not stressed in the same breath these twin pillars of a national internationalism.

The one, a tyrant, isolated a people that was internationally minded and had co-operated with the League of Nations. The other, a leader, guided an isolated people toward international collaboration and into the League of Nations. In other words, the one was a tenekedshi, a peddler, an adventurer, an alien. The other one was a ghazi, the victor of the Dardanelles and of Sakarya, personifying Ottoman, Young Turkish, and Turkish history in his own life and molding the raw material of the Turkish people into a nation.

Let us listen to this voice—not only of Ataturk but of Turkey herself. All the Turks whom I met felt just as Ataturk felt when he said: "There are two Mustafa Kemals. One is sitting before you, the Mustafa Kemal of flesh and blood, who will pass away. There is another whom I cannot call Me. It is not I that this Mustafa Kemal personifies, it is You—all you present here, who go into the farthest parts of the country to inculcate and defend a new ideal, a new mode of thought. I stand for these dreams of yours. My life's work is to make them come true."

Indeed, two Kemals were bound together in this singular personality. From the site of Kemal Atatürk's monument in Istanbul one can look up to the sunlit summit of the Bithynian Olympus. It was there that the Greek gods watched the Homeric heroes on their nearby Trojan battlefield. From there they set out on those adventures kept alive in such names as Dardanelles, Bosphorus, and Europa. This was the scene of the struggles between the gods and the giant Titans. One of these Titans was Prometheus who also was burdened with a double fate—*Prometheus Unbound* brought fire to earth and created mankind; *Prometheus Bound* was chained to a Caucasian mountain and a vulture devoured his liver.

Now, the Kemal of flesh and blood, the *Kemal Bound*, came from Anatolian peasant ancestry. His parents lived in the Turkish quarter of Salonika. His father was a poor customs official and his mother a pious woman who dreamed of an education and a career for her son in the church and detested the military uniform of the cadet college where he was enrolled. The young Kemal was "wiry though not very strong," with blond hair and blue eyes and a sharp penetrating look. Even when the slim young officer developed into the older and heavier Ghazi, the body never lost its erect military bearing and the eyes were cold and implacable even to his friends.

One habit followed him through his life—his fondness for *rakki* and other strong drinks. He was never a drunkard but appeared to find in alcohol a stimulant for his mental powers. Close associates have described all-night drinking sessions which were in no sense orgies but brilliant political discussions with ambassadors, ministers and generals on problems of the Middle East and the Balkans. On such occasions, which I shared repeatedly, he never showed any signs of losing control of himself. It was perhaps this quality of a "strong head" that prevented him from noticing any early warnings of the cirrhosis of the liver that resulted in his death when he was only fifty-eight years of age.

The picture of Kemal as a man of gargantuan appetites leading the debauched and dissolute life of an Eastern potentate² is far from the truth. Women played a part in his life, but not an all-important part. His marriage in Smyrna after his victory over the Greeks was not successful and soon ended in divorce. His closest attachment

² *Grey Wolf*, by H. C. Armstrong, a resentful British war prisoner.

was probably to his mother, Zubeide Hanum, whom he brought to Ankara at the height of his fame and power, in order to have her near him. He had real affection for his dozen adopted children, daughters of officers in his army who had been killed in action. It is true that he enjoyed the presence of attractive women but they were in no sense a consuming interest of his life. However, it should be remembered that it was he who provided them with their equal status in human society.

The Kemal of flesh and blood, *Ataturk Bound*, has gone to his tomb in Ankara which, significantly enough, is immediately next to the People's House. But *Ataturk Unbound* lives on in the hearts of his people and in the history of mankind. Both these Kemals were merged into one dynamic personality by an exceptional loneliness, which gave him no peace and which he was never able or willing to transcend. It was *Ataturk Unbound* who carried the light of life to his people and kept the fire of freedom burning and constantly expanding. He re-discovered, or rather re-created, the soul of a seemingly lost nation. Not only had he the strength to inspire his followers to almost impossible feats, but he actually saved Turkey from extinction and established for her a new place in the family of nations. Adulation? No, but that true admiration which will be borne out by the verdict of history.

Whatever the Turks may be called upon to decide tomorrow, they will be guided by Ataturk's *My Struggle*. In 1939, in the spring before the outbreak of the war, I was in Constantinople's Park Hotel, opposite Franz von Papen's embassy, the guest of the chief of the British Information Service, together with a mutual friend, once a Young Turkish General Staff officer. In discussing the approaching war³ and its consequences, our Turkish partner anticipated our questions and said: "As far as we Turks are concerned, there will be only one way to follow—Ataturk's appeal to the Turkish youth in his great speech which is, in a sense, his last will. Read it, and you will know our future attitude toward our neighbor

³ See the author's report and address to Chatham House in London, on June 22, 1939: "Reviewing the fundamental contrast and conflict between the two world conceptions I have tried to outline—domination or co-operation, force or law—the ultimate outcome is bound to be clash and catastrophe. Thus war seems inevitable. . . . But the truth will again conquer the myth. Thus defeat seems inevitable for Germany."

at the next table." We looked around and there was the German ambassador sitting and watching us.

Here is Ataturk's advice against "ill-will" and "the strongest force that the earth has ever seen":

Turkish Youth! your primary duty is ever to preserve and defend the national independence, the Turkish Republic.

That is the only basis of your existence and your future. This basis contains your most precious treasure. In the future too there will be ill-will, both in the country itself and abroad, which will try to tear this treasure from you. If one day you are compelled to defend your independence and the Republic, then, in order to fulfill your duty, you will have to look beyond the possibilities and conditions in which you might find yourself. It may be that these conditions and possibilities are altogether unfavorable. It is possible that the enemies who desire to destroy your independence and your Republic represent the strongest force that the earth has ever seen; that they have, through craft and force, taken possession of all the fortresses and arsenals of the Fatherland; that all its armies are scattered and the country actually and completely occupied.

Assuming, in order to look still darker possibilities in the face, that those who hold the power of government within the country have fallen into error, that they are fools or traitors, yes, even that these leading persons identify their personal interests with the enemy's political goals, it might happen that the nation has come into complete privation, into the most extreme distress; that it finds itself in a condition of ruin and complete exhaustion.

Even under those circumstances, O Turkish child of future generations! it is your duty to save the independence, the Turkish Republic.

Indeed, Ataturk's proclamation keeps on echoing in the responsive mind and will of the Turkish people.

It is worth while to pick-out of those 716 pages of *My Struggle* just a few significant pieces indicative of the directions he gave in the matter of both national dependence and international interdependence, arranged under the headings of my comprehensive formula in *The Moslem Ottoman Empire of the Turkish Nation*.

The Moslem . . .

If the Caliph and Caliphate were to be invested with a dignity embracing the whole of Islam, ought they not to have realized in all justice that a crushing burden would be imposed on Turkey, on her existence; her

entire resources and all her forces would be placed at the disposal of the Caliph? The Caliph-Monarch would have the right of jurisdiction over all Mohammedans and all Mohammedan countries, that is to say, over China, India, Afghanistan, Persia, Iraq, Syria, Palestine, Hejaz, Yemen, Assyria, Egypt, Tripolis, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, the Sudan. It is well known that this Utopia has never been realized.

For centuries our nation was guided under the influence of these erroneous ideas. But what has been the result of it? Everywhere they have lost millions of men. Do you know how many sons of Anatolia have perished in the scorching deserts of the Yemen? Do you know the losses we have suffered in holding Syria and Iraq and Egypt and in maintaining our position in Africa? And do you see what has come out of it? Do you know? . . . We cannot conscientiously permit this tragedy to continue. . . .

The humane attitude which we shall adopt toward the Christian population dwelling in our country will be all the more appreciated at the present time, and the possibility that the Christian population will not enjoy any real or apparent protection from any of the foreign governments will be conclusive evidence of the civilizing factors existing in the character of our race. I request you to proceed in strict accordance with the law and enforce it with vigor if any persons should act contrary to the interests of our country and disturb order and quiet in the country. Administer the law impartially, without distinction of race or creed.

Ottoman Empire . . .

With regard to the Ottoman Empire, I had been convinced for a long time that it had run its course . . . [This statement comes from a ghazi who has defended the Ottoman Empire on seven battle fields—in Syria-Lebanon, Macedonia, Libya, Thrace, Dardanelles, Caucasus, and Palestine.] Sovereignty is acquired by force, by power, and by violence. It was by violence that the sons of Osman acquired the power to rule over the Turkish nation and to maintain their rule for more than five centuries. It is now the nation that revolts against these usurpers, puts them in their right place and carries on their sovereignty. This is an actual fact. It is no longer a question of knowing whether we want to leave this sovereignty in the hands of the nation or not. It is simply a question of stating an actuality, something that is already an accomplished fact and must be accepted unconditionally as such. And this must be done at any price.

What particularly interests foreign policy and upon which it is founded is the internal organization of the state. Thus it is necessary that the

foreign policy should agree with the internal organization. In a state that extends from the East to the West and unites in its embrace contrary elements with opposite characters, goals and culture, it is natural that the internal organization should be defective and weak in its foundations. In these circumstances its foreign policy, having no solid foundation, cannot be strenuously carried on. In the same proportion as the internal organization of such a state suffers particularly from the defect of not being national, so also its foreign policy must lack this character. For this reason, the policy of the Ottoman state was not national but individual. It was deficient in clarity and continuity.

To unite different nations under one common name, to give these different elements equal rights, subject them to the same conditions and thus to found a mighty state, is a brilliant and attractive political ideal; but it is a misleading one. It is an unrealizable aim to attempt to unite in one tribe the various races existing on the earth, thereby abolishing all boundaries. Herein lies a truth which the centuries that have gone by and the men who have lived during these centuries have clearly shown in dark and sanguinary events.

. . . of the Turkish Nation

. . . In these circumstances, one resolution alone was possible, namely, to create a New Turkish State, the sovereignty and independence of which would be unreservedly recognized by the whole world. The main point was that the Turkish nation should be free to lead a worthy and glorious existence. Such a condition could only be attained by complete independence. Vital as considerations of wealth and prosperity might be to a nation, if it is deprived of its independence it no longer deserves to be regarded otherwise than as a slave in the eyes of civilized humanity.

. . . Thank God, our nation is endowed with such fortitude of mind and intrepidity of spirit that it will never sacrifice its life and its historic traditions from a feeling of discouragement, or allow itself to submit to such a sentence of execution.

. . . The Turk is both dignified and proud; he is also capable and talented. Such a nation would prefer to perish rather than subject itself to the life of a slave. Therefore, Independence or Death! . . . I may add that it was incumbent upon me to develop our entire social organization, step by step, until it corresponded to the great capability of progress which I perceived in the soul and in the future of the nation and which I kept to myself in my own consciousness as a national secret.

The political system which we regard as clear and fully realizable is

national policy. In view of the general conditions obtaining in the world at present and the truths which in the course of centuries have rooted themselves in the minds of and have formed the characters of mankind, no greater mistake could be made than that of being a utopian. This is borne out in history and is the expression of science, reason, and common sense.

In order that our nation should be able to live a happy, strenuous and permanent life, it is necessary that the state should pursue an exclusively national policy and that this policy should be in perfect agreement with our internal organization and be based on it. When I speak of national policy, I mean it in this sense: To work within our national boundaries for the real happiness and welfare of the nation and the country by, above all, relying on our own strength in order to retain our existence. But not to lead the people to follow fictitious aims, of whatever nature, which could only bring them misfortune.

It is not difficult to appreciate the character of a government standing upon such foundations. Such a government is a People's Government, based on the principle of the sovereignty of the people. Such is the Republic.

All the individuals constituting our nation, whether ignorant or educated, have without exception rallied around one principle, perhaps even without being conscious of the difficulties lying before them, and they have resolved to shed the last drop of their blood to carry out what they have to do in order to defend it. This principle is the attainment and maintenance of our independence. Whoever speaks of complete and full independence means thereby unlimited independence: political, economic, legal, military, cultural, and the rest. If in any of these spheres of independence there should be something lacking, it would be equivalent to saying that the country has not yet gained its independence in the fullest meaning of the word. We do not believe that we can enjoy peace and enter into purely formal agreements; but our nation will never be at rest nor mistress of her own existence under a peace or an agreement which does not bestow complete independence on her.

For this reason, I had to interest the Turkish nation in the war in all their actions, their sentiments, and their conceptions, in the same way as the army at the front. Not only those who were facing the enemy, but every single individual in the village, in his home, in the fields, had to consider himself in the same manner as those fighting at the front as being entrusted with a special mission to dedicate himself with his whole heart to the conflict.

Nations that fail to sacrifice their material and moral possessions to their fullest extent in the defense of their country, or even do this reluctantly, cannot be looked upon as being decided to carry on a war or as being convinced that they will bring it to a successful issue. In future wars also, the decisive element of victory will be found in this conception.

. . . and the one world

Let us put an end to the catastrophes into which the people had been dragged by following those who deceive themselves and misjudge our real rank and position in the world . . . The English author Wells has written a historical work which was published two years ago. The last pages of this work contain some contemplations under the heading of "History of Mankind in the Future." These contemplations relate to the question of the establishment by the governments of a World League. In this chapter Wells develops his ideas as to the form the government of a World League would take, and speaks about the essential fundamental lines of such a state. He depicts what might become of our earth under the government of justice and a uniform law. Wells says: "Unless all the sovereignties amalgamate into one single sovereignty, unless a higher power than nationalities appears, the world will perish," and he continues as follows: "The real State could not be anything but the Government of the United States of the World, which are necessarily brought together by the conditions of modern life," and "it is certain that sooner or later, men will be compelled to unite if they do not want to succumb under the weight of their own inventions." He also says that, "we do not know yet exactly what must be done and what must be prevented finally to attain the realization of the great thought of human solidarity," and that a world federation of states will only succeed with difficulty in letting those powers join whose external policy has traditionally an aggressive character. Let me also quote the following observations made by Wells: "The joint sufferings and needs of Europe and Asia will perhaps, to a certain degree, contribute to bring the peoples of these two continents nearer to one another" and "it is possible that a number of individual federations will precede the World Federation."

I will by no means deny the beauty of the idea of the "United States of the World," the establishment of which would produce the result that the experience, knowledge, and conceptions of mankind at large would be developed and uplifted, that mankind would abandon Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, and that a pure, spotless, simplified religion, understood by all and of a universal character, will be established, and that men

will understand that they have lived hitherto in a place of misery amidst disputes and ignominy, their desires and gross appetites, and that they will decide to eradicate all infectious germs which have hitherto empoisoned both body and soul.

Thus spoke Ataturk in 1927.

This is no Westernization, discriminating between West and East, Occident and Orient. Indeed, in view of the Turkish and the Chinese development alike, we may say that there is no Occident and no Orient any more, and there is the same idea of the one world and of man's future represented in the West as in the East. Franklin D. Roosevelt's words, "World events and the common needs of all humanity are joining the culture of Asia with the culture of Europe and the culture of the Americas to form for the first time a real world civilization," are, in fact, a paraphrase of the Turkish President's similar thoughts.

Thus spoke Ataturk, in 1927, and thus speaks Turkey today—through all her statesmen and diplomats, generals and officers, members of parliament and the press, the common people of the old and the young generation. When I was in Turkey between 1937 and 1940, not only did they express themselves to me along these lines of political and human fundamentals but they were and are acting accordingly.

The *Turkish Statue of Liberty*, Ataturk's monument on the promontory of the old Seraglio, which welcomes the newcomer to Istanbul, means freedom not only for the Turkish but every nation of the international community.

INTERDEPENDENT STATE IN A WORLD OF NEIGHBORS

IT IS IMPORTANT TO SEE HOW THE NEWLY GAINED INDEPENDENCE OF the Turkish nation and the internal stability of the new state were related to a practical policy of interdependence in a "world of neighbors." President Roosevelt used the later phrase in his inaugural address of 1933. Even then he was preparing the American people for the extension of the concept of "good neighbor" from a purely regional connotation in the Western Hemisphere to a universal connotation in the world itself.

Turkey shares with Germany the geographic fate of being blessed or cursed with an abundance of neighbors. Before the outbreak of war, no less than nine neighbors surrounded the "middle land." Four of them were great powers, the other five were smaller states. Just beyond a narrow strip of the Mediterranean, England holds Cyprus and Italy holds the coastal chain of the Dodecanese Islands. For land neighbors, Turkey has France in the Syria-Lebanon mandate, on one side, and Russia just beyond the Caucasus and across the Black Sea, on the other. Three Balkan states border on Turkey on the north—Greece, Bulgaria, and Rumania—while to the south are the three Moslem states, Iran, Iraq, and Syria-Lebanon (already mentioned as a French-mandated territory).

This was the situation immediately prior to the outbreak of war. All these nine neighbors held territory that was formerly part of the Ottoman Empire; five of them are Ottoman succession states.

Now, satisfactory relationships are difficult between nations in the Eastern world where a long history of antagonisms and distrust is almost bound to prevail. As an example, all along the Danube from Belgrade to the Black Sea not one single bridge connects the

Rumanian with the Yugoslavian and Bulgarian shores. When ice blocks the Danube and prevents the ferry from plying between Ruschuk in Bulgaria and Giurgiu in Rumania, it is impossible to get across the river unless a guide takes the risk of rowing the boat through the channels in the ice, using an ax to cut his way through if necessary. If such a course is too dangerous, he may put his passenger in a boat fixed onto a sled, so that if the ice breaks, the boat will keep the passenger afloat until he can be extricated. But on no account will the military risk be run of throwing a bridge across the river.

The new Turkey, however, has a keen sense of interdependence with her neighbors. If we return to the night of Independence Day, 1937—to which we have already made reference—we shall see an interesting demonstration of how it expressed itself. According to the tradition of the young republic, Ataturk, as president, opened the public ball in the small rectangle reserved for him, his ministers, the diplomatic guests and their wives. When he came to choose a partner for the opening dance, his sense of politics matched his taste in beauty. He chose the attractive wife of the chief of the Greek General Staff. Now, the Turkish Independence Day celebrated Ataturk's victory over the Greek army of invasion some fifteen years before. In the intervening time, Greece, the archenemy of Turkey, had become friend and ally. What was more fitting, then, than that Ataturk should single out for special honor the wife of General Alexander Papagos—that same Papagos who a few years later was to earn his fame as a military leader by his victories over the armies of Mussolini.

Following this symbolic act of good will and unity even more important events took place which emphasized Turkey's sense of responsibility among her neighbors. The Turkish President withdrew into an adjoining room accompanied by the members of the diplomatic corps. We saw him seated at a table surrounded by the chiefs of staff of Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, the foreign ministers of Turkey and Iran, and two ambassadors whose invitation to that intimate conference boded ill for Hitler and the Axis. For here were the military chiefs of the European-Balkan Entente and two foreign ministers of the Asiatic Saadabad Entente,

made up of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan. Two weeks before that night the Greek premier and dictator, Metaxas, had been in Ankara to discuss with Ataturk a common Balkan policy. Now all the military chiefs of the Balkan Entente were following up those political discussions by planning a regional military collaboration. A Hitlerite German who had enjoyed just a little too much of champagne was overheard to remark to his colleague in Dr. Goebbels's propaganda department: "Just one bomb would be very effective at this moment."

Such a Hitlerite coup would have *purged* not only the high Turkish host with all the military leaders and foreign ministers mentioned, but two more guests of honor at his table—the ambassadors of Britain and France. While Ataturk granted the German Ambassador von Papen's harmless predecessor a fleeting handshake, he kept Sir Percy Lorraine and M. Massigli at his table for more than ten hours, from eleven o'clock in the evening until nearly ten o'clock next morning. They talked about his favorite topics—collective security, the character of his Turkish people, and pre-Ottoman Turkish history. The contrast between this significant scene of cordial friendship and the isolation of the German ambassador, who stood alone in a corner, gave a clear demonstration that the Turkish-British-French treaty of mutual assistance was now an effective reality. The cause was set toward common action with Britain and France—away from and against the German ex-ally with whom Turkey had gone to war in the last days of October, 1914, in fact, exactly on the date of this Independence Day, thirty-three years ago.

The development toward regional interdependence had begun in 1923 at the Peace Conference of Lausanne. Its first stage was marked by discussions between President Venizelos of Greece and Ataturk's deputy, Inonu. Both statesmen felt that they were being bossed around by the Great Powers. They, therefore, approached each other with the challenging question: "Are we not mature enough to settle Turkish-Greek affairs ourselves without the interference of the Great Powers? Why must we keep on being the victims of their rival ambitions? It is to our mutual interest to bury the disastrous past and together build a secure future. Let us exchange

our minorities and share our major ideas and thus attempt to arrive at a mutual understanding and enduring collaboration."

Thus an honorable peace was concluded between Turkey and Greece. It provided for generous terms of indemnity which wise Turkish statesmanship granted to the defeated invader, a favorable trade agreement, and the transfer of one and a half million Greeks from Asia Minor to Greece and of half a million Turks from Greece to Turkey. This was the first contemporary wholesale migration, planned by two governments and completed in six years by a League of Nations committee under the chairmanship of Dr. Fridtjof Nansen. In this way the two Mediterranean states of Turkey and Greece became homogeneous nations without any *irredenta*, any minority to be liberated, on either side. Thus they were able to inaugurate a new epoch of good-neighborliness in the Eastern Mediterranean. An alliance actually provided for the representation of Turkey and Greece at international conferences by a single delegation instructed by both governments.

It had been inevitable that all previous attempts at a Turkish-Greek understanding would fail so long as a large Greek minority existed in Ottoman Turkey. They failed in 1908 when, during the Young Turkish revolution, Young Turkish newspapers showed their good will by printing pictures of a "Union of the Ottoman Crescent and the Greek Cross." They failed again in 1917 when King Constantine of Greece asked me if I could help in preparing the Young Turkish government for a Greek-Turkish understanding and future alliance.¹ Only through the exchange of minorities could a new Turkish-Greek relationship be created. At first it was a *détente* only, but it turned into an entente and eventually grew into an alliance in 1933. The Turkish foreign minister once described this alliance

¹ The foreign minister of Greece, Dr. Streit, wrote to the author from Zurich on September 29, 1917: ". . . Following up the conversation you had in St. Moritz with his Majesty the King and the Crown Prince we want to urge you again to convey to your Turkish friends in Constantinople our sincere desire for a most intimate Greek-Turkish collaboration for the sake of enduring peace in the Near East. We would greatly appreciate your acting as a spokesman of the Greek minority in order to prevent any terrorizing Turkish measures." To which the author replied on October 30, 1917: ". . . The talks I had in Constantinople with Grand Vizier Talaat Pasha and Generalissimo Enver Pasha strengthened my impression that they both join you in your wishes and aims. Both are convinced of the desirability of a Turkish-Greek postwar alliance."

to me as "une liaison pas d'amitié mais d'amour" between both the statesmen and the nations. When the Greek premier and principal architect of Greek-Turkish friendship, General John Metaxas, passed away in 1942, Turkish public opinion mourned his death and sincerely stated: "The news of his death shocked us Turks as greatly as though we ourselves had lost a leader."

Metaxas had been a leader indeed. True, Metaxas's domestic regime was a far cry from any classical trusteeship of ancient democracy, but it was no totalitarian tyranny. Although it expressed itself in shocking ways, it saw its task in halting disintegration of the state when the shortsighted policies of too many factions proved incapable of coping with the country's greatest economic and social crisis. Metaxas succeeded in rallying Greece to defeat Mussolini and to upset decisively Hitler's Mediterranean, Turkish, and North African timetable. Metaxas has often been labeled "pro-German." He was not. He clearly realized Hitler's pan-German drive to the Balkans and was determined to resist and to fight it, although he was quite aware—as he told me as early as 1939—that little Greece was bound to be crushed by the mammoth Hitlerism. "We may lose battles, but not our souls," he said to me—and went to war against Germany. Sir Reginald Hoare, the British Minister to Rumania, stated that if Rumania had possessed a statesman like Metaxas she might have played her oil trump—the threat to destroy the wells—in such a way as to alleviate some of the misfortunes which had befallen her, and at least might have retained Rumanian independence. Metaxas was determined to broaden with Atatürk and İnönü the Balkan horizon beyond Greek-Turkish frontiers toward the Balkan *Entente* of Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania and further on to a Balkan *Union*, to include Bulgaria.

As this evolution is unique in the history of both the Balkans and of Europe and is indicative not only of prewar tendencies but also of postwar aims, it calls for a short summary. It is the story of four years of preparatory nongovernmental Balkan Conferences (1930-1933), seven years of a Balkan Entente, accomplished by four governments (1934-1940), and three years of an approaching Balkan Union (1938-1940), with official Turkey leading through all three phases. In 1931 Atatürk emphasized the contribution thus made by the

Balkan nations to "all civilized humanity" when he encouraged the idea of a Balkan Federation by welcoming the second Balkan Conference in Ankara in the hall of the Grand National Assembly: "The present Balkan states including Turkey owe their birth to the historic event of the gradual displacement of the Ottoman Empire, finally interred in the tomb of history. That is why the Balkan nations, possessing a common history, were related for centuries. If the history presents painful and sorrowful aspects, all the Balkan nations share their responsibility for it, while that of Turkey has not been less heavy. That is why you are going to erect on the sentiments . . . of the past . . . the solid foundations of fraternity and open the vast horizons of union. . . . Since the foundation and aim of the union are collaboration in the economic and cultural domains of civilization, it is not to be doubted that such an accomplishment will be received favorably by all civilized humanity."

Turkish leadership in Balkan regionalism is illustrated by various events: the quick sequence of Turkish pacts of friendship with all Balkan states, the subsequent visits to Ankara of all Balkan statesmen, kings and prime ministers, and the decision of the Balkan Conferences, representing all Balkan states, to make Istanbul the permanent headquarters of their organization. Istanbul, where Atatürk had addressed the Second Conference in 1931, was scheduled to be the scene of the fifth Balkan Conference in 1934, which never was held owing to Hitler's advent to power. The first and fourth Conferences chose two Greek towns: Athens in 1930, and Salonika in 1933. The third was held in the Rumanian capital, Bucharest, in 1932. These four Balkan Conferences resulted in the adoption of a political pact "which—for the first time in Balkan history—was to govern all the states of the peninsula in their mutual relations. The far-sighted leaders in the movement towards Balkan friendship apparently had met the challenge to adopt a pact. Would the Balkan governments accept their handiwork?"²

What was the difference between these four nongovernmental Balkan Conferences (1930-1933) and the Balkan governments' subsequent Entente (1934-1940)? The character of the Balkan Conferences was aptly described by their first initiator, Alexander Papanastassiou,

² Robert Kerner and Harry N. Howard in their most comprehensive study of *The Balkan Conferences and the Balkan Entente, 1930-1935*.

Greek ex-premier: "Though based on national groups, composed of politicians, representatives of peace organizations, universities, and professional organizations, and though its decisions do not obligate the governments, this organization [of Balkan Conferences] has nevertheless an official character, not only because the governments of the six countries support the activities of the national groups, but also because the delegations of each country to the Conferences are chosen after consultation with the government, and these governments are represented at each Conference by their diplomatic officials (who follow the deliberations in the capacity of observers) in the country in which the Conference meets."

The organization of the Balkan Conferences originated from the International Bureau of Peace which had held its Congress in Athens in 1929 and was encouraged by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Because neither a European federation nor a world federation seemed attainable, Balkan statesmen aimed at a regional federation within the framework of the League of Nations, an indigenous Amphictyonic League, such as the Greek states once had accomplished in the fourth century B.C.

In fact, the Conferences included all six Balkan states, victor and vanquished, antirevisionist and prorevisionist: Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania as well as Albania, Bulgaria, and Turkey. They all voted for a common Balkan flag of six stars and six stripes, and they achieved a permanent organism with a president, Council, Assembly, secretary general, and Headquarters, all patterned after the model of the League of Nations. They worked through six commissions with the following significant names and aims: (1) Commission on Organization: general principles of union and statutes; (2) Commission on Economic Relations: economic understanding, common protection of agricultural products, bank and chamber of commerce, and agriculture; (3) Commission on Social Policy: unification of social legislation, facilities of travel, and labor; (4) Commission on Communications: Balkan postal union, improvement and development of the ways and means of communication; (5) Commission on Intellectual Co-operation: Balkan institute, reform of instruction in history, and exchange of professors; (6) Commission on Political Relations: Balkan, Locarno, treaties of friendship, arbitration, and disarmament.

These Conferences succeeded in the adoption of a political Balkan pact, though the vote was not unanimous. It provided for a system of organized security which surpassed the League Covenant by accepting not only the League obligations and the Locarno principles of nonaggression and arbitration but also the Geneva protocol of mutual assistance. It stipulated concerted action against any Balkan aggressor. This accomplishment was correctly summarized by the author of the draft, the Greek professor of international law, Jean Spiropoulos, as follows: "The mutual assistance by our governments may lead to a series of other agreements, political as well as economic, no less important for the development of our relations. . . . Of course, the draft . . . was not accepted unanimously, the Bulgarian delegation having withdrawn from our commission, and our Yugoslav friends having made some reservations concerning the protection of minorities, and that has tended to weaken somewhat the value of the results obtained. But it would be going to the other extreme to underestimate its importance. It is now for our government to act. Let them do everything possible to conclude and crown the work which we have begun."

Did the Balkan governments act according to these Balkan Conferences of nongovernmental, though semiofficial representatives of the six states? Not all of them: Albania was already under Italian pressure, and Bulgaria also refused the invitation of the Entente to join in a Union. Thus the Balkan Conferences had paved the way to a Balkan Entente of the four states, surrounding Bulgaria, but not to a Balkan Union, which would include their common center, Bulgaria, the country after whose Balkan mountains the whole peninsula is named. Both Albania and Bulgaria were to become the loopholes for future infiltration and intrusion by Italy and Germany. This Balkan Entente Pact was registered with the League of Nations and provided for a mutual guarantee of their common front, joint negotiations with any other Balkan states and mutual assistance against a non-Balkan power assisted by a Balkan state.

But though Bulgaria was not a member, even within Bulgaria a new "Balkan mentality" was developing. The Balkan peoples had in their past experienced two systems of *regionalism*. One was a nationalist expansion of a Greater Serbia, Greater Greece, Greater Bulgaria, or Greater Rumania, at their neighbors' expense. The other was an

imperialistic hegemony by great powers such as Ottoman Turkey, Russia, Austria, France, Germany, and Italy or by their combinations as in the Triple Entente and Triple Alliance. Both these regionalisms had a fundamental similarity inasmuch as they were imposed from the outside either by one Balkan nation or by a great power.

Now for the first time a home-grown, Balkan-made regionalism appeared, an indigenous organism, independent of any outside interference and interdependent by reason of the mutual good will of a Balkan mentality. This eventual outcome of Turkish-Greek initiative and leadership represented a promising federation in prewar Europe in a territory as large as that of Germany, Italy, France, and Britain combined, though lacking, of course, their density of population. In fact, the whole territory had no more than the approximate population of prewar Germany, 65 millions.

The statements made at the last Council meeting of the Balkan Entente in Belgrade, February, 1940, were echoed in Sofia. There, in Belgrade, the Turkish Foreign Minister Sarajoglu had spoken of "complete solidarity"; the Greek Premier Metaxas of the "Balkan Family of Nations"; the Yugoslavian peasant leader Milan Gavrilovitch (later ambassador to Moscow) of the "Balkan Fatherland between the Adriatic and the Black Sea," and the Rumanian Foreign Minister Gafencu of the "desirability of a Balkan Union." When a week later in Sofia I discussed with Bulgarian Prime Minister Kiosseivanoff the impressions I had collected in Belgrade, Athens, Ankara, and Bucharest, he too stressed his "Balkan rather than purely Bulgarian mentality and outlook." He proved it during the same week by the way he handled anti-Rumania and pro-Dobrudja demonstrations of Bulgarian students.

In Sofia, at that time, the most experienced diplomat was Belgian Minister M. de Motte. He had outlived any other diplomat in Sofia. He was married to the daughter of the adviser of ex-King Ferdinand and the tutor to King Boris. He said to me: "Nous assistons à la naissance de la solidarité Balkanique. Until recently the Balkan peoples have emphasized the 20 per cent of their differences and difficulties. Now they have begun to stress the 80 per cent of their common and identical interests. And Turkish leadership is responsible."

PEACEFUL CHANGE AND COLLECTIVE SECURITY

THIS BALKAN PATRIOTISM CULTIVATED BY ATATURK'S GOOD WILL AND determined preference for peaceful change and collective security lived not only within the Balkan Entente but also in its Bulgarian neighbor outside. On that Independence Day to which we have referred several times the Bulgarian minister was seated at our table. I remember him speaking hopefully of the day when Bulgaria would enter into full partnership in the Balkan Union.

In 1937, that day seemed not far distant. Whenever Foreign Minister Sarajoglu, that master of diplomacy, or his farsighted permanent undersecretary, Numan Menemenjoglu, passed through Sofia, they always interrupted their journey so as to discuss the general Balkan situation with their Bulgarian colleague. If the Bulgarian mountain did not come to Mohammed, the Turkish Mohammed would go to the mountain.

We have seen that in the Balkan picture, Bulgaria for some time had rated as a source of trouble. In 1914, as a consequence of Turkey's closing the Dardanelles, Bulgaria was drawn into the Turkish-German alliance against Czarist Russia, her historical creator. But in 1918, she was the first to walk out of this partnership and to sue for a separate peace. Since 1941, she has been bound to Turkey by a treaty of "sincere and perpetual friendship" and nonaggression. The Cairo Conference between Roosevelt, Churchill, and Inonu encouraged Turkish diplomacy to bring pressure on Sofia and suggest that Bulgaria free herself from her German master. Even today Bulgaria still maintains diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia and takes advantage of the presence of the Russian ambassador and a Russian military attaché in Sofia. The country itself, unfortunately,

has been bound to the Axis war adventure by a clique of the Bulgarian General Staff. The action took place over the protest of the King, and in spite of the Slavic people's traditional feelings toward "Mother Russia" impressively represented by the monument of the Russian liberator, and the Russian orthodox cathedral near the Bulgarian parliament.

As in the last war, so once more Bulgaria holds a key position in possessing the only existing land corridor between Turkish Asia Minor and Germany's Europe, or, if you like, between the Allied Middle East and Hitler's "Festung Europa." Bulgaria has always commanded a crucial geostrategical position in the center between the two Mediterranean neighbors, Turkey and Greece, and the two Danubian states, Yugoslavia and Rumania. During World War I the Turkish-Bulgarian-German alliance added to her Danubian status a front on the Mediterranean. The Peace Treaty of Neuilly pushed her back from the Aegean behind landlocked borders. Ever since then, Bulgaria has claimed the right to a Bulgarian outlet to the sea, through Greek territory opening onto the Mediterranean in the vicinity of the Turkish Dardanelles. This projected reconquest was part of the bribe offered by Hitler and cashed in on by the Bulgarian government.

Turkey, naturally, has been immediately interested in this Bulgarian claim to regain her previous Mediterranean position, just as much as Greece. In fact, such a Bulgarian access to the Aegean would thrust a wedge between Turkey and Greece.

Bulgaria's second and third territorial claims, also satisfied by Hitler's salesmanship, were for a part of old Macedonia (until 1942 in Yugoslavia's possession), and the Dobrudja, south of the Danube Delta (since 1913 twice in Rumanian and twice in Bulgarian possession).

In the case of Bulgaria's fourth claim—to be freed from the unilateral disarmament imposed on her by the Treaty of Neuilly, and to obtain the right of rearmament—the Turkish principle of peaceful change was applied. The Balkan Entente granted Bulgaria this revision in 1938 by the Pact of Salonika, but failed to obtain in return Bulgaria's adherence to the proposed Balkan Union because the Balkan Entente had insisted on Bulgaria's renewed recognition

of the territorial status quo. However, Bulgaria undertook not to change the existing frontiers by force and to submit all disputes to arbitration or judicial settlement. The method of peaceful change employed by the Balkan Entente acting as a unit in its negotiations with Bulgaria was in striking contrast with Hitler and Mussolini's treaty-tearing practice. This was underscored by Cordell Hull who, in welcoming Turkish journalists at the State Department, remarked: "During the past nineteen years Turkey has established an outstanding reputation for the correct and orderly conduct of its international relations. In 1936, for example, at the very time when certain other nations were disregarding so flagrantly their treaty obligations, Turkey called a conference of the interested nations at Montreux for revision of the treaties pertaining to the Dardanelles. I am happy to reflect today the most favorable impression which Turkey has created in the United States by the consistently correct and able manner in which the Republic's foreign affairs have been conducted."

By 1940, Balkan mentality had advanced to the point of the general acceptance of three important principles:

- (1) no Balkan Entente state would separately concede any revision to Bulgaria; but
- (2) every Balkan Entente state would contribute its share to a prospective Balkan Union which would satisfy Bulgaria if and when she became a member; and
- (3) any revision should wait until after the World War.

There was general agreement that what was needed was a comprehensive settlement between the Balkan Entente and Bulgaria, not just a "frontier revision" or a "cession" or a "concession" but a constructive arrangement of give-and-take, a two-way traffic of peaceful change which would develop the Balkan Entente, weakened by distrust, into a Balkan Union, strengthened by co-operation.

It was my privilege between 1937 and 1940 to make a small contribution to such a development. Missions for the British government and the task of organizing national study groups to co-operate in a Balkan regional research scheme sent me zigzagging once or twice each year across the five Balkan states. On these trips I had a similar

experience to that on revisiting Turkey, since I met there the same scholars and statesmen whose confidence and co-operation had been given me on my frequent visits between 1909 and 1918. The crown princes of that time were now kings, and their former tutors were leading statesmen. Former exchange students were now liberal leaders, some of them peasant leaders. They all appreciated my previous attempts to help secure their national independence and regional interdependence through an indigenous Balkan Union, a Balkan Commonwealth of Nations, free from interference and intervention from outside. Now all five Balkan governments welcomed me as a "peripatetic rallying point" and co-operated by setting up national research groups to which they admitted representatives of the opposition although they were one-party dictatorships. Needless to say, this work enjoyed the full assistance of the British as well as the American ambassadors and ministers. Since 1937 the British government favored a Balkan Union, and one of the British ministers in the Balkans elaborated a comprehensive scheme. The Hitlerites, of course, did not like it and twice I was protected by Rumanian and Bulgarian authorities against threatening plots.

Turkey consented to a memorandum of mine written on March 10, 1940, which suggested Istanbul as the center of an Institute of the Near East with three divisions, for the Balkans, the Saadabad states, and the Mediterranean states. The Turkish foreign minister characterized this scheme as "correct, comprehensive, and constructive," when we discussed it in Ankara.¹

In 1939 and 1940, when responsible Rumanian statesmen discussed the Bulgarian claim to regain the Dobrudja, they said: "Tell your friends in Sofia that we have begun to see the necessity of a Dobrudja revision in favor of Bulgaria—but only in return for a Balkan Union including Bulgaria. And not before peace returns. Any procedure now might start with the revision of a frontier (as it started in Sudetenland) and end with the destruction of a state (as it ended with Czechoslovakia)."

To the Macedonian claim the Yugoslav reply sounded similar.

¹ Discretion forbids quoting too much of confidential statements made by present leaders between 1937 and 1940. This applies to the whole of Part IV.

The same attitude was taken by Greek statesmen: "Tell them in Sofia that we have begun to understand the desirability of a Bulgarian outlet to the Aegean Mediterranean—however, not in the form of a territorial cession but by a commercial and technical arrangement providing for a Bulgarian free zone in a Greek port such as Salonika or Dedeagach or Porto Lago, for special railroad transit lines and for close economic co-operation."

In Ankara, too, the point was stressed that any Bulgarian position in the Mediterranean around the corner of the Dardanelles would depend on Bulgaria's becoming a partner in the common policy of a Balkan Union.

To these and similar arguments the Bulgarian echo responded: "Tell your friends in Belgrade, Bucharest, Athens, and Ankara that responsible Bulgarian policy is determined to stick to the method of peaceful change in order to be able to sit at the Peace Conference with clean hands and to arrive at a Balkan Union providing for collective security. As a loyal member of the Balkan family of Nations, Bulgaria intends to take no step that would harm the position of any Balkan country or undermine mutual confidence in the Balkan states."

The King himself, of German-French (Coburg-Bourbon) extraction, used to underscore his prime minister's peaceful waiting policy by pointing to his conviction of "Hitler Germany's inherent weakness and inescapable doom" just as the Queen, a daughter of the King of Italy, did not conceal her utter contempt for "the adventurous demagogue, Mussolini." And yet, this same King, who liked to dub himself "the only genuine Bulgarian between a pro-Russian peasantry and a pro-German General Staff," yielded to the military clique which threatened him with dethronement.

In all these endeavors to consolidate a common Balkan policy the Turks took the initiative and the lead, not only because they were the only people who had no revisionist claim whatsoever on any Balkan country, but also because they had consistently practiced the method of peaceful change for the settlement of their own three grievances against the Great Powers:

1. In Iraq, which was backed by Britain's mandatory power, they accepted—though they were greatly dissatisfied—the League's

decision which in 1926 confirmed Iraq's possession of Mosul but awarded to Turkey 10 per cent of the oil output.

2. In Syria, under France's mandatory trusteeship, they obtained the Sandjak Alexandretta with its Turkish population and a valuable port, also by a decision of Geneva in 1938.

3. The third revision was the most important and was reached at an international conference at Montreux, in 1936, although without Italy's signature: the restoration of Turkish sovereignty over the Straits and Turkish refortification of the Dardanelles, which had been demilitarized by the Treaty of Lausanne. In addition, Turkey obtained the right to full control of the Dardanelles in a war in which she was a belligerent. In time of peace the warships and merchantmen of the Black Sea powers as well as the merchantmen of any power enjoyed unrestricted use of the Dardanelles. So did the Black Sea powers' warships during war, if they had to come to the help of a victim of aggression, under the covenant of the League. Once more it was significant that Bulgaria supported Turkey's application.

Turkey became a member of the League of Nations in 1932. In Geneva she took a firm stand in favor of the Soviet Russian thesis of "indivisible peace" and was elected to a Council seat in 1934. As all her practice of peaceful change was connected with Geneva, Lausanne and Montreux, so was her policy of collective security with another town near Geneva—Nyon. There a League Committee of nine powers organized a collective policing of the Mediterranean against Italian piracy, when Mussolini attacked the Spanish Loyalists. In contrast to the cynical farce of the European "nonintervention policy," this naval policing of the Mediterranean stood out as a positive and successful action. Turkey put her submarines at the disposal of the British-led naval patrol, just as she had offered the British navy the hospitality of her waters in case a British-Italian war should be the result of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia and of the subsequent anti-Italian sanctions in which Turkey co-operated with other League members. There, on a limited field and in a special case, collective security succeeded by using collective force.

But collective security did not succeed in the Balkan area—in spite of the Balkan pact of the Balkan Entente. There collective

security was restricted to the Balkan peninsula and against its Bulgarian center; it was not directed against any outsider of the Balkans. When the four Balkan governments signed their pact on February 9, 1934, they entered reservations that they could not be involved in war against any great power. Thus collective security of a peace bloc around the neighbor whom they surrounded was matched by timorousness and appeasement with those who surrounded them.²

Although the Balkan Entente had achieved regional economic, commercial, and cultural agreements, it fell short of a common foreign and military policy that could be applied beyond their common neighbor.

Although Hitler's advance toward the Balkans across Austria and Czechoslovakia and Mussolini's invasion of Ethiopia and pressure on Albania was unmistakable handwriting on the wall, Atatürk's advice, at the end of October, 1937, during that week in Ankara, did not produce a decisive step forward toward a collective Balkan

² There were warnings. At the end of the same year, in November, 1939, the director of the Yugoslav Foreign Office, Stoyan Gavrilovitch, delivered a speech at the Anglo-American-Yugoslav Club which was published by the *South Slav Herald* and reads like an exact prophecy of today: "Our collaboration with the British and Americans [in the World War I] was not a matter of accident. It was not even a matter of sympathy and admiration, which indeed we have always felt for these two great and far-distant nations. . . . The cordial relations between our three nations rest upon psychological and moral factors which are permanent and intrinsic and not upon any artificial political calculations which are ephemeral or connected with a passing object. Those psychological and moral factors are clear and simple: freedom as against slavery, justice as against tyranny and oppression, international law as against international anarchy, international understanding and co-operation as against intrigue and violence, peace as against war. But after a terrible struggle in which our three nations played such an important part fighting for a better and a happier international community, where have we come to and what do we see? We . . . see a foreign hand threatening to compromise all the beneficial results of the long years of our united efforts and to send us back to the days of savagery from which we thought we had emerged in the last war. . . . The sinister forces which we fought so stubbornly against are now at work again. . . . The destructive activities of these forces are directed not only against this country, but against all of us, against Yugoslavia just as much as against England and America, and indeed against every other country whose national policy is based upon those high ideals which I have just described. . . . The deep meaning of this can be outlined in one single sentence which I want you to remember well: There is an open and gangrenous sore on our common body which it is our sacred duty to heal with all possible speed and by means of every possible expediency, if we do not wish the whole body to get infected and to rot slowly and gradually away to its destruction. In other words, in the days gone by we fought to establish a better international order. At the present moment we must unite our forces to preserve the order which we have with such difficulty created."

defense system against aggression from an outside power. He himself, however, was willing to defend Turkish and Balkan security on a line as far away as the Danube.

So, in Belgrade, at the last Council meeting of the Balkan Entente, in February, 1940, the Turkish foreign minister suggested that they turn the system of collective security of the Balkan Entente outward and achieve solidarity in the face of any threat of aggression from abroad. He admitted, however, that he understood the peculiar difficulty of Yugoslavia's situation, squeezed in between the strategic positions of near-by Germany and Italy.

The leading parliamentarian and chief editor, Hussein Yalcin, expressed Turkish official policy as late as the end of 1940 by writing: "Turkey's frontier will begin at the [Yugoslav-Rumanian-Bulgarian] Danube and end at the [Yugoslav-Albanian-Greek] Adriatic, and automatically Turkey will join in defense of these frontiers of a common Balkan fatherland." Hussein Yalcin summarized the reasons for the realization of a collective foreign policy: "The Balkans belong to the Balkan states in common; each Balkan country would retain its present frontiers, but all must consider themselves integral parts of the Balkan fatherland. . . . The union must not serve to increase the power of any one state; the union must not be subject to the influence of any great power. . . . The Balkan states must have a common army, foreign policy, and military system."

Thus the Turks went on suggesting concerted Balkan action along the Danube until Rumania's final surrender in 1940, and even into 1941 until Yugoslavia's temporary defection. Both Danubian states had become immediate neighbors of Germany after the annexation of Austria and the subjugation of Hungary by Hitler, and were separated from the two Mediterranean states of the Balkan Entente by Bulgaria's strategic position, by the Russian-controlled Black Sea, and the Italian-controlled Adriatic.

Turkey had warned Rumania in time when the Dobrudja issue was negotiated with Bulgaria, and she advised Rumania again to secure Soviet Russia's backing against Hitler-Germany by offering Russia a postwar plebiscite in Bessarabia and an annual inspection of Rumanian Black Sea ports. But although King Carol, shortly after his Berchtesgaden dinner with Hitler, was bold enough to let

Hitler's Quisling, the Rumanian Nazi Leader Codreanu (of Polish-German extraction) be shot, he could not prevent Codreanu's surviving Iron Guard from murdering Rumania's most determined statesman, the strong-chinned and one-eyed Premier Calinescu, dethroning the King and turning Rumania over to Hitler's ambassador, a relative of Mr. Ribbentrop.

Yugoslavia was under a dictatorial regime that resembled Rumania's in many respects. Moreover, she faced acute minority problems as well. Rumania had its Hungarians, Germans, Bulgarians, and Russians; Yugoslavia was composed of Serbs, Croats, Slovenes, Germans, and Hungarians. This heterogeneity of population was a factor that contributed to her temporary surrender. An earlier source of weakness was, of course, the assassination of King Alexander in 1934, who as a protagonist of a Balkan Union was liquidated with Mussolini's knowledge by the very same Croat gang leader, Pavelitch, who has become Hitler's gauleiter of Croatia. Although the Regent, Prince Paul, at a lunch he gave just before he went to Hitler's "magic mountain," was outspoken enough to say that "he hated to sup with that devil Hitler" and had actually dismissed his dictatorial premier, Stoyadinovitch, he eventually yielded to the German pressure. Both prince and dictator are now in British custody, the prince in Africa, the dictator on the Island of Mauritius. When at the last minute a popular uprising overthrew the Quisling government and young King Peter followed Turkey's repeated advice and the example of resistance given by the Greek King, his prospective uncle by marriage, it was too late for collective security. However, the action of Yugoslavia and of Greece, supported by the British expeditionary force, resulted in delaying Hitler's timetable and thus saved Turkey from invasion and probably also saved Russia from losing the Caucasus.

The fact remains that for the first time a Balkan Entente and the Saadabad pact had bound together by interregional and interlocking treaties around Turkey's key position all the states, with the exception of Bulgaria and Albania, from Middle Europe to Middle Asia, from the Adriatic coast to the Afghan passes, from the Italian borders to the Indian frontiers. This achievement represented the widest regionalism ever reached in Europe and Asia and was organ-

ized within the League of Nations where both parts, the Balkan Entente and the Saadabad Entente, used to act and to vote as regional units.

It was a unique accomplishment of Turkish statesmanship and for the first time in modern history that at the outbreak of war the Balkan peninsula was the quietest corner of Europe. It may yet be a leading example for a new world society built up as a federation of federations, with both the universal community and the regional organizations strengthened by an interlocking system of collective force and machinery for peaceful change.

On the future development of a Balkan federation some new facts will have their influence: the disappearance of three sovereigns who were mutually suspicious of each other, the Bulgarian and Rumanian Kings and the Yugoslav Prince Regent; the readiness of the two exiled Kings of Greece and Yugoslavia to bow to a plebiscite; and the growing power of popular movements, particularly of the Balkan peasantry which forms the majority in every Balkan state and whose leaders fight for the same aims of political freedom and social security. To this may be added the weight of advancing Soviet Russia in her threefold capacity—as Slavic father of the Yugo-Slavs and the Bulgaro-Slavs, as Mother Church once more of all orthodox Balkan churches, and as promoter of the peasants' co-operative and collective organization.

What may this development spell for Turkey—with no Slavic minority, with no orthodox church character, with no class struggle, and still the sovereign and the guardian of the Straits which are Russia's access to the Mediterranean?

TURKISH TURKEY STANDS IN THE GAP

WHEN ASKED ABOUT TURKISH-RUSSIAN POLICY, ISMET INONU GAVE THE same answer in 1937, when he was Ataturk's prime minister, that he repeats today as President Ataturk's successor: "Nobody can ignore the one unchangeable fact that the nearest neighbor of 18 million Turks is a nation of 180 million Russians. They border Turkey all along the Black Sea coast and from the Caucasus along half of the eastern side of the Turkish rectangle down to the Russian-Turkish-Iranian corner." (As long as the Russia occupation of the north of Iran lasts, Russia borders Turkey even farther down along the whole Eastern Turkish frontier to the Russian-Turkish-Iranian-Iraqian corner.)

For centuries this unchanged geographical fact has been a determining political factor—between Czarist Russia and Ottoman Turkey, and now between Soviet Russia and Kemalist Turkey. However, although geography as the "mother of politics" may give the choice of directions, the decisive factor is the spirit in which geography is used.

The physical transfer of the capitals of the two new states from St. Petersburg to Moscow and from Constantinople to Ankara implied a spiritual change as well. It expressed to a certain extent the same need and purpose—that of self-defense and security, against the same enemies, within and without: The two old regimes of the Romanov czars and the Ottoman sultans, both backed by the Western imperialistic powers, invaded and occupied Russia as well as Turkey and attempted to uphold the St. Petersburg and Constantinople dynasties and position and to fight down the revolution in these two neighboring peoples. Against these forces the aims were the same—national independence. And identical interests turned the awakening East against the oppressing West.

This community of interest produced a decade of political agreement and another decade of economic co-operation, but not an ideological rapprochement.

From the very beginning of the Turkish war of independence, Atatürk's military forces and the Ankara National Assembly enjoyed the wholehearted sympathy and the active help of Moscow. This included arms, ammunition, money, and a solemn renunciation by the Soviet Union of Czarist Russia's secret treaties with the Western powers which had partitioned Ottoman Turkey. Indeed, Moscow recognized the Ankara government and all its territorial claims set forth in its National Pact, including "the freedom of the Straits and the absolute sovereignty and safety of Turkey." The abolition of Capitulations also was agreed upon.

All this was settled as early as 1921 by the Treaty of Friendship in Moscow that amounted to a virtual alliance, and was coupled with Soviet Foreign Commissar Chicherin's explicit warning to Atatürk that Turkey should never make any agreement with "the common enemy," Britain. The treaty was renewed in 1925 (and subsequently every fourth year) when the solution of the Mosul issue in favor of Britain deeply disappointed and angered Kemalist Turkey. Turkish-Russian understanding found another expression in the Montreux agreement which regulated passage through the Dardanelles in a way more favorable to Russia's exit to the Mediterranean than to Britain's entrance to the Black Sea.

The second decade of Russian-Turkish relationship brought about much economic help from the Soviet Union. A pact of commercial and financial relations was signed. Russia made suggestions for four- and five-year plans to industrialize the country. Moreover, Soviet engineers gave their assistance in building up Turkish industries, transportation system, and roads. Russia also made loans in gold to assist in the industrialization program as well as in the construction of public buildings and schools. Soviet pilots helped in training young Turkish men and women to fly.

Although Atatürk did not forbid Lenin, Trotsky, and Marx's writings to be read and studied in Turkey, nor made it an offense to listen to the U. S. S. R. radio, he took care that neither Communist party emissaries nor Communist propaganda reached Turkey. The

Communist party itself, which had developed out of the idea of the class struggle, is banned in classless Turkey.

There was another line dividing Soviet and Turkish outlook. As we have seen, Atatürk's nationalism implied both national independence of every nation and international interdependence of all nations. Thus Turkey's national consciousness did not fit into any scheme of building up an outdated security system by a chain of buffer states, spheres of influence, or protectorates, to defend Russia from Afghanistan to the Danube. These very states were the same which later became members of the Saadabad and Balkan Ententes, with Turkey linking them together into a regionalism of their own. New Turkey did not want to go back to the old "Russian Friendship" of the treaty of Unkiar Eskelâssi which just a century before "protected" Ottoman Turkey by using it as a sort of geopolitical block or stopgap for Russia's fortification against Western imperialism. Nor did Turkey's organization of regional and international interdependence, which provided for peaceful change and collective security, tally with Trotsky's extreme gospel of a world revolution or Stalin's temporary isolationism which would prevent the Soviet's prospective partner from international co-operation. On the contrary, just as the Young Turks had sought an alliance, so Atatürk was looking for a way out of a one-sided and insecure isolation.

Turkey did not want to make the choice between East and West or to be the pawn of either one. Rather, she understood her historic position of the middle land standing in the gap between East and West. She saw that she belonged to the two worlds which must be connected into the one world of today—"a brand-new world built on humane principles," as a leading Turkish writer put it to Colonel W. J. Donovan in Ankara, in February, 1941. This was the outspoken vision and wisdom of her two successive presidents and of her three successive prime ministers and foreign ministers.

Small wonder that Moscow became suspicious and began to frown on Ankara when it started out to lead the Near Eastern and Middle Eastern neighbors of the Soviets into the Balkan and Saadabad pacts, although this regionalism was not meant to serve as a cordon sanitaire against the U. S. S. R. Rather it was an attempt, though late and incomplete, to form a collective defense against the

octopuslike aggressive expansion of a new Western imperialism, first that of their Mediterranean neighbor, Italy, which annexed Ethiopia and threatened Albania, and then that of approaching Hitler Germany, which menaced the Danubian Balkans through Austria and Czechoslovakia.

Small wonder, too, that distrustful Moscow did not like Ataturk's assuming the initiative in seeking to add to his first Russian friendship a complementary British alliance, so as to meet the threats of the Italian-German Axis. Of all Balkan states, Turkey was the only one free of Soviet Communism. Moreover, in the Mediterranean, landlocked Russia could not be of any help.

Whereas Turkey kept her eastern ally informed of her approach to her prospective western allies, it was Soviet Russia which surprised and shocked her Turkish ally by the sudden somersault of her agreement with Hitlerism in August, 1939, at the same time that a British delegation and the Turkish foreign minister were in Moscow negotiating British-Russian and Turkish-Russian pacts. They were both held in suspense, and no pacts were obtained. Two months later the Turkish-British-French alliance was signed; this, in its turn, increased Soviet suspicion and fear of "Western and Turkish imperialism."

Thus, after two decades of a virtual Turkish-Russian alliance and actual co-operation, the latent rift had developed into an open antagonism between the Soviets, temporarily siding with Hitlerism, and Turkey, allying herself definitely against Hitlerism.

The gulf which Turkey had intended to fill between East and West reopened, even broader and deeper, and Turkey's 18 millions faced the danger of being engulfed by the whirlpool of 180 million Russians plus 80 million Germans. Germany and Russia now seemed as closely aligned as are their two embassies in Ankara, where the Hammer and Sickle decorates the building next door to Hitler's Swastika, and where his Excellency Franz von Papen and Sergei A. Vinogradoff were able to shake hands over their common hedge. While the godfather of the Hitler-Stalin pact, Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop, was cheered and feted in Moscow, Foreign Minister Sarajoglu felt humiliated and insulted by not being received in the Kremlin although he was honored by the hospitality and growing

intimacy of the British and American ambassadors. When later Laurence A. Steinhardt was transferred to Ankara, in addition to his Moscow experience, his energy, and constructive judgment, this friendship became invaluable in preparing for the third period of Soviet-Turkish relationship.

The years between 1939 and 1943, then, formed the second period that was filled with mutual distrust, suspicion, and even fear in Ankara as well as in Moscow. The Turkish foreign minister, though hard-pressed in Moscow to abandon his plan of a British-French alliance, did not yield but clung to his sense of honor, loyalty, and wisdom. Did this mean, asked Moscow, that the British navy would be permitted to enter the Dardanelles and the Black Sea against Russia and that "Western and Turkish imperialism" would prepare an attack on the Caucasus oil fields?

On the other side, Ankara asked: Was Soviet Russia returning to Czarist Russia's "eternal imperialism" and intending to restore Czarist frontiers by the reannexation and reincorporation, with Hitler's help, of Polish and Finnish territories and of the Baltic states? And will Soviet Russia, after Hitler's defeat and retreat, not also reclaim former possessions of Czarist Russia and even aim at an expansion beyond previous imperialistic aspirations? For example, what are her intentions in Rumania, which apparently will have to pay most of the Balkan bill, in Bessarabia and Bukovina, and in North Dobrudja, which controls the mouth of the Danube? Or in Bulgaria which, while not waging war against Russia, seems still to have the chance of becoming that "Greater Bulgaria," once cherished by old Russia? Will Soviet Russia reach out farther to the Bulgarian border, along South Dobrudja, and seek Bulgarian bases on the Black Sea, and perhaps even through a Greater Bulgaria seek a Bulgarian port in the Mediterranean? Will Soviet Russia also reach out through Iran for an Iranian port in the Indian Ocean where the historic desire of warm-water ports can better be satisfied than in the Mediterranean, which after all is just another bottleneck like the Black Sea? And if so, will Russia, having thus encircled Turkey, press for a change of Turkish guardianship in the Dardanelles, and for a restoration to Soviet Russia of Caucasus territories—the return of the region around Kars and Ardahan? (This latter region Moscow once

ceded to Turkey but fluctuating nomadic tribes never cease to cause "frontier incidents" which, in 1942, for instance, caused the Turkish prime minister to visit the Caucasus and the commander of the Turkish Caucasus army to strengthen his forces.) Will the importance of geography re-create the old spirit once expressed in a policy of strategic frontiers, spheres of influence, and balance of power?

These are the questions which kept Turkey in suspense for nearly four years, a suspense richly nourished by the cunning Ambassador von Papen's unscrupulous intrigues and insinuations, and by other Hitlerites' falsified papers and maps. Turkish uncertainty was not completely overcome even by an official British-Russian Declaration, presented by the British and Soviet ambassadors in Ankara, on August 10, 1941, which stated in identical terms that the two governments "have no aggressive intentions or claims whatever with regard to the Straits." The Soviet ambassador added that in view of "the malicious propaganda being intensively conducted by the German government, an exchange of views should take place on the subject of relations between the Soviet Union, Turkey, and Great Britain."

The four Conferences of Moscow (of the British-American-Russian foreign ministers), Cairo (of the British-American-Chinese chiefs), Teheran (of the British-American-Russian chiefs) and again Cairo (of the British-American-Turkish chiefs, and a Russian plenipotentiary) did much to clear away doubts. These conferences of the Big Four representing West and East and their interlocking link in the Middle East, resulted in "closest unity," in the "identity of interests and views of the great American and British democracies with those of the Soviet Union," in such a solid mutual understanding that Foreign Minister Numan Menemenjoglu, an experienced and competent statesman, could state: "The relations between Turkey and Russia are now almost as strong as those with Britain." And he added: "We examined [in Cairo] all aspects of the problems with brutal frankness but with extremely cordial understanding of each other. We learned many things we had not known and our friends also learned many things they had not known. We got as close to them as possible to understand them just as they came as close to us as possible to understand our interests and our possibilities. It was this spirit that enabled us to go away the closest allies and leave

Cairo in an atmosphere of perfect cordiality. After having worked with great frankness we arrived at a thorough understanding."

As to the American and the Turkish President, he added that "within five minutes of meeting each other [they] acted as if they had been friends forty years." Inonu said of Mr. Roosevelt: "I have never seen anyone so sympathetic." President Roosevelt remarked of Inonu: "His forceful character and forthrightness impressed me. In President Inonu I feel I have made a new and firm friend."

The outcome of the preceding Moscow agreement, which superseded the Washington, Casablanca, and Quebec meetings and prepared for the Teheran and Cairo conferences, was characterized by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in his brief and challenging declaration: "There will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power." Instead, there is to be established "at the earliest practical date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states."

That is to say, Soviet Russia has joined the Mediterranean and the European Commissions and has made clear that she does not seek her national security by strategical frontiers and regional spheres of influence, which may interfere with Turkish independence, but by a world authority providing for collective as well as national security. Russia has stated her belief in the sovereign equality of the co-operating nations. Russia and Turkey's common neighbor, Iran, a member of the Saadabad Entente with Turkey and for the duration of the war occupied by Russia and Britain, was specifically mentioned as a symbol of "territorial integrity and political independence" and as "a state to be included in the scope of international agencies of an economic structure." Whatever will be the eventual solution in the Northeast, in regard to the Balkan states, the Polish-Russian Curzon Line as drawn in 1919 by an international agreement, and in the Southeast, with reference to Hitler's satellites, Rumania and Bulgaria. Iran's territorial integrity means that Turkey's eastern frontier with the U. S. S. R. will not be lengthened. Iran as well as Turkey will remain independent, bordering the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, respectively.

Let us repeat the belief of the satisfied Turkish statesman, that Turkish-Russian relations have become "almost as strong" as Turkish-

British relations. At long last, Turkey has become the true link between East and West in the one world where "there is no East or West" in any sense of political antithesis.

This, indeed, had been Ataturk's vision from 1937 on: a Turkey independent as well as interdependent, situated between Russia, the nearest and greatest land power, along two sides of the Turkish rectangle, and Britain, the nearest and greatest sea power, on the other two sides of the Turkish peninsula.

When, in 1937, Turkey had taken the first steps toward such an all-round security by approaching the British government, London, still busy trying to appease Mussolini in the Mediterranean, did not see her way to renew the more than century-old tradition of British-Turkish alliance. This policy had begun in 1799 against an aggressive Napoleon and had continued against an aggressive Czarism. It changed when German expansion forged the former antagonists together into the Triple Entente.

It was during World War I that Ataturk himself witnessed the decisive superiority of sea power over the land power of Germany and Russia, and expressed to me his firm adherence to this guiding principle. In spite of London's temporary deafness in 1937, he stuck to his plan and demonstrated it in that fairly obvious manner on the Independence Day occasion we described. Two years later, on October 19, in spite of Hitler's having assigned to Ankara his most wily diplomat, Franz von Papen, the Turkish-British-French alliance was signed by Sir Percy Lorraine's successor, Sir Hugh Montgomery Knatchbull-Huggessen. The latter had been transferred to Ankara from China after his recovery from being machine-gunned in his car by a Japanese plane, and now lives on the Chankaya hilltop above Ankara next door to President Inonu and Premier Sarajoglu. In contrast to the secret treaty of 1914, the alliance in 1939 was signed publicly before representatives of the world's press and with batteries of flashbulbs illuminating the faces of the satisfied diplomats and military chiefs. The text was published everywhere and passed on to the parliaments for their approval.

Under the terms of this tripartite treaty of mutual assistance against aggression in the Mediterranean or the Balkans the three nations agreed to "collaborate effectively" and lend to one another

"all the aid and assistance in their power" if any of the three powers became involved in hostilities in the Mediterranean as a result of aggression by any European power. The reservation was made, however, that Turkey should not be compelled to take any action that might bring her into armed conflict with the U. S. S. R.

Thus far, until 1944, the military provisions of the alliance have not been called upon and Turkey has neither become a battleground nor a passageway to the junction of the belligerents, for reasons we shall discuss later. Suffice it to state that whatever the Turks did during this period was done with the full knowledge and consent of Britain and France. The British foreign minister and the British General Staff chiefs held frequent conversations in Ankara with their Turkish colleagues. Later, in February, 1943, after the Casablanca Conference, President Inonu with all his military advisers had the audacity to meet the British war leader, Mr. Churchill, in Adana, near Tarsus. All these parleys ended in mutual agreement as to how and when to act or not to act.

The fundamental facts and views involved were authentically summarized by Churchill in his report to the Commons:

"From the conference at Casablanca, with the full assent of President Roosevelt, I flew to Cairo and then to Turkey. I descended upon a Turkish airfield at Adana already well-equipped with British Hurricane fighters' manned by Turkish airmen, and out of the snow-capped Taurus Mountains there curled like an enamel caterpillar the presidential train bearing the head of the Turkish Republic and the prime minister, foreign secretary, Marshal Chakmak and party leaders—in fact the high executives of Turkey.

"It is no part of our policy," Churchill continued, "to get Turkey into trouble. On the contrary, disaster to Turkey would be disaster to Britain and all the United Nations. Hitherto, Turkey has maintained a solid barrier against aggression from any quarter, and by doing so even in the darkest days she rendered us invaluable service in preventing the spreading of the war through Turkey into Iran and Iraq, and in preventing the menace to the oilfields at Abadan which are of vital consequence to the whole Eastern war.

"It is of important interest," Churchill concluded, "to the United Nations and especially Britain that Turkey should become well-


armed in all the apparatus of a modern army, and her brave infantry shall not lack the essential weapons which play a decisive part on the battlefield today. These weapons we and the United States are now [in 1943], for the first time, in a position to supply to the full capacity of Turkish railways and other communications to receive. We can give them as much as they are able to take, and we can give them these weapons as fast or faster than Turkish troops can be trained to use them. At our conference, I made no request to Turkey except to get this rearmament business thoroughly well organized, and a joint military mission is now sitting in Ankara—a British and a Turkish mission—in order to press forward to the utmost development the general defense strength of Turkey, improvement in communications, and by reception of new weapons to bring its army up to the highest pitch of efficiency. . . . Turkey is our ally. Turkey is our friend. We wish to see her territories, rights, and interests effectively preserved, and we wish to see in particular warm and friendly relations established between Turkey and our great Russian ally to the northwards to whom we are bound by a twenty-year Anglo-Russian treaty.”

In Ankara, too, the British ambassador denied emphatically German-inspired reports that Britain asked Turkey to enter the war, and that Turkey had refused. “The views on both sides coincided perfectly,” he said.

On the Turkish side, full satisfaction was expressed, particularly at the assurance given at Adana that Turkish interests in postwar problems would be duly considered. The prime minister, in a speech at the People’s House, described the mutual friendship and trust between Britain and Turkey as “indestructible,” and he stated in parliament: “Since the Adana conference the Turks had got to know Mr. Churchill more and to love him better, and everywhere they found the outstretched hands of British statesmen. Our friends, the British, may rest assured that we cordially grasp these outstretched hands. . . . Anglo-Turkish friendship is not only dictated by mutual interests, but also by the vital needs of both countries.” He also sent greetings and expressions of esteem to “Republican and Democratic America” and thanked the United States for Lend-Lease supplies. The foreign minister called the British alliance “a close alliance . . .

limitless in time and scope . . . free from any shadow or hesitation."

But, "a little while ago," Churchill had admitted, "it looked as if Turkey might be encircled by the German advance into the Caucasus and by a German-Italian attack on Egypt on the other side."



Indeed, this was the realistic picture of Turkey and the Middle East. When, in 1942 in Ankara, the four men whose wisdom guides Turkish policy—President Inonu, his statesmen Sarajoglu and Mene-menjoglu, and his Marshal Chakmak—looked upon the European-African-Asiatic map, the crooked cross of Hitlerism projected the black shadows of its six arms, grasping like tentacles all around Turkey. Indeed, these crooked arms had approached along their three vertical and their three horizontal parallels:

- (1) from Germany over Poland through Russia to the Black Sea toward the Russian-Turkish frontier;
- (2) from Italy over Albania and Yugoslavia through Bulgaria toward the Turkish shores of the Black Sea;

(3) in Africa by German-Italian armies advancing through Libya into Egypt; and

(4) into this African passageway to the Middle East and toward Turkey, from Germany over Italy and Sicily;

(5) over the Balkans and the Aegean, along the Turkish shores, down to the Dodecanese and Crete;

(6) previously by Axis Quislings in and from Syria and Palestine (by the Mufti of Jerusalem, now in Hitler's service in Berlin), Iraq (by its Prime Minister himself), and Iran up to the Turkish borders.

There, in the right-hand corner of the crooked cross stood Turkey, outflanked and bypassed for the time being. It looked as if she might be encircled, as Churchill put it, and she was actually encircled by the crooked arms. Indeed, of the four rectangles, embraced by the arms of the Swastika, three were completely held by Hitler as well as most adjacent lands, with the sole exception of Malta, the one dot in the Western Mediterranean. Only one rectangle, the fourth, in the southeast, thus far had held its own ground but it was endangered too: that between Turkey and Egypt, which together form the twin cornerstones of the Middle East, with British Cyprus as a bulwark in the Eastern Mediterranean. But whereas Hitler's territorial conquests within and around those three corners remained landlocked, the two—Britain and America—oceanic powers controlled the three approaches toward and into Hitler's European fortress, or rather prison; from the Atlantic to both the North Sea and the Western Mediterranean, and from the Pacific through the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Sea—the Middle East and Turkey. Thus, in the long run, Allied sea power once more—those Turkish leaders calculated—may prove superior to Hitler's landlocked power. Therefore, in spite of all his tremendous land conquests, Hitler looked doomed to be overcome and defeated someday by the United Nations—if Turkey's fundamental strategic position could be maintained.

This was the situation between Adana and Cairo. The Middle East between Turkish Adana and Cairo looked endangered and the Turkish policy looked dangerous, too, between the conferences of Adana and Cairo. Courageous confidence was called for as well as the teamwork of the statesmen of four nations—the tough, loyal

Turkish leaders, the energetic American Steinhardt, the experienced British Knatchbull-Huggessen, and the determined Russian Vinogradoff—to stand together against Hitler's diplomatic ace, Papen, the "devil in top hat." As a matter of fact, the Turks succeeded in fooling him repeatedly in ways possible only to Orientals. When the Turkish-British Alliance was signed, Papen, quite ignorant of what was taking place, was away in Istanbul, where he was invited to meet the Archbishop of Canterbury. Misjudgment by Hitler's mischiefmaker met with even more serious misfortunes. When Inonu slipped out from Ankara to meet Churchill at Adana, Papen was away on a hunting party. When the British and American ambassadors attended a political dinner party given at the Russian embassy to converse with the Turkish premier until early in the morning, Papen, uninvited, had to be satisfied with the hospitality of his Italian colleague. (In Ankara's bleak wintertime, incidentally, political and diplomatic purposes are served by dinner and bridge parties or by less formal gatherings at the gourmets' Karpitch bar and restaurant and at other drinking and dancing spots.)

The Turkish-German official relationship was built up on a friendship pact in June, 1941, and the much-disputed chrome agreement in October, 1941. The Turkish-German treaty of friendship, nonaggression, and mutual consultation bound the two countries "to respect the integrity and inviolability of their territories" and pledged them to take "no measure that is aimed directly or indirectly against the other contracting party." Moreover, the signatories bound themselves "in the future to communicate with each other in friendly manner on all questions affecting their common interests in order to bring about understanding on the treatment of such questions." This treaty was made "without prejudice to present obligations of both countries."

Did such a Turkish-German Treaty of Friendship replace or supplement the three-year-old Turkish-British Treaty of Alliance and the still-existing though apparently sleeping Turkish-Russian Treaty of Friendship? Only those who did not know the traditional honesty and long-range vision of Turkish diplomacy could be worried by such doubts. In fact, three aspects of the treaty revealed its actual implication more than did its text and contents.

First the date, June 18—four days before Hitler's attack on Russia—revealed its purpose, to encircle Russia. In other words: it opened the military front and belligerent gap between Hitler and Stalin. But it did not close the geostrategical gap between the two Axis fronts in the Balkans and the Aegean, on the one side, and in Africa and Egypt, on the other. On the contrary, Turkey's statesmen pointed correctly to the reassurance the treaty should give to Turkey as well as to Britain as "a neutral barrier" between the German troops in the Near East and the British-American-Russian position in the Middle East.

In the second place, it is significant that the Turks kept the British government fully informed on every step in the negotiations—once more in complete contrast to the diplomatic secrecy in 1914.

Third, the most important fact was that, in spite of repeated and prolonged German pressure, the Turks stuck to their fundamental condition, and succeeded in obtaining the contractual clause that all existing rights and obligations (including the Turkish-British Alliance) take preference over the Turkish-German agreement.

When the Turkish premier reported to parliament on the Turkish obligations, he stated that Turkey's foreign policy remained based on the Turkish-British Alliance, that the British had approved Turkey's fidelity to that treaty and that full confidence existed between Turkey and Britain. "The British government," he said, "realized that our decision was dictated by the necessity of certain circumstances. . . . That was a unique demonstration of confidence from a nation of gentlemen." This remark was met with applause, whereas a later reference to the German Treaty of Friendship was received in cold silence.

As if to demonstrate Turkish feelings, a group of twenty Turkish aviation cadets left Ankara for Britain to receive training as bomber and fighter pilots, and additional groups followed in the ensuing months. A dispatch from Ankara on June 18, 1941, to the *New York Times* added: "The British still respect and admire the Turks and think that they will stand solidly on the British side despite the German agreement."

This belief was confirmed by everything that happened during the subsequent three years of "neutrality," those years of Turkey's inevi-

table unpreparedness (not for lack of spiritual determination but for lack of mechanical equipment). One can only understand the German treaty in relation to the tasks which the Turkish leaders had set for themselves. For the first time in more than one hundred years an ancient nation in a new state was enjoying the opportunity of constructive work. It was tragic irony that the material support in the form of economic and commercial assistance needed for this historic task could come only from a neighbor they neither trusted nor liked, a neighbor they even suspected and feared.

This dislike, fear, and suspicion of Hitler Germany applies to the great bulk of the Turkish people, the statesman as well as the man in the street and the man in the bazaars, the men and women in the offices and factories and on the farms, the men and women on the newspapers. The people I met, even as early as 1937, knew surprisingly well the implications of Hitlerism, the deadly danger it held for their freedom, economic, political, and spiritual. They saw, in a word, that Hitlerism was a threat to their very "soul," as they called it themselves. They had read and were reading the Hitlerites' manifestoes and editorials in the original German. Again ironical it is that of the thousands of Turks whose studies in Germany, twenty years before, Dr. Rushdi Aras and I had arranged, many were now in key political and industrial positions, in the Foreign Office, in the Information Service, and so on. "Knowledge of German recoils on Hitlerism like a boomerang," said a witty Turkish secretary of state when he expressed his "appreciation of what you have done for our Turkish youth."

However, what was deadly serious was the growing dependence of Turkey's economic life on German industry and trade. Between 1933 and 1936, the Turkish exports to Germany had risen from 19 to 51 per cent. Likewise the sums owed by Germany to Turkey had increased to more than the total of German clearing debts to all of Southeastern Europe. This condition resulted from Dr. Schacht's successful barter system and payment in blocked marks—that is, in German goods—a method which this financial magician of Hitlerism called "ingeniously simple and brutal." In order to cancel that balance Turkey restricted the quantities of many goods going to and coming from Germany, although for cotton, tobacco, sesame oil,

nuts, fruits, and other produce Germany paid prices above the prevailing world level. But after 1941—with Germany controlling Greece's Aegean Islands and the Rumanian and Bulgarian Black Sea ports, with Britain blockading the Mediterranean, and with the United States restricted to the not-always-open narrows of the Red Sea and the Suez Canal and to the one Baghdad railway—Turkey became economically more and more isolated from normal trade. In regard to the manufactured goods she wanted in exchange for her agricultural products and mineral raw materials, Turkey was bound to feel the pressure of near-by Germany, the greatest industrial neighboring power, controlling the land routes and the Danubian waterways from Central Europe to Turkey and offering to supply commodities hitherto obtained from Britain but unobtainable since the war had spread to the Middle East. Once more the statement made by a German vice-chancellor to me during World War I proved correct: "He who controls the Danube will control Middle Europe and the Near East." This great river rises in Germany, flows through the capitals of Austria, Hungary, and Yugoslavia, unites or separates Rumania and Bulgaria, and in its Delta reaches the Black Sea and the neighborhood of the Russian Ukraine and of Turkish Asia Minor. This whole Danubian basin is now controlled by Hitler Germany.

In her program of industrialization Turkey had entrusted Britain with most of the work related to industrialization and military security; for example, the coalworks of Zonguldak, the iron- and steelworks of Karabuk, the power stations, the harbor and port installations—the naval base at Geleuk, the deep-water piers opposite British Cyprus, at Mersina and Alexandretta, the main port of entry for American Lend-Lease supplies, and the shipbuilding works for the Turkish merchant marine. Also warships were ordered from British yards, in 1939: 4 destroyers, 4 submarines, and 2 minelayers. In 1942 deliveries had been made of more than 50 per cent. It was significant too that the Turks rejected Krupp's low tender for the Dardanelles fortifications, awarded the contract to a British firm, and appointed British engineers as economic advisers. But the British government credits were mostly devoted to armament purchases. The United States was not able to buy from Turkey more than 14 per cent of her exports in 1940. Moreover, British commitments to

their imperial and colonial trade policy, as laid down, for example, by the Ottawa Agreements, made it impossible for the British Commercial Corporation in Turkey to succeed in replacing Germany's unfair competition and pressure. From the standpoint of trade, therefore, Britain and the United States were in a position inferior to that of Germany.

But the Turks were constantly aware of the political danger threatening from any economic agreement, based on pointed bayonets. The fundamental issue was not the actual German pre-eminence in the Balkans, which was unavoidable for the reasons given, but it was whether Germany would misuse her geographical and industrial preponderance for economic monopoly and political pressure in order to incorporate the Balkan states in Hitler's New Order.

The chrome trade agreement is good evidence of Turkey's independent attitude and firm determination. Chrome is a vital alloy, indispensable for cutting armor plate and toolmaking, and Turkey produces the second largest supply in the world. Two-thirds of the Turkish output went to Germany until the outbreak of the war, when Britain and France contracted to buy Turkey's entire exportable surplus. After the collapse of France, Britain took over the latter's share. Then Germany, swollen with her blitz successes, appeared on the scene and asked for the renewal of chrome delivery to her war industry. At any rate, Germany claimed the French share. Turkey loyally refused German offers and defied German pressure of various kinds. However, in 1941, "when we Turks were alone and forced to do what Germany wanted," explained a Turkish diplomat, "we informed the British of the plans under the terms of our alliance. Now [in 1943] that Germany is weak, we must still honor our word. We are fulfilling our contract strictly to the letter, but in no way facilitating it."

This official Turkish viewpoint is a flat understatement. Negotiations had been entered into and broke down repeatedly. Hitler had asked for 150,000 tons a year and had put into play all his diplomatic and commercial aces, Franz von Papen, Walter Funk, minister of economics, Karl Clodius, his trade-pact maker, two ruthless delegations, and a Germany army on the Bulgarian-Turkish frontier. Finally, a compromise was reached. Turkey refused categorically to

breach or to end its British treaty. Only after the expiration of the British-Turkish agreement on January 8, 1943, was Germany to receive 90,000 tons of newly mined chrome in that year, and in 1944 the same tonnage in return for certain German goods, such as locomotives, freight cars, railway coaches, tanks, planes, and all kinds of spare parts, chemical and medical supplies. Actually Germany obtained not even half of the urgently needed quantity of chrome; in fact, thus far only 70,000 instead of 180,000 tons. Turkish exports went to Germany not in order to help German war economics but to receive under a "goods for goods policy" materials needed for Turkey and available for the time being only from Germany which actually has delivered the goods. If the "chrome test" was a German failure it was because the Turks did not fail their allies.¹

For the Turks have no desire to become a member in any Pan-German or Hitlerite New Order (the "Pan-German Egypt" of the Young Turkish World War). They want to remain what they have become as a result of their war of independence and their subsequent struggles against heavy odds: a Turkish Turkey, neither more nor less. For this they will fight if they are called upon.

A British military spokesman told the *New York Times* correspondent in Ankara at the end of 1943: "Thus far the Allies have not wanted Turkey in the war. . . . Mark my words, when Turkey's honor and national interests are jeopardized then the Turks will fight and fight like tigers—against the fools who make the fatal mistake of misjudging them."

¹ Due to its hardness, surpassed only by the diamond in its non-tarnishing properties and in its resistance to corrosion and heat, ferrochrome is indispensable for steel of unusual toughness as required in armor plate, gun barrels, aircraft engines, ship machinery, etc. It is processed from chrome ore which, being a grey-white metallic element, took its name from a Greek word meaning color, and was discovered in 1797 by a French chemist, L. N. Vauquelin.

*RED-LIGHT NEUTRALITY AND THE
COMMON FRONT*

WITHOUT TURKEY'S DETERMINED STAND BETWEEN HITLER'S EUROPEAN fortress and the Middle East it is doubtful if either the Cairo or the Teheran conference could have taken place. A free passage for Hitler's troops might have had the direst consequence in regard to the North African campaign and the campaign on the southern Russian front. At best, had such passage been granted or enforced, the German armies would today be massed somewhere in Turkey or in the neighboring countries between Egypt and Russia, between Cairo and the Caucasus, the Nile and the Volga. The Allied armies would be effectively divided—as they were divided in World War I. It should be remembered that then German-Turkish armies held the oilfields of Mosul and Baghdad, all Iraq and parts of Iran, near Teheran, and stood at the Suez Canal, near Cairo, as well as in the Russian Caucasus and in Stalin's homeland Georgia which was then represented in Berlin by Prince Matchabelli. There could have been no conference bringing together the important statesmen of Britain, Russia, the United States, and China.

Turkey's neutrality has made possible an actual common front between the Mediterranean and Middle Eastern forces of Britain and the United States and the fighting Russian forces whose advance outposts reach down into Iran, at present the domain of British-Russian condominium. It has made possible the maintenance of two of the most important lifelines of military supplies as well as civilian requirements—one from the Persian Gulf either via Baghdad to the Caucasus or via Teheran to the Caspian Sea; the other from the Red Sea and the Suez Canal to Palestine-Syria and to the Caucasus and Black Sea. Marshal Stalin has frequently admitted the pre-eminent

importance of these direct ties with American and British production lines.

There the *Middle East Supply Center*, originally a British agency, since 1942 a joint British-American body, with headquarters in Cairo and branches in Ankara, Baghdad, Teheran, and Beyrouth, covers an area larger than Europe and serves a population larger than that of Germany. It includes: in Asia Minor, Turkey, Syria-Lebanon, Palestine, Trans-Jordan, Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia; in East Africa, the Sudan, Ethiopia, and British Somaliland. There a network of pipelines of the biggest oil industry,¹ indispensable for the Mediterranean fleet, and a system of new railroads through innumerable tunnels, called the "Iranian I.R.T." by Americans, and of winding highways over threatening mountains have developed a new Middle East both as a storehouse of strategic materials and as a supply route for the United Nations.²

Turkey's geographical position between Hitler's Balkan armies and the Allies' Middle Eastern forces has provided the opportunity for Turkey's invaluable contribution to the war effort of the United Nations. It has been her attitude on the subject of neutrality that has made the contribution real. The drawbridge of the Turkish peninsula with bridgeheads on the peninsulas of the Balkans and the Arabias is now stronger than the Ottoman tricontinental bridge

¹ The President of the American Reserves Corporation, Harold Ickes, announced on February 5, 1944, that under an agreement between the United States government and the Arabian-American Oil Company (owned by Standard Oil of California and the Texas Company) and Gulf Exploration Company (owned by the Gulf Oil Corporation), the government undertakes to construct a pipeline about 1,200 miles across Saudi Arabia from Persian Gulf refineries to the Mediterranean at a cost of \$130,000,000 to \$165,000,000 in order to obtain a minimum reserve of 1,000,000,000 barrels of petroleum to meet military and naval needs.

² "Allied workshops in Southern Iran cover quite a respectable area," reports the London *Times* from Teheran. "In the settlement which forms their center of an evening there gather British railway men from Crewe and Swindon, American fitters from Detroit, bearded Sikhs and Russians with Armenian and Persian truck drivers rubbing shoulders in a boom-town atmosphere worthy of a Hollywood film and in a temperature which seldom drops below 100 degrees."

Another dispatch to the New York *Times* reports as one of the results of the American oil enterprise in the Middle East the fact that Arab workmen in Saudi Arabia, already used to higher living standards, had requested drinking water. When they received water that had been warmed by the sun, but which they and their forefathers used to drink, they spat it out and demanded "American" water, meaning ice water carried in vacuum jugs. It is expected that workers who are not able to achieve the standard set by the Americans will clamor for it nonetheless.

which confused Allied plans between 1914 and 1918. Hitler was desperately anxious to gain control of this bridge so as to obtain access to the oils, minerals, cottons, and foodstuffs of the Middle East and effect a junction with Japan in the Indian Ocean. Had he been successful he would have gained a strategical, political, and economic advantage that, in the words of former Ambassador Joseph E. Davies, would have made the war last "forty years instead of forty months."

Instead, Turkey has served as a stumbling block—not as a stepping-stone—for Hitler, as a bulwark for the Middle East and has enabled the Allies to develop a position of last-ditch defense into a prospective base for offensive operations against Hitler's Europe. In Marshal Smuts' words: "The Middle East not only will be defended but before the end of the war will become a great offensive situation."

By adhering strictly to Turkish neutrality and thus landlocking Germany in her European prison President Inonu prevented Hitler Germany from conquering the Near and Middle East just as Ataturk in World War I had prevented Czarist Russia from dominating the Near East and Middle Europe by landlocking Russia behind the Bosphorus.

Now, there are different types of neutrality. One may be called "red-light neutrality." Turkey is a case in point. Other states have followed a policy of "green-light neutrality" with various shades of emphasis. Sweden, for example, situated between Germany and German-occupied Norway, has consented, under duress, it is true, to Germany's use of her railways to and from Norway. Switzerland is in a similar position between the two Axis partners and has had to consent to a restricted use of her railways connecting Germany and Italy. The case of Franco Spain is somewhat different. Situated between two belligerent camps and abutting on occupied France, she has shown more than a "neutral" sympathy for the Axis aims and fortunes. In fact, Spain has termed her status: a pro-Axis "nonbelligerency" and has only in 1944 begun to consider "full neutrality." When I was in Barcelona in 1940 I found at the entrance to the office of the Spanish air service, the placard of the Deutsche Luft-Hansa placed prominently above the Spanish plate, Iberia. The Spanish air service, in fact, was run by German officials wearing Hitler badges.

and the Swastika and a large portrait of Hitler hung on the walls of the Spanish office.

In contrast with these green-light neutrals, Turkey has observed scrupulously the political traffic regulations laid down in her three treaties of alliance or friendship with Britain, Russia, and Germany. Her neutrality closed the drawbridge and put up the red stop sign. This neutrality has, of course, applied to both sides. But, in effect, it has closed the road only to Hitler, who needed it and asked for it and even tried pressure to secure it. But not a load of Axis war material has been allowed to pass through Turkey en route to fifth columnists, nationalist conspirators, or Hitlerite agents in Iran, Iraq, and Syria. And not a single Hitler soldier has been allowed to get through, nor the Axis fleet through the Dardanelles and Bosphorus to reach Bulgaria and Rumania—or Russia. Even a clever German trick, similar to that of 1914, did not succeed—to sell and send Italian destroyers to Bulgaria, a neutral in the German-Russian war, and to deliver them in the Bulgarian Black Sea ports to Germany. Ankara refused.

As far as the Allied side is concerned, the Turkish drawbridge could not have been of any use as long as their armies in the Middle East were weak: they lacked everything to protect Turkey or to risk a Balkan campaign. In fact, they made no request for free passage and were very happy about the "road blocked" sign. In other words, the same red light prevented Hitler from driving into and through Turkey and protected the Allies and Turkey alike.

Looked at from another point of view, it must now be obvious that earlier Turkish belligerency would have amounted to suicidal action and would have seriously endangered the Allies' Middle Eastern position. For even if the tough Turkish soldiers could have stopped the German juggernaut in the rugged mountains and protective deserts of Anatolia, Hitler would in all probability have been able to take Istanbul, just around the corner of Bulgaria, and the European shore of the Dardanelles although the fortified zone between Adrianople and Constantinople would prove a great military and natural obstacle. Hitler would have been able to attack by land as well as destroy Istanbul, Smyrna and even Ankara from near-by airfields in Bulgaria, Greece, and on the Dodecanese Islands. Up to

now, neutrality has served the Allied cause better than belligerency.

In October, 1943, the Turkish prime minister spoke of a Turkey "which was the key to the two sides of the war." In the Near Eastern and Balkan region, as we have seen, Turkey was the key nation in the Balkan group which included Greece, Yugoslavia, and Rumania, with Bulgaria standing pouting on the sidelines. The stand of Greece and Yugoslavia against Hitler's armies upset his campaign timetable and undoubtedly delayed his projected attack on Turkey until it was too late. The defection of the other two Balkan states, Rumania and Bulgaria, did not discourage the Turkish statesmen to try their diplomatic abilities to lead them out of Hitler's camp and back to their Balkan neighbors. On her eastern border, Turkey extended her pact with Iraq, Iran, and Afghanistan, in 1943, for a further five years, and these states have declared war on the Axis. To the north of Turkey are Russia's armies, advancing relentlessly into Poland and driving toward Rumania and Bulgaria. To the south and west are the British, American, and Fighting French forces controlling the Mediterranean and the Middle East, North Africa, and at the moment of writing, with a firm toehold on Italy. Turkey occupies a key position in the potential grand strategy of welding together the British-American-French forces with the Russian in a solid south-eastern front.

If we study the chart on page 236 we can see that Turkish red-light neutrality has contributed to smashing the four side arms of Hitler's crooked cross—the Arabian, the African, part of the Italian, part of the Russian. Its central arms meet and cross just where Hitler's European fortress borders the Turkish fortifications. If anywhere in the southeast the "underbelly," as mentioned by Churchill, can be found, it is there. Apart from the Russian front, the Turkish frontier provides the only invasion route to Europe by land. At this point the risks of amphibious attack would be greatly lessened; for the termini of the Anatolian and European railways at Haidarpasha and Istanbul are connected by a Bosphorus boat which takes no more than fifteen minutes to cross. Thus the Turkish drawbridge could be converted into a springboard into landlocked Germany's southeast. It would not afford an alternative to the offensive from the west but would

constitute a complementary offensive at the opposite end of the European diagonal from the British Isles invasion base, but by no means before this Western offensive began.

Will such a plan be realized? Will Turkey give the Allies her "go ahead" signal? And will Turkey participate herself?

In a report to British authorities, in 1937, which was used for an address to Chatham House on June 22, 1939, I attempted an answer:³

Report in 1937 on Turkey's prospective attitude

1. The Balkan nations will fight if attacked by Hitler or Mussolini. If they listen to Turkey, they will all defend themselves together.

2. Of all nations in the Near and Middle East, Turkey is the most determined to defend her independence against any aggression.

3. The Turkish government is fully aware of the decisive factor of sea power which is necessary to secure Turkey's Mediterranean and oceanic communications with the world.

4. Through her alignment with sea power, Turkey expects delivery of modern mechanized war equipment.

5. What Turkey offers in return is, besides her military power, her geographic position as the middle land between her prospective allies and her possible opponents. This implies the use of Turkish waterways, land routes, and airways between the Black Sea, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East.

6. Turkey needs and prefers peace in order to complete her national regeneration and will go to war only if attacked and if properly equipped.

We have already dealt with three of these points. The other three—the conditions for any change of Turkish neutrality, the provisions which Turkey could supply, and Turkish preference for her peaceful policy—call for some elaboration.

At the risk of appearing repetitious we must first establish three preliminary bases of Turkish action. First, Turkish policy is still guided by the fact that Turkey has no territorial ambition whatsoever, in sharp contrast with Bulgaria, Rumania, and Hungary, which were all bribed and won over by Hitler's offer of territorial gains. Turkey appreciates her national homogeneity so highly and so sin-

³ Royal Institute of International Affairs, Vol. XVIII, No. 6; and *Survey Graphic*, New York, January, 1941. Also letters to the editors of *The Spectator* and the *Times* in London, in 1939, and in New York to the *New York Times* in 1941.

cerely that she refuses to be weakened by any new minority, Greek or Bulgarian, Syrian or Arabian, Armenian or Russian. True, there is the Aegean Islands chain, the Dodecanese, seized from Turkey by the Italians in 1912 and built by Mussolini into powerful strategic bases which form a perpetual threat to the near-by Turkish mainland. However, the population is Greek and out of racial, religious, and ethnological considerations Turkey agrees to the restoration of the Dodecanese to Greece. Turkey and Greece are now two countries which, uniting their fortunes, have reached a stage where "their respective rights and interests might be considered as almost identical, and whose future outlook is based on mutual reliance." Thus spoke the Turkish foreign minister. For herself Turkey may expect only the return of some islands closest to the Turkish shores, in speaking distance only, and only on the basis of a permanent Greek-Turkish alliance which might even bring about such a condominium as is practiced by an American-British understanding on some Pacific islands.

"Our government has stated on several occasions," said President Inonu to the National Assembly, "that Turkey does not covet an inch of territory outside its frontier, that it has no intention of trespassing on the rights of anyone." Thus, no territorial offer is able to induce and seduce Turkey to belligerency.

As a matter of fact, Turkey has refused all German offers of this kind. The Turkish ambassador to Berlin was reported to have brought to Ankara the following propositions:

1. In exchange for immediate permission for transit and/or use of Turkish bases for German troops for an operation against the South Caucasus and Iraq, the German government offers:

2. Fifty per cent of the output of the Mosul oilfields for the duration of the war to be handed unconditionally to Turkey; on the conclusion of hostilities Turkey to guarantee preferential tariffs for German purchase of such oil as she needs from the entire output, which would be dispensed by Turkey.

3. Turkish mandate over Syria for a fifteen-year period, after which the mandate on completion of a "plebiscite" (the outcome of which would be guaranteed by the Germans) would revert to the Turkish states as a definitive possession.

4. Immediate cession to Turkey of the [Greek] islands of Lem-

nos, Mytilene, and Chios, which, however, for the duration of hostilities, would continue to serve as bases for German and other Axis troops and submarines garrisoned or stationed there.

5. "Rectification" of the western frontier of European Turkey by cession of parts of Greek Thrace.

Ambassador von Papen even ventured a public offer by telling a Spanish correspondent in Ankara: "In the Mediterranean Spain and Turkey would control the sea, and Turkey would also be allotted a sphere of interest in Syria and Iran. The peoples of Europe would be forced to co-operate with the new order; if they refused they would be starved into submission, and rebellion would be ruthlessly stamped out."

The Turkish reply was: "Our national policy has been to yield territory to no one, and to take territory from no one."

No more successful was Hitler's radio address "to the heart of the Turkish nation" on May 4, 1941, or the mission to Ankara of five Hitlerites who carried by air a dramatic message from the Fuehrer himself.

A broadcast from Ankara pointed out that "German investigations made before the war established that the self-sufficient European power into which Germany wishes to make herself needs the whole of the Mediterranean, the peninsulas of Arabia, and the plateaus of Anatolia and Persia, as well as the waterways in this part of the world."

In 1942 the Turkish police arrested thirteen Axis agents suspected of operating an espionage ring in Syria, Iraq, and Iran. They included three Syrians who had been working as translators in the German News Agency in Istanbul. The importation of the German paper *Signal* and of the anti-Soviet *Novo Slovo* (printed in Berlin) was prohibited. The Turkish authorities ordered all German governesses and nurses to leave the country within fifteen days. The notorious German press chief, Paul Schmidt, who had arrived in Ankara with six assistants, left Turkey shortly after, having failed to induce the government to muzzle the pro-British press and prevent the publication of British news.⁴

Turkey resisted threats with the same firmness that she showed in

⁴ The authenticity of these facts is confirmed by *The Bulletin of International News*, published by *The Royal Institute of International Affairs*.

the face of bribes. No menacing troop movements, no economic pressure, no radio provocation changed Turkish determination, even during those two years of actual encirclement by the Axis pincers. All the more so since the chief of the general staff, Fevzi Chakmak, whom the Germans had invited to their Russian front in 1942, could not be impressed by what he was shown there.

Then, one day, the tide turned. The British-American-French forces reconquered Africa and the Western Mediterranean and the Soviet armies rolled back the German invaders mile after mile toward the Polish and Rumanian borders.

The Turks had made up their minds and chosen their side long before the global war started. They had decided in favor of collective security and against the aggressor nations. In addition to Turkey's strength through her national homogeneity and her firmness against foreign interference, there is a third basic factor in Turkish policy which we should understand before approaching the ultimate question of whether Turkey's red-light neutrality may eventually turn to belligerency.

Any Turkish move must be linked up with the entire European campaign by a common strategy and a common timetable. It must be set according to the "scope and timing" of joint action "from the east, west and south," as formulated by the Russian-British-American Moscow Conference, and according to the "closest unity" and "identity of purpose," as professed by the Turkish-Russian-British-American Cairo Conference. Any separate or precipitate action on the part of Turkey would be ill-timed and dangerous. Only a move on the appointed day can count on securing the full aid of logistics which is vitally necessary.

The *sine qua non* of any Turkish move toward belligerency is to be fully equipped and thus capable of waging war successfully. "Not too soon and not with too little." This is in the common interest of both Turkey and the Allies. The Turkish-British-French treaty of alliance committed Britain and France, especially General Weygand's Syrian arsenal, to equip Turkey with a specific amount of war material, as it committed Turkey to assist Britain and France under the terms given above. Neither party was able to fulfill its obligation. When France and Syria collapsed and when Britain stood alone with

most of her modern equipment left and lost in Europe, Winston Churchill, aware of the decisive character of the Middle Eastern front, had the audacity almost to empty the British islands of their own minimum equipment, and to protect their lifeline to Egypt. To many this line then seemed to be the lifeline of the British Commonwealth only. Actually it was the line to the Middle Eastern position of Russia and the United States as well as of Turkey. At a time when Britain put in a hurry call to Washington for obsolescent American weapons, and "in Britain a million empty hands reached eagerly for these rifles and guns laid away in grease in American arsenals in 1919,"⁵ not much British war equipment could be spared for anybody except Greece where Britain was to fight once more to strengthen the fateful Middle East. Turkey herself was able to assist her Greek ally only by delivering livestock, wheat, coal and other commodities and later by inviting half a million Greek children to Turkey.

However, first, American aid replaced British supplies. On December 3, 1941, it was announced in Washington that the President had declared the defense of Turkey to be "vital to the defense of the United States" and that instructions had been issued to the Lease-lend administrator to supply Turkey's needs as quickly as possible. Officials stated that a considerable amount of war supplies had already been sent, and that "today's action means that Turkey is now co-operating with the United States and Britain."

Later, Britain became increasingly capable of supplying guns, trucks, locomotives, planes, submarines, and other war material to the Middle East and to Turkey. (In the traditional military parade on the Independence Day in Ankara in 1943 British-made helmets and boots and American antitank guns, artillery-towing trucks, and reconnaissance cars impressed the Turkish people.) After the Adana Conference, at the beginning of 1943, it was stated that deliveries of British war material under the treaty of alliance were arriving more rapidly, including a number of a new type Hurricane fighter. Of course, there were still many essential items unavailable in Turkey in sufficient quantity. The Teheran and Cairo Conferences, like the earlier Adana meeting, foreshadowed a still greater volume of war

⁵ E. R. Stettinius, *Lend Lease: Weapons for Victory*.

material for Turkey from the United States and Britain. The fact is certainly significant that, at Cairo, President Inonu and his military chiefs had the opportunity to discuss matters with the Allied Middle Eastern and Balkan expert, General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson, now Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean in succession to General Dwight D. Eisenhower. General Wilson is known to be aware of the importance of Turkey's "red-light neutrality." In fact, he has repeatedly visited the Turkish General Staff in Ankara with a view to executing decisions taken at the various conferences of the statesmen.

The first national condition for Turkish belligerency is that the General Staff is fully satisfied, that the Turkish army is really ready, and that the promised necessary equipment has been delivered and distributed. The leading deputy and veteran publicist, Hussein Yalcin, wrote at the end of 1943: "We are ready to discharge our obligations under our treaty of alliance with Britain in both letter and spirit, but we refuse to commit suicide. . . . Why have the Allies not yet opened a second front? Was it because they did not want to? No! Certainly not! Was it because they were not ready? Does the necessity of being ready apply to Britain and the United States alone but not to us?"

It is a military issue and outside the bounds of this political analysis to say whether readiness and preparedness will also mean the need first to be free from the iron ring of the German-occupied Aegean Islands all along the Turkish mainland extending from the Dardanelles down across the heavily fortified Dodecanese and the rocky Scarpanto caves and casemates to the formidable fortress of Crete, the "German Malta" in the Eastern Mediterranean, or whether Turkey would be ready to join the Allies in breaking this island-to-island ring and to help regain control of the Eastern Mediterranean. There are two schools of thought: one emphasizes that those islands must be taken by the Allies before Turkey can and will move; the other expects Turkish co-operation to obtain this goal. Anyway, the reconquest of some Dodecanese islands by the Germans from the British in December did not make the Turkish decision easier nor did the disappointment about the temporary failure of the battle for

Rome. The time has not yet come to know whether it would have been more advisable, or possible, to pour more strength into the Eastern Mediterranean between Crete, Greece and Turkey, and thus to relieve the extended Turkish coast from the permanent all-round German air invasion threat from all the German occupied Greek islands in the Aegean.

Turkey could give invaluable help without declaring war herself, by putting at our disposal her land, seas, and skies, or by cutting off from Germany Turkish exports of vital war commodities, especially strategic military metals.

1. She could open her drawbridge to the Allied armies in the Middle East for transit facilities through Turkey from Syria-Palestine-Egypt as well as from Iraq and Iran via Turkish railroads and highways to the German frontier in Bulgaria and to the Black Sea. Such a move or even its sheer threat could cause Bulgaria and Rumania to come over—back into the prewar Balkan community and to join Turkish allies against the Hitler forces. This would make Hitler's Balkan front untenable. Likewise, the other alternative of a new fighting front from Turkey across the Balkan peninsula, joining hands with the Yugoslav and Greek patriot groups and the trans-Adriatic Allied armies in Italy could yield the same dividends.

2. She could admit British warships through the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus to the Black Sea, to supply Russia and to reach the German front in Russia, Rumania, and Bulgaria. (Article XX of the Montreux Convention of July 2, 1936, states that "in time of war, Turkey being belligerent, the passage of warships will be left entirely to the discretion of the Turkish Government," and Article XXI says, "should Turkey consider herself to be threatened with imminent danger of war, she shall have the right to apply the provision of Article XX.")

3. She could grant the use of her elaborate airfields, of Istanbul, Ankara, Smyrna, Adana, Diarbekr, and Eskishehir, for operations against German-occupied territory on the Aegean Islands and in Bulgaria and Rumania. Any comparison to Portugal's similar cession of the Azores is, however, beside the point, because in the Portuguese case distant Germany is not able to strike back, whereas the

Turkish position, just around the corner from the German forces, will be immediately attackable from near-by German air and land bases.

4. She could block her supplies of war commodities to Germany such as wool, cotton, tanning materials and particularly chrome. The discontinuance of chrome delivery would deprive Germany of almost 50% of this alloy indispensable for certain steel production, the other half being mined in Yugoslavia and Greece, but increasingly menaced by guerrilla partisans and deteriorating railway communications. Moreover, it would mean the repudiation of the still valid Clodius agreement and of an actual debt, and it would be an open challenge to Germany.

In other words, Hitler may take each of these ways of belligerency as tantamount to open warfare and retaliate accordingly. Once more Turkey must be certain of being prepared for such a consequence or of being protected by sufficient air power against the otherwise easy destruction of Istanbul, Smyrna and Ankara, all highly vulnerable to bombing and capable of being destroyed by a few air attacks—more easily and more quickly than Warsaw, Rotterdam, or Coventry.

In view of such possibilities, how ready does Turkey herself appear to be to accept the full responsibilities of belligerency?

Military leadership is still vested in the two personalities who won their fame by their brilliant victories alongside of their closest comrade, Ataturk, at the Sakarya, at Inonu, and in the Dardanelles—Field Marshal Fevzi Chakmak⁶ at Gallipoli and the Sakarya, and President and Commander in Chief Ismet Inonu at the Sakarya and Inonu. They are sixty years of age, and together with their greatest comrade-in-arms, Kemal Ataturk, they have taken care that Turkey has at her disposal a well-trained officer corps, both professional and reserve officers, and a well-disciplined army of those peasant-soldiers who for generations have earned, in the words of Field Marshal Allenby and Colonel Lawrence, the reputation of being "the best natural soldiers in the world." Or in the words of a collaborator of Lawrence's, then as bitterly anti-Turkish as himself: "Ragged, half-

⁶ The only field marshal besides and after Ataturk; now succeeded by Kiazim Orbay, about ten years his junior and known for his pro-British attitude.

fed, ill, and often barefoot, pinched and worn, they are indomitable. . . . At the feet of the Turkish peasants who made up that army, I lay tokens of esteem. They are gifted with many virtues." Since then the new conscript army has been built up on eighteen months' active training for every Turk between twenty and forty-six, and on a general mobilization between sixteen and sixty-five. Turkey's new educational system is carried into the actual army training so as to broaden the peasant-soldiers' geographical and political knowledge of the nation's position. During the War of Independence, as we learned from the National Monument at Ankara, the women of Turkey stood alongside of their men in fights for the freedom of their country. Now the girls at schools receive military training so that they may be as fit to defend their country as their mothers were. In case of war a National Service Act will be the natural consequence of Turkish experience and mentality.

The full strength of the Turkish army, which since 1940 has been semimobilized, is known to number almost two million men. They are organized in four principal armies: (1) in European Thrace and along the European side of the Straits, (2) along their Asiatic side and the Aegean Sea, (3) along the Caucasus and their southern frontier, and (4) along the eastern Black Sea coast. As matters stand today, the only decisive front seems to be the one along the German-occupied Bulgarian and Greek borders, since no sea-borne attack by a German army from the Mediterranean seems possible in view of the German lack of sea power. Thus, only an air-borne attempt at invasion by German parachutists from the Aegean Islands seems at all feasible.

The Turkish air force was small and numbered only about 300 planes in 1941. It is estimated to have trebled since. The extent of its increase by British and American Lend-Lease is, of course, a military secret. Turkish fighter pilots are known as first-class material. An Aviation League has developed general air-mindedness which expresses itself in the presentation of planes to the government by private flying groups.

The navy is small. However, although it consists of not more than an old ex-German battleship of World War I, two cruisers, eight destroyers, and a dozen submarines, partly from British yards, yet

along with the Russian fleet it will be able to control the Black Sea. In addition to the Turkish base in the Gulf of Izmit, between the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, the number of good harbors along the coast of Asia Minor is an additional advantage.

For her modern mechanized war equipment Turkey must, as we have seen, rely on her more industrialized British ally and on American Lend-Lease.

If war comes it would come to a Turkish generation which, after having been in war for more than twelve years from 1910 to 1922, has enjoyed the longest Turkish period of peace with all her neighbors in centuries. Turkey has stood for a thoroughgoing peace policy and has succeeded in building up a new nation and a new state, new cities, new politics and new economics, even a new Balkan policy of outstanding regionalism, still hoped for after the war. This mentality makes Turkey hesitate to wage once more a Balkan war and encourages her statesmen to attempt to talk her Bulgarian⁷ and Rumanian neighbors out of the war in a "bloodless battle." Atatürk, who, like Washington, was "first in war, first in peace, and first in the hearts of his countrymen," had, together with the leaders of today, fought four wars and taught them to "keep out of war and out of foreign entanglements"; as President İnönü put it, on November 1, 1941: "Turkey, forming the connecting link between Europe and Asia, was as ever a center of calm, and she would feel the greatest joy if she could become the source of peace."

But the same Atatürk led them also to understand the true implications of interlocked independence and interdependence, of national and collective security. They faithfully adhere to their greatest comrade-in-arms and in spirit. The middle land between three continents

⁷ A Bulgarian military mission arrived at Ankara on November 20, 1943. At the same time a Turkish article in *Akşam* stated that Turco-Bulgarian friendship must be based on two principles for which Turkey had always stood, the independence and freedom of the Balkan countries, exclusive of the interference of non-Balkan powers, and a fair adjustment of the frontiers between the Balkan countries. Turkey was bound to Greece by the Treaty of 1933, guaranteeing the inviolability of their common Balkan frontiers, and Turkey would abide by that treaty. "The vicissitudes of war," the Turkish author stated, "put under Bulgarian occupation territories the retention of which should be considered impossible even by the more optimistic Bulgarians. Therefore our frank and friendly advice to Bulgaria would be that, taking a realistic view of the situation, she should not wait till the last moment, but return now those territories to their rightful owners."

can achieve postwar security only if it is linked up with the community of powers, which will be decisive for the collective security to come, politically and economically. Turkish independence as well as interdependence calls for joining the round table of the security-and-peace makers as a responsible coactor rather than as a distant onlooker.

Ataturk's successors and "assistants," as Inonu himself called them, are still backed by the national unity which he created and which recently was expressed by the leading *Ulus*, the government newspaper: "We present a front in which there is no chance for any breach. We are attached to our national leader by unlimited confidence. The army and nation have their eyes fixed on him. You know he values, above everything, every drop of Turkish blood. But he is also our commander who knows best how to defend our national interests—the liberty and territorial integrity of our country. If one day we are called upon to do our duty we know that the only way to preserve the life, honor, and prosperity of our nation is to respond to the appeal with all our material and moral strength and be ready to sacrifice our property and our lives."

The principle of joint responsibility in organizing a new Europe and a new world goes beyond all opportunism. The Turkish President, addressing the Grand National Assembly at its opening, on November 1, 1943, said they wished the victors in the war to be "civilization and humanity." They deprecated the "spirit of domination, which is bound to collapse" and believed in the establishment of an order based on the sincere co-operation of all free nations, large and small; and they had maintained that conviction even when everyone else despaired of it. The shocks of the struggle, provoked by a spirit of domination, had undermined the foundations on which humanity rested. Turkey had, since the crisis of 1935, made her choice in foreign policy and followed one which tended to reinforce the foundations of civilization based on "the freedom and independence of nations." He concluded by saying that Turkey was prepared for greater sacrifices, in order "to lift the great weight which oppresses humanity and prevents it from breathing freely in an atmosphere of security."

In the same spirit the Turkish prime minister, in a speech on

June 15, 1943, assured the People's Party National Convention that "we find between our views and American views such affinities that we consider the latter as our own. For such reasons we are resolved to contribute with all our power and to participate in all activities which, after the war, aim at suppressing the possibility of war . . . and which grant individuals and nations the right to equality and liberty."

It is clear that such a stated position did not go unnoticed in the neighboring European countries. Budapest's leading newspaper replied significantly: "We know the Turkish character. . . . If Turkey proclaims that she desires the triumph of civilization and humanity in the world, then Turkey will make a stand for it."

Does this not sound like Kemal Ataturk's own statement when, in the last year of his life, his foresight anticipated the world issue of today and set the definite course of tomorrow: "Once we so-called pagan and infidel Turks, though believers in the Mohammedan version of Judaeo-Christianity, seemed to threaten civilization in Central Europe; now, however, world civilization will be defended by us Turks against the menace of modern barbarism and paganism which is spreading from Central Europe to the four corners of a world of neighbors."

This book was written during the second part of 1943, and annotated during March 1944. At the time it went to press, the Turkish foreign minister made the following statement: "The Turkish nation would not be surprised if it should find itself obliged to resort to arms."

APPENDIX: DOCUMENTS

I. FREE-LANCE AMBASSADOR

(When I did not accept the foreign minister's proposal to enter the Foreign Office as Near Eastern expert, the Kaiser summoned me aboard the *Hohenzollern* lying in the port of Kiel and repeated his minister's suggestion.)

(1) *To the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency A. von Kiderlen-Waechter*

Kiel, July 9, 1911

I am happy to comply with your wish to report to you on my audience with his Majesty the Kaiser aboard the *Hohenzollern*. Everything developed according to schedule—the evening visit aboard the *Hohenzollern* as well as the morning audience with H. M. on the bridge. The Kaiser was exactly as you told me he could be, especially when he is alone (and this he was—only the commander of the *Hohenzollern* was there, a few steps from him). He was simple and unassuming just like any captain, talkative and interested like a Berlin intellectual, charming like any hospitable host, nothing of “Imperator Rex”—only a sports coat.

The atmosphere of the imperial audience was so human right from the beginning that I had the nerve to venture a bon mot. When the Kaiser, referring to your and my Swabian origin, asked me whether I, too, hailed from Stuttgart or from what other part of Wuerttemberg, I quoted the political answer of a Swabian democrat, a member of the National Assembly at Frankfort in 1848, who had told the Kaiser's granduncle, King Friedrich Wilhelm IV of Prussia, in answer to a similar question: “Between Hohenstaufen and Hohenzollern!” My answer was to indicate my geographical origin from the Swabian Alp (of Hohenstaufen) as well as my political

attitude toward the German problem (of the Hohenzollerns) as a democratic follower of my friend Naumann's "Demokratie und Kaisertum" [attempting to balance Swabian Hohenstaufen democracy and German Hohenzollern monarchy in the British way].

Then we discussed what you had touched upon. He repeated your wish that I should accept an appointment as Near East expert in the Foreign Office. My answer and my reasons for it were the same I had given you: I would be glad to co-operate with you on an informal basis, but independently, without being burdened with the ties of an official. I cannot accept any call for which I do not feel any "call." I can accomplish my share only in complete spiritual independence, out of my own impulses and responsible only to myself. I had the feeling that the Kaiser, too, understood my viewpoint.

Finally, Oriental politics was our topic: exactly along lines which you know from our conversations in Berlin; also Agadir, just as you indicated it to me in Berlin before the *Panther* was sent there: no territorial designs on Morocco, only a symbolic invitation for direct French-German negotiations concerning a compensation (cession of the French Congo to Germany for a French Morocco).¹

I shall be happy to follow your suggestion to find another opportunity for moving from our Swabia to Berlin for a regular collaboration with you "to carry out that what we recognize as right and just in the world" (as you quoted Plato). As a matter of fact, I believe I see a way already.

There are sufficient tasks to undertake. First of all is the completion of preparations for the foundation of a Turkish-German Association to serve as a clearinghouse for everything that will develop and strengthen Turkey culturally, economically, and politically. Our aim must be to liberate Turkey from the chains of Capitulations and to consolidate her genuine independence. Since this policy is in accord with Disraeli's Near Eastern policy, it may well lead to the German-British understanding and co-operation that is so close to our hearts.

¹ The Morocco crisis of 1911, caused by French occupation of Fez and intensified by the arrival of the German gunboat *Panther* at Agadir, near Casablanca, ended in a French-German agreement by which in return for compensation in the French Congo Germany gave France a free hand in Morocco.

(2) *From People's Commissioner (later Reich President) Friedrich Ebert*

November 30, 1918

I hear that you did not accept the post of Wuerttemberg minister to Berlin which the new republican premier of Wuerttemberg offered you. I am very glad about this and I hope also you will not follow the suggestion of the Foreign Office to serve in your Constantinople. I would like to propose to you other and greater tasks as soon as you have concluded the organization of your League of Nations policy. I should like to discuss these matters with you at our next round-table dinner, as well as the interesting differentiation you recently made between "international" and "supernational" in the relationship between nation and world.

(3) *From Professor Walther Schuecking, Permanent Judge at the World Court in The Hague*

February 22, 1935

This time my birthday congratulations must seek you out in England, since you chose two years ago to exchange Berlin for London, despite the fact that you are the only unofficial German whom all political leaders—from the Kaiser to Socialist Ebert and Field Marshal Hindenburg, from noblemen to workingmen, conservative, liberal, clerical—trusted and honored. There was no chancellor or minister of foreign affairs to whom you had no access, regardless of whether the government was monarchist or republican, whether the public man was a "nationalist" or "socialist."

From personal experience I know very well about the relations between you and all the big shots. You used to meet them as an independent man, with aims and ways of your own. . . . "You could talk with kings and not lose the common touch" . . .

In our own collaboration, before, during, and after Versailles, and now between your London and my The Hague, there is one thing about you which has particularly impressed me. It is what I should like to call the impersonal quality of your personality, your independence, your devotion to tasks which you have freely sought out and chosen to accomplish . . .

II. TURKISH CONSISTENCY

(4) *From the Sheikh of Islam*

Constantinople, August 29, 1915

We Moslems are grateful to you for having made available to Europeans Mahmud Muktar Pasha's book on Islam and other Turkish literature.² Mahmud Muktar's book will have a clarifying effect not only abroad but in Mohammedan countries as well, providing it is translated into Turkish with certain revisions. Unfortunately, shamefully little is known of our own religion even among the Islamic nations. Our common religious conceptions are steeped in superstition and narrow-mindedness, comparable only to the Greeks and Armenians. Our so-called educated classes have been prey to complete irreligiosity for decades, while the masses suffer from excessive religious zeal. To adjust this situation and appraise Islam's moralizing influence in its true value is admittedly a great task.

I have been following your efforts on behalf of Turkey since 1911, when I visited you officially as the Grand Vizier's representative. You will remember that you were in the Pera Hospital then, ill of malaria contracted through your work in Asia Minor. We know that you worked harder than many of our Turkish governor generals. . . . The Turks are grateful for your loyal understanding, which began in 1908 when you first discovered the "Rising Crescent" among the world's national constellations.

(5) *Telegram from Colonel Mustafa Kemal (Ataturk)*

Dardanelles, September 2, 1915

May I convey my thanks and that of Marshal Liman von Sanders for the collection for Ottoman soldiers wounded and invalided on the Gallipoli peninsula. Your million marks have been put into a "Jackh Fund." Fevzi Bey³ also sends greetings and thanks to the friend who has remained loyal to us through every hard blow of

²Various series of pamphlets and books enlightened public opinion, such as translations of novels by national leaders: Halidé Edib Hanum's *Das Neue Turan* and Ziya Goekalp's *Kysy Elma* (the country of the red apple); *Tuerkismus und Pan-Tuerkismus*, by Tekin Alp; *Islam, Koran und Hadith*, by Mahmud Muktar Pasha; *Die Toleranz des Islams*, by Professor Giese.

³In 1915, Marshal Liman's first adjutant, now Marshal Fevzi Chakmak, chief of the General Staff.

fate, which you not only suffered with us, but which you have made lighter by every imaginable kind of help.

(6) *From General Zekki Pasha, Adjutant General to the Sultan*

March 2, 1917

Do you realize that when our government places at your disposal a building plot for your Dostluk Yurdu [House of Friendship], it is against all our laws? Islamic law does not permit any foreign ownership of land in Stamboul. But you are not a foreigner to us, you are our best friend. . . . I know of only one other instance of a "concession personnelle" in the Islamic world. It was made in Egypt in connection with the Suez Canal, and there too it was made on the same basis: "To our friend"—M. F. de Lesseps. . . . The fact that on the occasion of laying the cornerstone of the Dostluk Yurdu you put the greatest importance on feeding the poor is of greatest value for us at present.

(7) *To the democratic leader, F. Naumann*

Berlin, October 19, 1917

. . . I want to tell you of another experience I had, one of the most beautiful of all my years in Turkey. The old seraglio section in Constantinople—that conglomeration of sultan's palaces, kiosks, harems—was never accessible to anyone. Even now, when the Young Turks are renovating these historical shrines in order to build up national consciousness,⁴ it is seldom and then only with great difficulty that anyone gets a chance to see them. When to honor me the Turkish government gave me a pass, I frequented it once a week. I find a stimulating seclusion in its atmosphere of *beata solitudo* or, rather, *sola beatitudo*. The other day I took a German journalist with me. The director of the seraglio, who was our guide, wanted to show us an old library kiosk recently renovated—a "jewel," as he said. We approached the staircase leading to the priceless manuscripts, and there we were confronted by a Turkish guard with a patriarchal gray beard and his arms stoically crossed in front of him. "Yassak!" he said softly but determinedly. "Entrance is forbidden." The director, somewhat embarrassed, tried to persuade the guard to let us enter,

⁴ See page 132.

and the German journalist and I stood aside while the director argued. We were recognizable as foreigners because we wore European hats, and the guard repeated over and over again that he had been ordered not to allow any foreigners into the kiosk. Finally the director said in desperation, "But this is our friend Jackh Pasha!" The guard's expression changed suddenly and he bowed toward me: "You are Jackh Pasha? There is nothing forbidden to you in our country. . . ." Then he went to the door, removed the seal, and opened the kiosk for us. It meant more to me than all my official decorations of Medjidie and Osmanie!

III. THE PRUSSIAN WAR MINISTER'S VENGEANCE

(8) *Letter to former Chancellor von Bethmann-Hollweg at Hohenfinow*

October 31, 1917

I am sorry I cannot spend the weekend with you at Hohenfinow. Just back from Constantinople, I received a telephone call from Geheimrat von Rosenberg, chief of the Near Eastern Section of the Foreign Office, asking to see me immediately. When I entered his office, he handed me a document and asked that I read it then and there.

It was from the Prussian War Ministry, signed by Secretary of War vom Stein himself, and it stated, to put it bluntly, that my political activities in the Near East were detrimental to German interests, that my intimacy with those in power in Turkey was strengthening their resistance against Germany, and that my influence, therefore, was dangerous and harmful. I would have to be rendered "harmless" by being drafted immediately as a plain recruit and sent to the front lines.

The Foreign Office regarded the Prussian War Ministry's challenge as a constitutional case. A rejoinder was sent to the War Ministry, refuting its contention that I was "dangerous" and proving my "indispensability" and the need for continuation of my deferment. All without any result.

Then the chancellor and the vice-chancellor acted officially. So did the Turks—the Sultan's adjutant general at Headquarters. Again no result.

I remember your having told me that the Prussian war minister sometimes is more powerful than the German government. You certainly were right.

Then I received an induction order by telegram—artillery, Perleberg Garrison, Potsdam-Brandenburg. Geheimrat von Rosenberg told me on Saturday that it looked as though I would have to accept the inevitable “in good humor.” But it would be for only a few weeks and he would continue to do everything possible.

I was all prepared to leave on Monday but on Sunday at 3 P.M. the chief of the Kaiser’s Civil Cabinet, von Valentini, called me from General Headquarters and said, “Well, that’s a fine mess you got yourself into!” Since I had been repeatedly in contact with him and a few weeks ago had again made detailed suggestions on why democratization of government in both Prussia and the Reich is inevitable, I was certain that the Kaiser’s conservative minister was reprimanding me because of my democratic policy, as he had done before. So I replied, “But you know from all my democratic activities, my reports, and our discussions why I feel democratization is necessary.” I could hear him laugh over the telephone. “That’s not it,” he said. “I’m talking about your row with the War Ministry. The chancellor asked me to report it to his Majesty, and the result is that H.M. has decided in your favor. So you don’t need to report for induction tomorrow. . . . The Kaiser still calls you by the nickname he gave you when his outburst on what you had said did not intimidate your Swabian frankness and he dubbed you “the brave little Swabian” (*das tapfere Schwabele*).

As far as I’m concerned the case is not over. I must find out who is behind the whole thing. I can’t believe that the war minister, whom I met only twice at the Kaiser’s dinner table in Constantinople, knows me and my policies so well that he acted on his own initiative.

(9) *Letter to the Premier of Wuerttemberg, Baron von Weizsaecker*⁵

November 9, 1917

. . . The “guilty one” has been found. And this is the way it happened. I discovered that the responsible Near Eastern agent in

⁵ Father of the present ambassador to the Vatican.

the Prussian War Ministry was Major Duesterberg.⁶ He was a typical Pan-German and I knew him personally from occasional social contacts in Constantinople. I decided to have it out with him and called him on the telephone for an interview, which he consented to immediately.

At the Ministry he had another officer with him whom he introduced as his collaborator, Captain von Ramsay. Duesterberg asked whether I had any objections to von Ramsay's presence. "On the contrary," I said. "I welcome any witness, because I came here to ask why you wrote that memorandum against me which the war minister signed."

My bluntness seemed to surprise him. He blushed but answered firmly, "Yes, I admit I'm the author."

We had a lively discussion which brought out our different points of view. He wanted to make Turkey a "German Egypt," and I wanted to develop a strong, independent "Turkish Turkey." In addition he listed my other "dangerous acts": (1) attempting to influence the Kaiser's advisers in favor of democratization of Prussia and Germany; (2) introducing a Social-Democrat—the first the Kaiser had ever seen—to the monarch, who granted him an audience for two hours; (3) politically and financially organizing propaganda against Pan-German war aims. He also quoted that infamous pamphlet by "Junius Alter" [pseudonym of Geheimrat Kapp, later to become the rebel of Kapp putsch fame] which stated that "Delbrueck and Jackh enjoyed unlimited political freedom to operate" and "were permitted unlimited freedom of speech" against the Pan-Germans. Finally Major Duesterberg objected to my advocating a League of Nations policy and to my collaboration with "the Jew Albert Ballin" for peace negotiations.

I am sure we shall never agree and the fight will go on.

Incidentally, our conversation was memorable in a way because it was interrupted by a telegram announcing the outbreak of the Russian Bolshevik Revolution. There was great satisfaction over the report, since the War Ministry claims credit for this success because they transported Lenin, Trotsky, and their friends from Switzerland

⁶ Duesterberg later became leader of the Stahlhelm and a candidate against Hindenburg in the presidential elections.

through Germany into Russia in a German train (sealed!) in order to revolutionize and bolshevize Russia. . . . The idea was suggested by Parvus (alias Dr. Helphand), a Russian socialist who escaped from Siberia and whom I had met in Constantinople.

IV. THE GRAND VIZIER'S ASSASSINATION

(10) *To the Sultan's Adjutant General Zekki Pasha*

March 17, 1921

. . . On March 15 at 11.30 A.M., the exact day and hour of his death, I had an appointment with Talaat Pasha in the Hardenbergstrasse Hotel where he lived with Nazim Bey and other Young Turkish friends and refugees. As I drove past the Zoo, I saw a crowd gathered on the other side of the street. I did not stop because I was a few minutes late and did not want to keep Talaat waiting. . . . I stopped before Hardenbergstrasse No. 4 where he lived, hurried up the stairs, rang the bell, and while I was waiting I heard a woman weeping and moaning. The door opened. Nazim Bey was standing before me and said: "Praise Allah you are here! Help us get Talaat's body. He is lying on the stoop a few houses down the street, shot by an Armenian, and the police will not release his body until the Homicide Squad arrives. That will take several more hours."

I hurried with him to the scene of the murder, pushed through the crowds, showed my credentials to the police official and requested immediate possession of the body. But I was told the same thing Nazim Bey had been told, that we had to wait until the Homicide Squad arrived. I asked why such formalities were necessary in a case which was so obvious—the Armenian murderer had been arrested and already confessed—and which concerned the highest former official in allied Turkey, its Grand Vizier. The police official was sorry but said he could do nothing.

Finally I persuaded him to let one of his patrolmen come with me to the next house where there was a telephone . . . and from there I made the same request of the responsible bureau in Police Headquarters, emphasizing that the man lying in the street was, in a way, the "Turkish Bismarck" and our loyal ally in the war. Well, I finally got Police Headquarters to inform the patrolman standing

next to me that I should be permitted to transport Talaat's body to the Charlottenburg morgue immediately.

We hurried to the next police station, called a Red Cross ambulance and brought Talaat Pasha into the morgue amidst the other dead. The back of his head, which had been penetrated by the Armenian student's bullet from very close range, was completely shot away.

The Armenian will be brought to trial, but I fear, in view of the outspoken anti-Turkish attitude of the present foreign minister, Dr. Rosen (an old dragoman and, like all dragomans, pro-Arab and anti-Turkish), that the trial will be loaded with politics. He is so shortsighted that he takes delight in boasting that for all time to come he would see to it that Germany never would have anything to do with any Turkish friendship.

The trial was held in Berlin on June 2, 1921. Salomon Teilirian, the 24-year-old Armenian accused of the murder, described the scenes of terror in which his whole family and relatives were killed in 1915 in Erzincan and in which he was spared only by sheer chance. After the massacre, Teilirian went to Tiflis and Salonika and ended up in Paris and Berlin as a student. "Suddenly," he testified, "my mother's spirit appeared before me and said, 'Salomon, you know that Talaat is in the same city as you are, and yet you are completely indifferent about it. You are not my son!'"

At this point, counsel for the defendant interrupted him and said, ". . . So the idea of revenge took hold of Salomon, and there is no doubt that he saw in Talaat Pasha the man responsible for the fate of his family and people. The act of the accused did not spring from ignoble motives and, in my opinion, is humanly understandable."

Despite the prosecutor's noticeable sympathy, the presiding judge demanded punishment, but instead came the denial of guilt by the jury and acquittal.

It was not in vain that the foreign minister had seen to it "that Germany never would have anything to do with Turkish friendship."

That was in 1921.

In 1944 it is Turkey that will have nothing to do with German friendship.

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
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This is a general survey of the most cryptic nation of the world—Turkey. It is, more particularly, a vivid account of the period in which Turkey, the "sick man of Europe," began to heal: the period which produced the revolt of the Young Turks and the rise of Mustafa Kemal.

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